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ESSAY 
ASYMMETRIC CONSTITUTIONAL HARDBALL 
Joseph Fishkin* & David E. Pozen** 
Many have argued that the United States' two major political 
parties have experienced "asymmetric polarization" in recent decades: 
The Republican Party has moved significantly further to the right than 
the Democratic Party has moved to the left. The practice of consti-
tutiori:al hardball, this Essay argues, has followed a similar-and 
causally related-trajectory. Since at least the mid-1990s, Republican 
officeholders have been more likely than their Democratic counterparts 
to push the constitutional envelope, straining unwritten norms of gov-
ernance or disrupting established constitutional understandings. Both 
sides have done these things. But contrary to the apparent assumption 
of some legal scholars, they have not done so with the same frequency or 
intensity. 
After defining constitutional hardball and defending this de-
scriptive claim, this Essay offers several overlapping explanations. 
Asymmetric constitutional hardball grows out of historically conditioned 
differences between the parties' electoral coalitions, mediating insti-
tutions, views of government, and views of the Constitution itself The 
"restorationist" constitutional narratives and interpretive theories pro-
moted by Republican politicians and lawyers, the Essay suggests, serve 
to legitimate the party's use of constitutional hardball. 
Finally, and more tentatively, this Essay looks to the future. In 
reaction to President Trump, congressional Democrats have begun to 
play constitutional hardball more aggressively. Will they close the gap? 
Absent a fundamental political realignment, we submit that there are 
good structural and ideological reasons to expect the two parties to re-
vert to the asymmetric pattern of the past twenty-five years. If this pre-
diction is correct, it will have profound long-term implications both for 
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liberal constitutional politics and for the integrity and capacity of the 
American constitutional system. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Donald Trump recently became the first President since James 
Garfield in 1881 to take office with a vacant Supreme Court seat to fill. 1 
1. See Barry J. McMillion, Cong. Research Serv., INI0469, Supreme Court Vacancies 
that Arose During One Presidency and Were Filled During a Different Presidency 1 
(2016). Trump is the first President since Abraham Lincoln to take office with a Supreme 
Court vacancy that arose when the presidency was controlled by a different political party. 
Id. Not included in this accounting, because there was no actual vacancy on the Court, are 
the events following Chief Justice Earl Warren's announcement in June 1968 that he 
intended to retire upon confirmation of his successor. Outgoing President Lyndon 
Johnson nominated Associate Justice Abe Fortas to be the next Chief Justice. Republicans 
and conservative Dixiecrat Democrats successfully filibustered the nomination, defeating 
the key cloture vote on October l, 1968, after which Johnson withdrew the nomination. 
See Attempt to Stop Fortas Debate Fails by 14-Vote Margin, CQ Almanac 1968 (1969), 
http:/ /library.cqpress.com/ cqalmanac/ cqal68-1284316 [http:/ /perma.cc/J4YT-KVP6]. 
This episode is an interesting if imperfect precursor of the phenomenon this Essay 
will discuss. The political factions in 1968 did not match up neatly with the parties. And 
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Political struggle, as much as luck, produced this result. The vacancy 
arose more than eleven months prior to President Trump's inaugu-
ration. After President Obama submitted a "consensus nominee"2 on 
March 16, 2016, Senate Republicans refused to give the nominee a 
hearing. They resolved to block anyone selected by President Obama 
from filling the seat. They also suggested that more was to come. As 
election day approached, one prominent Republican Senator "pro-
mise [d]" that his Republican colleagues would likewise "be united 
against any Supreme Court nominee that Hillary Clinton, if she were 
president, would put up. "3 The arguably unprecedented blockade of the 
Merrick Garland nomination4 stands as a classic example of constitu-
tional hardball.5 
Fortas had minor ethics problems that became public in the months leading up to the 
cloture vote (his more serious ethics problems emerged later). Still, the use of a filibuster 
to stop a Supreme Court nomination was, at the time, unprecedented; observers specu-
lated that the motives of the key Republican Senator leading the charge against Fortas 
"were, at least, mixed, and that he really intended to save the nominations for GOP 
Presidential 'candidate Richard M. Nixon, if Nixon was elected." Id. That is what 
happened. After Nixon was elected, he chose Warren Burger to fill the seat, and Chief 
Justice Warren honored his stated intention to resign. 
2. Thomas Ferraro, Republican Would Back Garland for Supreme Court, Reuters 
(May 6, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-hatch-idUSTRE6456QY20l00506 
[http:/ /perma.cc/7YZD-BWN8] (quoting Republican Senator Orrin Hatch describing 
Judge Garland as "a consensus nominee" who would be confirmed with bipartisan sup-
port, "[n]o question" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
3. David A. Graham, What Happens if Republicans Refuse to Replace Justice Scalia?, 
Atlantic (Nov. 1, 2016), http:/ /www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/ll/whats-the-
opposite-of-court-packing/506081 [http:/ /perma.cc/GL2U-WBW] (quoting Senator 
John McCain); see also id. (noting that while Senator McCain "partially walked back his 
comments," other Republican Senators echoed and extended them), When Trump 
subsequently defeated Clinton, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell announced that 
"the American people simply will not tolerate" Democratic efforts to thwart President 
Trump's choice for the Court. Alexandra Jaffe, McConnell: Public "Will Not Tolerate" 
Dems Blocking SCOTUS Pick, NBC News (Jan. 4, 2017), http:/ /www.nbcnews.com/ 
politics/ congress/ mcconnell-public-will-not-tolerate-dems-blocking-scotus-pick-n 703301 
[http:/ /perma.cc/MU6E-TWPW]. 
4. See, e.g., Jon Huntsman & Joseph Lieberman, Opinion, Jon Huntsman and 
Joseph Lieberman: The Republican SCOTUS Blockade Is 'Not Acceptable,' Time (Mar. 
25, 2016), http://time.com/4271942/supreme-court-compromise (on file with the 
Columhia Law Review) ("There is no modern precedent for the blockade that Senate 
Republicans have put in place."). As Professors Robin Bradley Kar and Jason Mazzone 
have detailed, the Senate had never before "deliberately transfer[red] one President's 
Supreme Court appointment powers to an unknown successor" in the absence of "con-
temporaneous questions about the status of the nominating President as the most recently 
elected President." Robin Bradley Kar & Jason Mazzone, The Garland Affair: What History 
and the Constitution Really Say About President Obama's Powers to Appoint a Replacement 
for Justice Scalia, 91 N.Y.U. L. Rev. Online 53, 60 (2016). For a critical discussion of the 
choices made by Kar and Mazzone in construing the historical record, see Josh Chafetz, 
Unprecedented? Judicial Confirmation Battles and the Search for a Usable Past, 131 Harv. 
L. Rev. 96, 128--30 (2017). 
5. See infra Part I (discussing definitions of constitutional hardball). 
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The Democrats' response to this highly salient and consequential act 
of constitutional hardball was comparatively muted. President Obama 
did not choose to raise the stakes. He did not, for instance, threaten to 
install Judge Garland on the Court on a theory of implied or forfeited 
Senate consent, as some commentators urged as early as April 2016.6 Nor 
did he give Garland a recess appointment.7 Following President Trump's 
election, Senate Democrats, under heavy pressure from progressive 
groups,8 engaged in a bit of constitutional hardball of their own. They 
used the filibuster to block President Trump's nominee, then-:Judge Neil 
Gorsuch, for the seat Judge Garland had been denied.9 Senate Republicans 
swiftly responded by exercising the "nuclear option" to change cameral 
rules so that a Supreme Court nominee no longer needs more than a 
simple majority vote. 10 
In the rush of real-time narration, as history unfolds around us, it is 
easy to tell a story about this episode and others before it that emphasizes 
tit-for-tat mutual escalation and the constitutional hardball of both sides. 
Such stories, we submit, neglect the elephant in the room. For a quarter 
of a century, Republican officials have been more willing than Democratic 
officials to play constitutional hardball-not only or primarily on judicial 
nominations but across a range of spheres. Democrats have also availed 
themselves of hardball throughout this period, but not with the same 
frequency or intensity. This partisan gap is in some ways analogous to the 
phenomenon of "asymmetric polarization" that social scientists have 
documented.11 This Essay will suggest that the two phenomena are 
intertwined. 
6. See Gregory L. Diskant, Obama Can Appoint Merrick Garland to the Supreme 
Court if the Senate Does Nothing, Wash. Post (Apr. 8, 2016), http:/ /wapo.st/2gNmhkM 
[http:/ /perma.cc/E65J-RP6R]. 
7. See, e.g., David Dayen, Obama Can and Should Put Merrick Garland on the 
Supreme Court, New Republic (Nov. 16, 2016), http:/ /newrepublic.com/article/138787 / 
obama-can-put-merrick-garland-supreme-court (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(urging an intersession recess appointment). 
8. See David Weigel, Activists Celebrate Democrats' Push to Filibuster Gorsuch, 
Wash. Post (Apr. 4, 2017), http:/ /wapo.st/2o7aily?tid=ss [http:/ /perma.cc/BF2Z-QWD6]. 
9. See Chafetz, supra note 4, at 108-09 (reviewing these events). 
10. See id. at 109. Neither of these moves was entirely novel. Although filibusters of 
Supreme Court nominations have been exceedingly rare, the tactic was successfully 
pioneered by Senate Republicans in the Fortas affair. See supra note 1. The use of the 
"nuclear option" to overcome the Gorsuch filibuster has a more recent precedent in 
Democratic Senators' use of this method, in 2013, to remove the filibuster for non-
Supreme Court nominations. See infra note 84 and accompanying text. 
11. See Nolan McCarty, What We Know and Don't Know About Our Polarized 
Politics, Wash. Post: Monkey Cage Uan. 8, 2014), http:/ /wapo.st/lifmRzK [http:// 
perma.cc/3N3B-JKB2] ("The evidence points to a major partisan asymmetry in polar-
ization. Despite the widespread belief that both parties have moved to the extremes, the 
movement of the Republican Party to the right accounts for most of the divergence 
between the two parties [since the 1970s]."). As we discuss below, asymmetric consti-
tutional hardball is not simply an epiphenomenon of asymmetric polarization, although 
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The small-c constitution12 now finds itself at a crossroads. As the fili-
buster of Justice Gorsuch demonstrates, we are at a liminal moment in 
political time, in which Democratic Party leaders are showing a new 
appetite for playing constitutional hardball in response to President 
Trump. Will they close the hardball gap with their Republican coun-
terparts in the months and years ahead? And would it be a good thing if 
they did? 
The answer to such questions may be clouded temporarily by the 
political and constitutional turmoil wrought by the Trump Administration, 
which has put some unusual cross-pressures on congressional Republicans. 
We hazard no guess here about when a post-Trump political order will 
arrive or exactly what shape it will take. But our account of recent 
constitutional history leads us to offer one important prediction. Barring 
a fundamental realignment in the party system, we believe the now-
familiar pattern of asymmetric constitutional hardball is likely to con-
tinue for the foreseeable future: While Democrats may well become 
more aggressive practitioners of constitutional hardball, 13 they will not 
keep pace with Republicans-and this partisan difference will continue 
to be a pivotal feature of American constitutional government. 
This might seem like a reckless prediction to make at a moment when 
so much is in flux. But this Essay will document a number of longer-term 
the latter is almost certainly one of the former's causes. See infra notes 101-104, 177-180 
and accompanying text. 
12. See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1457, 1459 (2001) (noting the distinction between "the small-'c' constitution-the 
fundamental political institutions of a society, or the constitution in practice-and the 
document itself'). The small-c constitution is often associated with "unwritten" norms of 
politics and governance. Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from 
Congressional Practice, 61 Stan. L. Rev. 573, 574 (2008). 
13. In January 2018, Senate Democrats took the once-unthinkable (for Democrats) 
step of shutting down the government in a bid to prompt legislative action on the 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program that the Trump Administration had 
announced it would end. Yet to the dismay of their activist base, the Democrats "collapsed 
and accepted the Republican terms for reopening the government" within three days. 
Newt Gingrich, Opinion, Newt Gingrich: Schumer Shutdown Tums into Schumer 
Surrender, Fox News (Jan. 24, 2018), http:/ /www.foxnews.com/opinion/2018/01/24/ 
newt-gingrich-schumer-shutdown-turns-into-schumer-surrender.html ( on file with the 
Columbia Law Review); see also Tim Murphy, Liberal Activists Are Furious that Democrats 
"Caved" on the Shutdown, Mother Jones (Jan. 22, 2018), http:/ /www.motherjones.com/ 
politics/2018/01/liberal-activists-are-furious-that-<lemocrats-caved-0n-the-shutdown [http:// 
perma.cc/XTUS-PHAQ] (describing activists' criticisms of "weak-kneed" Democrats for 
"caving" rather than maintaining the shutdown (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Nicky Woolf, The Democrats Ended the US Government Shutdown-but at What Price?, 
New Statesman (Jan. 23, 2018), http:/ /www.newstatesman.com/2018/01/democrats-us-
govemment-shutdown-republicans-state-spending-bill [http://perma.cc/ 4 T5T-PXT2] ( con-
trasting the January 2018 shutdown with the shutdowns forced by Republicans in 1995 and 
2013 and concluding that "Democrats have demonstrated that they don't have the sto-
mach for that kind of brinkmanship"). 
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dynamics that seem poised to perpetuate the divide. 14 To come to grips 
with the constitutional period the country has just lived through, and 
also with the new one it may be entering, we need to understand better 
both the causes and the consequences of asymmetric constitutional 
hardball. 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL HARDBALL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 
Professor Mark Tushnet has defined constitutional hardball as "po-
litical claims and practices ... that are without much question within the 
bounds of existing constitutional doctrine and practice but that are 
nonetheless in some tension with existing pre-constitutional understand-
ings. "15 Constitutional hardball tactics are viewed by the other side as 
provocative and unfair because they flout "the 'go without saying' as-
sumptions that underpin working systems of constitutional govemment." 16 
Such tactics do not generally flout binding legal norms. But that only 
heightens the sense of foul play insofar as it insulates acts of hardball 
from judicial review. 
Although Tushnet allows for the possibility of judicial constitutional 
hardball,17 his account focuses on legislative and executive actors, and 
the most straightforward cases of hardball often occur in legislatures. 
Legislative bodies teem with rules and norms, not expressly required by 
constitution or statute, that govern the interactions among political blocs 
within the institution. Tushnet's original examples of constitutional hard-
ball include the impeachment of President Clinton, the 2002-to-2003 
Democratic filibusters of judicial nominations by President Bush, and the 
2003 efforts of Republican representatives in Colorado and Texas to push 
through mid-decade redistricting plans. 18 The recent blockade of Judge 
Garland fits Tushnet's model nicely, as there is a longstanding custom, 
14. See infra Part III. 
15. Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. Marshall L. Rev. 523, 523 (2004) 
[hereinafter Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball]. 
16. Id. at 523 n.2; see also Mark Tushnet, 1937 Redux? Reflections on Constitutional 
Development and Political Structures, 14 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 1103, 1108 (2012) 
[hereinafter Tushnet, 1937 Redux] (describing constitutional hardball as "the develop-
ment of practices that violate previously well-understood and accepted ways in which mem-
bers of political parties who disagreed on matters of policy conducted their debates-and 
fights--over policy development"). 
17. Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 15, at 537-38. 
18. See id. at 524-28; cf. Lawrence Wright, America's Future Is Texas, New Yorker 
(July 10, 2017), http:/ /www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017 /07 /10/americas-future-is-
texas (on file with the Columhia Law Review) (stating that Texas's 2003 "redistricting pro-
cess has since been replicated in statehouses around the country, creating congressional 
districts that are practically immune to challenge and giving Republicans an impregnable 
edge in Washington"). 
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but no clear-cut legal obligation, that the Senate provides timely advice 
and consent on Supreme Court nominations. 19 
In what sense are these examples of constitutional hardball, rather 
than simply political hardball? We believe that the use of "forceful 
uncompromising methods"20 by government actors can qualify as 
constitutional hardball in one of two basic ways. The first involves what 
some call constitutional conventions.21 Constitutional conventions are 
"unwritten norms of government practice" that emerge in a decen-
tralized fashion and "are regularly followed out of a sense of obligation 
but are not directly enforceable in court. "22 Whatever explains their 
existence, constitutional conventions may foster consistency, coordi-
nation, and comity in governance by prescribing "the way in which legal 
powers shall be exercised" by high-level officials. 23 They fill in the gaps of 
adjudicated structural constitutional law.24 
A political maneuver can amount to constitutional hardball when it 
violates or strains constitutional conventions for partisan ends. 25 In other 
19. See Kar & Mazzone, supra note 4, at 5~2. 
20. Hardball, Merriam-Webster, http:/ /www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/ 
hardball [http://perma.cc/9DT8-HREZ] (last visited Jan. 18, 2017); see also Hardball, 
Oxford Dictionaries, http://en.oxforddictionaries.com/ definition/hardball [http:// 
perma.cc/3ULJ-YWPY] (last visited Feb. 15, 2017) (defining hardball as "[u]ncompro-
mising and ruthless methods or dealings"); Hardball, Urban Dictionary, http:/ /www. 
urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=hardball [http:/ /perma.cc/R5UU-MPRF] (last 
visited Feb. 15, 2017) (defining hardball as "playing any kind of game, including real life, 
in the toughest possible way but without breaking the law"). 
21. This is an extension of Tushnet's account; Tushnet himself suggests this move in 
passing. See Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 15, at 523 n.2. 
22. David E. Pozen, Constitutional Bad Faith, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 885, 930 (2016) 
[hereinafter Pozen, Bad Faith]. More formally, constitutional conventions "(1) are norms 
of domestic governmental behavior (2) that emerge from decentralized processes, (3) are 
regularly followed ( 4) out of a sense of obligation, and (5) are not directly enforceable in 
court but rather (6) are enforced by political sanctions, if not also by 'the internalized sanc-
tions of conscience.'" David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 Yale 
LJ. 2, 29 (2014) [hereinafter Pozen, Self-Help] (quoting Adrian Vermeule, Conventions 
of Agency Independence, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 1163, 1182 (2013)). Less formally, they are 
rules of the policy game that the players themselves have developed over time, the breach 
of which triggers disapproval. 
23. Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada 17 (3d ed. 1992). 
24. See Pozen, Self-Help, supra note 22, at 33 ("Conventions help to organize public 
life in ... the vast domain in which the [constitutional] text underdetermines outcomes. 
They help to shape a normative order in which representative politics is transacted." 
(footnote omitted)). Following a path laid by Commonwealth theorists, American scholars 
have increasingly begun to explore the role of constitutional conventions in our domestic 
system. See id. at 32-33. 
25. By partisan ends, we mean the collective goals or objectives of one side in a poli-
tical conflict. Often, the two sides in such conflicts will be identified with the two major 
political parties. But not always: A bipartisan coalition of senators, for example, could play 
constitutional hardball versus the President in order to advance the institutional interests 
of their branch or chamber. 
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words, if all forms of hardball are marked by "questionable, qualm-
producing means,"26 when the means are seen as questionable and 
qualm-producing because they disrupt an especially respected or resilient 
interbranch or interparty practice, now we are talking about consti-
tutional hardball. Uncompromising methods that do not disrupt the 
"machinery of government, "27 by contrast, lack this small-c constitutional 
dimension. Although necessarily fuzzy at the edges, this formulation 
clarifies the ambiguous phrase "pre-constitutional understandings" in 
Tushnet's definition. This formulation also highlights something distinc-
tively constitutional about constitutional hardball tactics: They put pressure 
on the "norms of good institutional citizenship" that help to structure 
and "sustain the constitutional system."28 
Given that constitutional conventions are thought to serve this sys-
temic function, acts of hardball that subvert them are experienced by 
officials and observers on the other side as breaches of "constitutional 
morality, "29 not merely as breaches of political etiquette. When the 
Republican-controlled Congress shut down the executive branch in 1995 
and 1996 to gain leverage over President Clinton in budget negotiations, 
or when Senate Democrats started holding pro forma "gavel-in, gavel-
out" sessions in 2007 to block President Bush's recess appointments, 
We include practices that violate or strain conventions on account of the possibility 
that participants in these conflicts "may not view their actions as a change in existing 
conventions at all, but rather as the best interpretation of existing conventions with re-
spect to a question that has never been clearly decided, or an issue that has never arisen 
before in precisely the same way." Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Hardball and Constitutional 
Crises, 26 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 579, 585 (2008) [hereinafter Balkin, Constitutional Hardball 
and Constitutional Crises]. Thus, some have suggested that Senate Republicans' refusal to 
consider the Garland nomination was within the bounds of convention, given that (among 
other things) the Senate had previously stonewalled many lower court nominees and exe-
cutive branch nominees. See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, Why the Senate Doesn't Have to 
Act on Merrick Garland's Nomination, Atlantic (May 15, 2016), http://www. 
the a tlan tic. com/politics/ archive/ 2016 / 05 / sen a te-o bama-merrick-gar land-supreme-
court-nominee / 482733 [http:/ /perma.cc/GT8H-RR96]. As with all historically informed 
inquiries, the patterns of behavior said to give rise to conventions can be described at 
different levels of generality. For a detailed discussion of the malleability of claims of "un-
precedentedness" in the judicial nominations context, see Chafetz, supra note 4. 
26. William A. Galston, The Obligation to Play Political Hardball, Phil. & Pub. Pol'y 
Q., Winter 1989, at 6, 6. 
27. Jon Elster, Unwritten Constitutional Norms 21 (undated) (unpublished 
manuscript) [http:/ /perma.cc/YPN8-764G] ("With virtually no exception, [constitutional 
conventions] regulate ... the 'machinery of government', that is, the relation between the 
main branches of government, their prerogatives, and the limitations on their powers."). 
28. Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, 
and the Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 Geo. LJ. 255, 266 (2017) (discussing con-
stitutional conventions). On account of the textual thinness and old age of the Founders' 
Constitution, the difficulty of formal amendment, and judicial reticence to intervene in 
legislative-executive disputes, it is plausible to think that conventions play an especially 
important role in the American constitutional system. 
29. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the 
Study of the Law of the Constitution 346 (3d ed. 1889)). 
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many believed these tactics were legally permissible yet nevertheless con-
stitutionally worrisome in some deep sense.30 Both tactics are fairly 
classed as constitutional hardball because both violated or strained con-
stitutional conventions for partisan ends. 
The second way in which a political maneuver can amount to 
constitutional hardball is more direct: if it is reasonably viewed by the 
other side as attempting to shift settled understandings of the Constitution in an 
unusually aggressive or self-entrenching manner. Put differently, consti-
tutional hardball can involve efforts to change big-C constitutional law 
that are themselves seen as violations of small-c constitutional norms 
regarding how such changes may legitimately be made. This category, 
too, is necessarily fuzzy around the edges. At any given time, a variety of 
actors may be trying to nudge constitutional interpretations and con-
structions in their preferred direction through a variety of means, such as 
bringing strategic lawsuits or introducing legislation that tests existing 
legal boundaries. These are standard moves in our constitutional politics 
and, without more, they are not constitutional hardball.31 But sometimes, 
one side tries to do something bolder: to take a substantive position that 
was up until that moment "off the wall" 32 and turn it into constitutional 
law in a more abrupt and self-serving fashion, without the extended 
period of public argumentation and mobilization and the incremental 
advances that typically enable such transformations. In such a situation, 
members of the other side are apt to protest that their adversaries have 
pressed some handy institutional advantage-such as five votes on the 
Supreme Court or control of the executive branch-to rewrite the con-
stitutional rules in their favor. 
30. On the convention-straining nature of the government shutdowns, see Peter 
M. Shane, When Inter-Branch Norms Break Down: Of Arms-for-Hostages, "Orderly 
Shutdowns," Presidential Impeachments, and Judicial "Coups," 12 Cornell J.L. & Pub. 
Pol'y 503, 516-21 (2003) [hereinafter Shane, Inter-Branch Norms]. On the convention-
straining nature of the pro forma sessions, see Alexander M. Wolf, Note, Taking Back 
What's Theirs: The Recess Appointments Clause, Pro Forma Sessions, and a Political Tug-
of-War, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 2055, 2067-68 (2013). 
31. Tushnet suggests that political actors play constitutional hardball when they 
"propose legislation that pushes the envelope of existing constitutional doctrine." 
Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 15, at 535. Without some element of ruth-
lessness or foul play, however, this suggestion threatens to divorce constitutional hardball 
from ordinary understandings of hardball. It also seems to be in tension with Tushnet's 
own definition of constitutional hardball as practices that "are without much question 
within the bounds of'-rather than pushing the envelope of-"existing constitutional 
doctrine." Id. at 523. 
32. See Jack M. Balkin, From Off the Wall to On the Wall: How the Mandate 
Challenge Went Mainstream, Atlantic Qune 4, 2012), http:/ /www.theatlantic.com/ 
national/archive/2012/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-mandate-challenge-
went-mainstream/258040 [http:/ /perma.cc/T449-4S97] [hereinafter Balkin, Mandate 
Challenge] ("Off-the-wall arguments are those most well-trained lawyers think are clearly 
wrong .... "). 
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Many liberals viewed the early litigation against the Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) as an instance of constitutional hardball not because there 
was anything unusual or untoward about the formal tactic involved (fil-
ing a lawsuit), but rather because the litigation aimed to destroy the Act 
by creating an activity-inactivity distinction that they saw as having no 
basis in modern Commerce Clause doctrine.33 The embrace of this 
formerly off-the-wall argument by conservative litigants and judges, from 
the liberals' perspective, represented an exercise of raw partisan power to 
change constitutional law. Many liberals saw the Supreme Court's 
reliance on a novel, case-specific theory of equal protection in Bush v. 
Gore34 in similar terms. 35 For their part, many conservatives characterized 
various initiatives of the Obama Administration that were not clearly re-
viewable in court when they were undertaken-most notably, its "de-
ferred action" programs for millions of unlawfully present immigrants-
as constitutional hardball of this sort. Instead of waiting for a legislative 
overhaul, the Administration's programs enacted what critics argued was 
an unprecedented expansion of executive enforcement discretion. 36 It is 
this sense of a radical, and opportunistic, departure from shared 
33. See, e.g.,John T. Valauri, Federalism, Mandates and Individual Liberty, 43 N. Ky. 
L. Rev. 175, 178 (2016) (" [M]andate defenders point out that the activity/inactivity 
distinction is a novelty without foundation or support in constitutional text or prece-
dent."); Balkin, Mandate Challenge, supra note 32 ("Three years ago, the idea that the 
Act's mandate to purchase health insurance might be unconstitutional was, in the view of 
most legal professionals and academics, simply crazy."). 
34. 531 U.S. 98, 109 (2000) ("Our consideration is limited to the present circum-
stances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many 
complexities."). 
35. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and 
Politics, llOYale LJ. 1407, 1431 (2001) (describing as "inescapable" the suspicion that the 
Court's equal protection argument was "a makeweight designed primarily to stop the re-
counts"); cf. Michael]. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History, 
89 Calif. L. Rev. 1721, 1730 (2001) ("The Court's equal protection rationale was so novel 
and far-fetched that Bush's lawyers came exceedingly close to not even bothering to raise 
it."). 
36. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Lawless: The Obama Administration's 
Unprecedented Assault on the Constitution and the Rule of Law 141 (2015) [hereinafter 
Bernstein, Lawless] ("Even if one concludes that there is at least a plausible legal defense 
of Obama's immigration unilateralism, no president had ever used the discretion provided 
by immigration laws and inherent to his office simply to evade congressional 
opposition ... , nor to extend de facto legal status to so many people."); Peter H. Schuck, 
Opinion, Why Con·gress Can Impeach Obama, N.Y. Times (Nov. 21, 2014), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2014/ 11 /22/ opinion/ the-impeachment-of-obama-on-immigration-
may-be-legal-but-its-wrong.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing against 
conservative calls for impeachment over the issue, but contending that "granting legal 
status and work permits to millions of people most likely exceeds [the President's] discre-
tion" and that "no one, including Congress, has legal standing to challenge his order in 
court"). Depending on how exactly this objection is framed, it may imply a breach of con-
stitutional convention, an attempt to shift the substantive principles governing the consti-
tutional order, or both. 
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constitutional understandings that defines this second variant of consti-
tutional hardball. 
What connects these two forms of hardball-tactics that defy 
constitutional conventions and efforts to achieve especially aggressive or 
self-entrenching forms of constitutional change-is that they break the 
perceived rules of normal constitutional politics. They may reflect a 
sincerely held, long-term vision of a good constitutional order, as with 
libertarian arguments for the activity-inactivity distinction. Or they may 
seek a one-time victory with a powerful political effect, as with the equal 
protection argument in Bush v. Gore. 37 Either way, these maneuvers elicit 
in their opponents a feeling that constitutional institutions or ideas have 
been instrumentalized for partisan gain, that there has been a process 
breakdown, that they have "been had." Recognizing such behaviors as 
constitutional hardball is not to deny their fundamentally political char-
acter, but rather to illuminate the nature of the stakes and the norms 
involved. And recognizing such behaviors as hardball is not to suggest 
they are inherently bad. While all acts of constitutional hardball create 
systemic risks, as Part III will discuss,38 specific acts may be justified for a 
variety of contextual normative reasons; sound political judgment might 
even require that certain types of hardball be played in certain situations.39 
Many Beltway behaviors are contentious or obnoxious without being 
constitutional hardball. Rhetorical attacks on the other side will rarely 
disrupt the machinery of government or effect dramatic constitutional 
change.40 So too with most policy proposals and programs. The Obama 
Administration's national security surveillance activities, for example, cer-
tainly became controversial, and some of them may have even been un-
lawful. But they did not generate charges of unfair dealing or upend the 
rules of the policy game. 
37. Cf. Balkin, Constitutional Hardball and Constitutional Crises, supra note 25, at 
584 (" [Pl olitical actors might play constitutional hardball for two reasons. First, they want 
to establish that the Constitution means one thing rather than another. Second, they want 
to stay in power and keep those who agree with them in power as long as possible."). 
38. See infra notes 197-199 and accompanying text. We return to this theme in the 
Conclusion. 
39. See Galston, supra note 26, at 6--8; cf. Thomas Nagel, Ruthlessness in Public Life, 
in Mortal Questions 75, 82 (1979) (proposing that the "moral impersonality of public 
action ... warrants methods usually excluded for private individuals, and sometimes it 
licenses ruthlessness"). Theorizing the conditions under which constitutional hardball is 
justified as a matter of political or constitutional morality is an important task, but one that 
would require another, very different sort of paper. 
40. But cf. Dylan Matthews, I Asked 8 Experts if We're in a Constitutional Crisis. 
Here's What They Said., Vox (Feb. 13, 2017), http:/ /www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/ 
2017 /2/13/14541974/ constitutional-crisis-experts-unanimous [http:/ /perma.cc/6VZJ-
P4EV] (quoting Tushnet as saying that "rhetoric can count as a form of constitutional 
hardball" when "inconsistent with settled ways of doing things" (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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Although our definition for the most part builds on and refines 
Tushnet's, it differs from his in that it does not limit constitutional hard-
ball to periods of large-scale constitutional transformation.41 While con-
stitutional hardball may be more likely to occur "when one side sees an 
opportunity to shift the constitutional order," we agree with Professor 
Jack Balkin that the phenomenon is more general.42 In any event, Tushnet 
maintains that the United States has been undergoing an "extended per-
iod of constitutional transformation" since around 1980,43 and no one 
seems to deny that we have been living with substantial amounts of con-
stitutional hardball for decades now. At this point, it is the only world our 
politicians know. 
IL PARTISAN PATTERNS (AND PERCEPTIONS) OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL HARDBALL 
Because acts of constitutional hardball are seen as provocative and 
high-stakes, they tend to invite a response. Often this response involves 
another act of constitutional hardball. And just as in the schoolyard, the 
question of who started it arises and becomes part of the dispute itself. 
Typically, Tushnet writes, "each side contends that the other breached 
the relevant implicit understandings"--or constitutional conventions-
"first. "44 "The prior breach then is said to have destroyed the implicit 
understandings already, thereby taking the sting out of the charge that 
one is breaching taken-for-granted norms."45 
In his account of this dynamic, Tushnet seems to suggest that a 
rough sort of symmetry, or parity, characterizes the partisan practice of 
constitutional hardball. Whichever side resorts to hardball, the other side 
will follow suit in a predictable sequence of tit-for-tat.46 Following 
Tushnet, other legal scholars have suggested the same.47 We agree that 
41. See Mark Tushnet, Response, 26 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 727, 732 (2008) ("For me, 
constitutional hardball is-definitionally-a transitional phenomenon that occurs when 
one side sees an opportunity to shift the constitutional order .... "). 
42. See Balkin, Constitutional Hardball and Constitutional Crises, supra note 25, at 
586-90. 
43. Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 15, at 549. 
44. Tushnet, 1937 Redux, supra note 16, at 1109. 
45. Id. 
46. See Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 15, at 524 n.4 ("The structure 
of my argument ... strongly suggests that when one side starts to play constitutional hard-
ball, the other side will join in."); see also Balkin, Constitutional Hardball and 
Constitutional Crises, supra note 25, at 581 ("As soon as one side begins to play consti-
tutional hardball, the other usually will quickly follow with a defensive version .... "). 
47. See, e.g., Michael Greve, Our Polarized, Presidential Federalism, in Parchment 
Barriers: Political Polarization and the Limits of Constitutional Order (Zachary C. Courser 
et al. eds., forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 3), http:/ /ssm.com/abstract=2885932 (on 
file with the Columbia Law Review) (stating that partisan polarization has generated "'con-
stitutional hardball' on all sides" offederalism debates); Bruce G. Peabody, The Twice and 
Future President Revisited: Of Three-Term Presidents and Constitutional End Runs, 101 
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constitutional hardball lends itself to retaliation and escalation-and that 
both Democratic and Republican officeholders engage in it to some 
substantial extent. 
Yet even if constitutional hardball is by nature reciprocal, it none-
theless remains possible that one side may play hardball more frequently 
or intensively than the other side over a sustained period of time. This is 
what we submit has happened for the past quarter century or so, since 
roughly the Gingrich Revolution48 of the mid-1990s.49 Constitutional 
hardball remains reciprocal but not symmetrical. One party, the Republican 
Party, has become especially identified with hardball tactics during this 
period, with large consequences for our constitutional system. 
A. Methodologi,cal Challenges 
We acknowledge at the outset that studying this potential asymmetry 
poses a considerable challenge. Because of the reciprocal character of 
constitutional hardball and the open texture of constitutional norms, 
both sides will frequently have a nonfrivolous claim to be responding to a 
transgression or provocation by the other side. And given the partisan 
overlay, perceptions among Democrats that Republicans play more 
Minn. L. Rev. Headnotes 121, 154 (2016), http:/ /www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/ll/Peabody-2.pdf [http:/ /perma.cc/6SHY-XZJM] (discussing 
"the ascension of ... 'constitutional hardball'" and its possible use by" [f]uture partisans," 
without reference to party affiliation); cf. Matt Grossmann & David A Hopkins, Ideological 
Republicans and Group Interest Democrats: The Asymmetry of American Party Politics, 13 
Persp. on Pol. 119, 120 (2015) [hereinafter Grossmann & Hopkins, Asymmetry of 
American Party Politics] ("Most theories of American political parties are designed to 
apply equally to Democrats and Republicans without recognition of party asymmetry."). A 
notable exception in the legal literature is Professor David Fontana, who suggests in a 
recent essay that the Obama Administration's "mostly ... cooperative" approach to jud-
icial nominations contrasts with the "more aggressive political strategies" of prior Republican 
administrations, leading to "asymmetric usage of 'constitutional hardball"' in that field. 
David Fontana, Cooperative Judicial Nominations During the Obama Administration, 
2017 Wis. L. Rev. 305, 307-08. 
48. Led by Newt Gingrich, the Republican Party took back control of the House of 
Representatives for the first time in more than thirty years following the 1994 midterm 
elections. See generally Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, It's Even Worse than It 
Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of 
Extremism 31-43 (paperback ed. 2016) (reviewing Gingrich's confrontational tactics and 
their legacy). In a recent blog post that offers a relatively symmetrical account of consti-
tutional hardball in Senate circuit court confirmations, Professor Keith Whittington none-
theless identifies an escalation in the late 1990s so significant that he divides his data into 
two periods, "Pre- and Post-Lewinsky." Keith E. Whittington, Partisanship, Norms and 
Federal Judicial Appointments, Balk.inization (Nov. 29, 2017), http:/ /balkin.blogspot.com/ 
2017 /11/partisanship-norms-and-federal:judicial.html [http:/ /perma.cc/2ZL3-NZXM]. 
49. An alternative starting point for the period explored in this Essay might be the 
Reagan Revolution at the tum of the 1980s. See Peter M. Shane, Madison's Nightmare: 
How Executive Power Threatens American Democracy 119 (2009) (cataloging a long list 
of "right-wing norm-breaking initiatives" since 1981 and suggesting that they can be traced 
to Republicans' suspicion of "pre-Reagan institutional norms of governance"). 
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constitutional hardball, or harder hardball, are almost inevitably going to 
be colored by "partyism, "50 confirmation bias, myside bias, or the like. 
The same goes for us. Like Tushnet, we are keenly aware that our own 
political location may make us "more attuned to examples of hardball 
practices [we] see on the right." 51 
Further complicating matters, the structure of constitutional 
hardball itself confounds objective measurement. By definition, consti-
tutional hardball consists of counter-conventional behaviors and efforts 
at constitutional change that may take any number of forms across any 
number of institutional and substantive domains-and that are therefore 
hard to count and compare. An interpretive judgment is always required 
to establish that a political maneuver amounts to constitutional hardball, 
because one must first determine what the relevant constitutional 
traditions and settled understandings are, at what level of generality to 
assess the historical record, and whether and to what extent the 
maneuver deviates from them. These judgments as to what is conven-
tional or unconventional, norm-abiding or norm-defying, are to some 
extent endogenous to constitutional practice. There is no Archimedean 
point from which we, as observers of politics, can stand outside politics 
and be completely confident in the accuracy of our assessments. 
In light of these challenges, one might be tempted to conclude that 
it is simply impossible to investigate the symmetry or asymmetry of con-
stitutional hardball in a credible or useful manner, at least beyond 
certain discrete patches of government activity.52 We think this conclu-
sion cannot be right. For one thing, it proves too much. Many different 
public law practices have long been inflected with partisanship. It would 
be perverse to exempt some or all of them from scholarly inquiry on that 
basis. Moreover, the phenomenon of asymmetric constitutional hard-
ball-if it exists-would be an extremely significant feature of American 
constitutional politics, with potential causes and effects too important for 
constitutional theorists to ignore. 
Given its inherently contested and shape-shifting nature, we know of 
no good way to reduce the overall practice of constitutional hardball to a 
50. See Cass R. Sunstein, Partyism, 2015 U. Chi. Legal F. 1, 1-8 (defining partyism as 
hostility "to the opposing party and willing[ness] to believe that its members have a host of 
bad characteristics" and reviewing evidence of implicit and explicit cross-party bias). 
51. Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 15, at 524 n.4. 
52. Thus, Professor Josh Chafetz suggests in a new essay on the Garland-Gorsuch 
imbroglio that claims that the other side has acted in an "unprecedented" manner ought 
to be taken with a grain of salt in the judicial nominations context, as such claims have 
long been a standard move in political argument. See generally Chafetz, supra note 4. The 
strongest version of Chafetz's thesis would hold that there is no way to say objectively, or 
even somewhat objectively, whether one side is playing more hardball than the other. We 
resist this hyper-relativist version of Chafetz's argument-as well he might, too. But we 
agree with Chafetz that it is important to maintain a skeptical stance toward one's own in-
tuitive assessments of these matters, as his essay underscores. 
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numerical scale, no scientific test to measure or code it.53 And we suspect 
that such scales and tests, if devised, would be vulnerable to the biases 
and value choices of the politically aware humans who create them. In an 
exploratory Essay like this, we believe it is appropriate to take a more 
encompassing, qualitative approach. As a first cut, our basic strategy is to 
scour the legal, political science, and popular literatures on constitu-
tional conflict in the political branches; to identify behaviors that 
plausibly satisfy the definition of constitutional hardball given in Part I; 
and to relate these examples to the growing bodies of research on 
partisan polarization, party organization, and the Constitution outside 
the courts. There are a number of specific domains of constitutional 
hardball (such as debt ceiling brinkmanship and restrictions on voting) 
within which the Republican-Democratic discrepancy seems plain, other 
domains (such as Senate obstruction of circuit court nominations) where 
the balance is more even. Taken together, however, the evidence suggests 
that constitutional hardball has been plausibly asymmetric for a quarter 
century. Laying out this evidence is the work of the rest of this Part. 
B. Motivating Observations 
What leads us to suspect that constitutional hardball has become 
asymmetric? The next section and Part III will consider numerous forms 
of indirect evidence. But the most immediate reason for suspecting as 
much is this: The recent historical record appears to contain more, and 
more distinctive, examples of constitutional hardball on the Republican 
side. Meanwhile, a perception of partisan asymmetry has emerged.54 While 
this would be notable regardless of the reality, the perception has an 
empirical basis. 
Our focus here is on the period from the mid-l 990s through the end 
of the Obama Administration. Republicans and Democrats both con-
trolled the presidency and each house of Congress for parts of this per-
iod. Partisan conflict was a near-constant, and President Trump had not 
yet brought his openly norm-shattering approach to the White House. 
There is no obvious a priori reason why one side would have become 
more identified with constitutional hardball than the other. 
53. This is not to say that constitutional hardball could not be measured more 
rigorously than we have attempted in this Essay. Systematic discourse analysis, for example, 
could be used to determine the partisan distribution of "hardball" allegations and hard-
ball-equivalent allegations. Surveys and interviews might be used to gauge the views of 
Washington insiders. At least some familiar categories of hardball tactics, such as minor-
itarian blocking and delaying tactics in the Senate, may be subject to certain forms of 
aggregation and quantification. See, e.g., infra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing 
the increased use of the filibuster during the Obama presidency). If it is plausible that con-
stitutional hardball has become asymmetric along partisan lines, then such empirical ef-
forts may well be warranted, notwithstanding their evident limitations. 
54. See infra notes 89-95 and accompanying text. 
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And yet that is what happened. The literature on constitutional con-
flict in the political branches has identified an impressive array of exam-
ples from this period that arguably qualify as constitutional hardball on 
the Republican side. A partial catalog from the pre-Obama years55 might 
include the government shutdowns of 1995 and 1996;56 Newt Gingrich's 
efforts in that same Congress to consolidate power in the Speaker's office 
and "dismantle" congressional institutions with professional staff;57 the 
impeachment of President Clinton in 1998;58 the 1,052 subpoenas issued 
by Dan Burton, then-Chair of the House Oversight and Government 
Reform Committee, to the Clinton Administration and other Democratic 
targets from 1997 to 2002;59 a range of techniques used in Florida to 
55. This catalog is focused on the actions of federal government officials. Given that 
(i) the two parties have also become increasingly ideologically cohesive and polarized 
throughout the fifty states, see Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1077, 108tH37 (2014), that (ii) state and federal politicians from the same party have 
increasingly collaborated around shared agendas, see id. at 1089, and that (iii) Republican 
state legislators on the whole have "clearly" been "polarizing faster than Democrats" over 
the past two decades, Boris Shor, Asymmetric Polarization in the State Legislatures? Yes 
and No, Measuring Am. Legislatures Quly 29, 2013), http:/ /americanlegislatures.com/ 
2013/07/29 / partisan-polarization-in-state-legislatures [http:/ /perma.cc/ 4DFT-LZNX]; 
but cf. id. (noting "lots of differences across states"), we expect that most of our claims 
about asymmetric constitutional hardball are likely to hold at the subfederal level as well. 
A sustained analysis of state-level constitutional hardball is beyond the scope of this Essay, 
however. For a prominent recent example of the phenomenon, see Jedediah Purdy, North 
Carolina's Partisan Crisis, New Yorker (Dec. 20, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/ 
news-desk/north-carolinas-partisan-crisis [http:/ /perma.cc/RA2T-675WJ (discussing a 
variety of tactics used by North Carolina Republicans, including secretive legislative ses-
sions and new limits on the governor's appointment powers, "intended to maximize par-
tisan advantage ... by pressing or breaking norms"). 
56. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
57. Bruce Bartlett, Gingrich and the Destruction of Congressional Expertise, N.Y. 
Times: Economix (Nov. 29, 2011), http:/ /economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/29/ 
gingrich-and-the-destruction-of-congressional-expertise ( on file with the Columbia Law 
Review). Gingrich's approach to the speakership was subsequently reinforced by his 
successors' use of the so-called Hastert Rule, the principle that Republican Speakers will 
only bring up a bill for a floor vote if a majority of their caucus supports it. See Holly 
Fechner, Managing Political Polarization in Congress: A Case Study on the Use of the 
Hastert Rule, 2014 Utah L. Rev. 757, 764-66. 
58. See supra note 18 and accompanying text; see also Shane, Inter-Branch Norms, 
supra note 30, at 525 (describing the Clinton impeachment as "an inexcusable assault on 
inter-branch norms"). 
59. See Henry Waxman with Joshua Green, The Waxman Report: How Congress 
Really Works 148-51 (2009) (recounting this "notorious" history); Alex Slater & Calvin 
Harris, Darrell Issa, the Man Who Would Be Nemesis, Guardian (Nov. 30, 2010), http:// 
www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/ cifamerica/2010 / nov /29 / republicans-us-politics 
[http:/ /perma.cc/86YK-8GFX] ("Burton issued a total of 1,052 subpoenas in his attempt 
to paralyse the Clinton administration .... Many of these investigations bordered on the 
farcical. Burton subpoenaed thousands of pages of documents on every conceivable is-
sue-relevant or not."). 
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restrict access to voting during the 2000 presidential election,60 which 
inspired Republican regulators nationwide and opened up a new front in 
what some now call the "voting wars" ;61 various tactical moves by the 
Bush side in the Bush v. Gore litigation and the ensuing Supreme Court 
decision;62 the firing of the Senate Parliamentarian in 2001;63 the ex-
clusion of congressional Democrats from conference committee deliber-
ations64 and the tum toward "closed" rules for bills on the House floor 
from 2001 to 2006;65 the mid-decade redistricting plans developed in 
60. See David Schultz, Less than Fundamental: The Myth of Voter Fraud and the 
Coming of the Second Great Disenfranchisement, 34 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 483, 493 
(2008) (reviewing voter suppression allegations leveled in 2000 against Katherine Harris, 
the Florida Secretary of State and state chair of the Bush election committee). 
61. See Ari Berman, How the 2000 Election in Florida Led to a New Wave of Voter 
Disenfranchisement, Nation (July 28, 2015), http:/ /www.thenation.com/article/how-the-
2000-election-in-florida-led-to-a-new-wave-of-voter-disenfranchisement [http:/ /perma.cc/ 
YLP9-97KL]; see also Sheldon Whitehouse, Conservative Judicial Activism: The 
Politicization of the Supreme Court Under Chief Justice Roberts, 9 Harv. L. & Pot'y Rev. 
195, 207 (2015) (criticizing "a raft of voter-identification laws, cuts to early voting, bans on 
same-day registration, and voter-roll purges" and arguing that " [ v] oter suppression of the 
kind [allowed by current doctrine] works virtually exclusively in favor of Republicans"); 
Paul Rosenberg, Destroying Democracy Is the GOP's Goal: Obstruction, Dysfunction and 
the Sneaky, Decades-Long Plan to Steal Your Vote, Salon (Mar. 30, 2015), http:// 
www.salon.com/ 2015/03/30 / destroying_democracy _is_the__gops__goal_obstruction_dysfu 
nction_and_the_sneaky_decades_long_plan_to_steal_your_vote [http:/ /perma.cc/8RSV-
MFP5] (stating that a "major front" of Republican "constitutional hardball in the Obama 
era has been the attack on voting rights centered in state legislatures"). The post-2000 
wave of Republican-sponsored measures aiming to restrict voting in one way or another 
came as a surprise to voting rights scholars, who had generally assumed that "vote denial" 
controversies were a thing of the past. Cf. Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where 
Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. Rev. 689, 693--718 (2006) 
(surveying post-2000 developments and the emergence of a "new generation of vote de-
nial claims"). For a helpful overview, see generally Richard L. Hasen, The Voting Wars: 
From Florida 2000 to the Next Election Meltdown (2012). 
62. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. 
63. See Charles Tiefer, Out of Order: The Abrupt Dismissal of the Parliamentarian 
Threatens to Rip Apart the Fragile Fabric of Senate Procedure, Legal Times, May 14, 2001, 
at 62 [hereinafter Tiefer, Out of Order]. 
64. See Eric Schickler & Kathryn Pearson, The House Leadership in an Era of 
Partisan Warfare, in Congress Reconsidered 207, 211 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. 
Oppenheimer eds., 8th ed. 2005) ("The degree to which Republicans exclude Democrats 
from conference deliberations is unprecedented in the modern era .... "); Charles Tiefer, 
Congress's Transformative "Republican Revolution" in 2001-2006 and the Future of One-
Party Rule, 23 J.L. & Pol. 233, 265-72 (2007) [hereinafter Tiefer, Republican Revolution] 
(reviewing "dramatic alterations of conference procedure" in the early 2000s); see also 
Hong Min Park et al., Politics over Process: Partisan Conflict and Post-Passage Processes in 
the U.S. Congress 70, 131 (2017) (describing a "dramatic drop in the frequency of using 
conference committees to resolve House-Senate differences," along with changes in the 
composition of these committees, that the authors attribute in substantial part to reforms 
"initiated by House Republicans after the 1994 elections" to advance "partisan efficiency 
and control"). 
65. See Tiefer, Republican Revolution, supra note 64, at 256--63 (reviewing the rise of 
closed and semi-closed rules). Closed rules deny minority-party legislators the opportunity 
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Colorado, Georgia, and Texas after the 2002 elections,66 followed by the 
broader and more systematic partisan redistricting initiative known as 
REDMAP; 67 and the "seemingly endless" ways in which the Bush 
Administration "pushed the legal envelope" following 9/11 in its inter-
actions with the other branches, from increased reliance on presidential 
signing statements to withholding information from congressional over-
sight bodies to aggressive interpretations and applications of the com-
mander-in-chief power. 68 
During the Obama Administration, Republican constitutional hard-
ball further escalated-and, in the Senate, became programmatic. Com-
mitted self-consciously to a stance of "united and unyielding opposition, "69 
Republicans used filibusters and "holds" to block legislation and nomi-
nations on an unprecedented scale;70 threatened repeatedly to default on 
to offer amendments to a bill. During this period, according to Juliet Eilperin, Republican 
House members viewed Democrats "as a bunch of sore losers who assail them on pro-
cedural grounds because they lack a compelling vision of how to rule the country," while 
Democrats viewed "the GOP majority as a ruthless band that will do anything to maintain 
its power." Juliet Eilperin, Fight Club Politics: How Partisanship Is Poisoning the U.S. 
House of Representatives 6 (2006). 
66. See supra note 18 and accompanying text; see also Elections A to Z 331 (Dave 
Tarr & Bob Benenson eds., 4th ed. 2012) ("Nothing in the Constitution or federal law 
barred mid-decade redistricting, but an unspoken compact between the parties prevailed 
until the first decade of the twenty-first century, when Republicans used their control of 
the state legislatures in Colorado, Georgia, and Texas to enact partisan, mid-decade redist-
ricting plans."). 
67. See David Daley, Ratfl'*ked: The True Story Behind the Secret Plan to Steal 
America's Democracy, at xviii (2016) (describing REDMAP's efforts "to redraw the poli-
tical map coast to coast, with the express goal of locking in Republican control of the U.S. 
House of Representatives and state legislative chambers for the next decade or more," as 
"gerrymandering's shock-and-awe campaign"). 
68. Jack Balkin, Constitutional Hardball in the Bush Administration, Balkinization 
(July 13, 2007), http:/ /balkin.blogspot.com/2007 /07 / constitutional-hardball-in-bush.html 
[http:/ /perma.cc/J4JU-2N68]. "These acts of constitutional hardball," according to 
Balkin, "were designed to transform the constitutional order to a new regime," oriented 
around "an expansive ... conception of Presidential power to combat a potentially endless 
war on terror." Id. 
69. Robert Draper, Do Not Ask What Good We Do: Inside the U.S. House of 
Representatives, at xix (2012) (describing "united and unyielding opposition to the 
president's economic policies" as one pillar of a plan devised by top congressional 
Republicans on the night of President Obama's inauguration); see also Michael Grunwald, 
The New New Deal: The Hidden Story of Change in the Obama Era 19 (2012) (quoting 
former Republican Senator George Voinovich as stating that "[i]f [President Obama] was 
for it, we had to be against it" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Michael A. Memoli, 
Mitch McConnell's Remarks on 2012 Draw White House Ire, L.A. Times (Oct. 27, 2010), 
http:/ /articles.latimes.com/2010/ oct/27 /news/la-pn-obama-mcconnell-20101027 [http:// 
perma.cc/C9QL-QQDT] (quoting Senator McConnell as stating that "the single most 
important thing we want to achieve is for President Obama to be a one-term president" 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
70. See Pozen, Self-Help, supra note 22, at 39-40 (reviewing these developments); 
see also Allison Graves, Did Senate Republicans Filibuster Obama Court Nominees More 
than All Others Combined?, PolitiFact (Apr. 9, 2017), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-
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the national debt;71 "employed a battery of unorthodox procedural 
maneuvers," including a government shutdown, "in a campaign to 
defund 'Obamacare"';72 and refused to permit any appointments to 
leadership posts at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) or 
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).73 Senate Republicans' 
stonewalling of the Garland nomination thus represented the culmi-
nation of a long line of convention-straining, yet not clearly law-violating, 
obstructionist maneuvers. "From its very first months," journalist 
Matthew Yglesias opined in 2015, "Obama's presidency has been marked 
by essentially nothing but constitutional hardball." 74 
To be sure, Democratic officeholders have also resorted to consti-
tutional hardball numerous times since the mid-l 990s-and many more 
times before then, perhaps most notably during the New Deal.75 Hardball 
in the 1930s may well have had a partisan skew opposite to the one de-
scribed in this Essay. More recently, the 1987 Senate campaign against 
Judge Robert Bork's Supreme Court nomination was an important 
example of constitutional hardball; many observers, especially conser-
vatives, viewed it at the time as an unprecedented escalation of the 
political battles over judicial appointments.76 A historical study with a 
meter/ statements/2017 / apr /09 /ben-cardin/ did-senate-republicans-filibuster-obama-court-
nomi [http://perma.cc/YUL6-T6UB] (explaining, based on Congressional Research 
Service data, that whereas "[!Jess than one Qudicial] nominee per year was subject to a 
cloture filing in the 40 years before Obama took office," from 2009 to 2013 "the number 
of nominees subject to a cloture filing jumped to over seven per year"). 
71. See Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, Don't End or Audit the Fed: Central 
Bank Independence in an Age of Austerity, 102 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 3-4 (2016) (explaining 
that "Tea Party-affiliated congressional Republicans repeatedly threatened not to raise the 
debt ceiling-and thus raised the specter of a first-ever default by the government of the 
United States-in order to obtain deep cuts in government spending"); see also Lori 
Montgomery et al., Origins of the Debt Showdown, Wash. Post (Aug. 6, 2011), http:// 
wapo.st/nLw7LO [http:/ /perma.cc/DF6P-LRRN] (quoting then-Senate Minority Leader 
Mitch McConnell as saying that what Republicans "leam[ed]" from the debt ceiling 
showdown of 2011 "is this-it's a hostage that's worth ransoming" (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
72. Pozen, Self-Help, supra note 22, at 45. 
73. See John C. Roberts, The Struggle over Executive Appointments, 2014 Utah L. 
Rev. 725, 736 (remarking that Republicans' "blatant misuse of the constitutional advice-
and-consent power ... came to a head in 2011 when the Senate minority resolved to pre-
vent two entities established by Congress-the CFPB and the NLRB-from carrying out 
their statutory responsibilities"). 
74. Matthew Yglesias, American Democracy Is Doomed, Vox (Oct. 8, 2015), 
http:/ /www.vox.com/2015/3/2/8120063/american-democracy-doomed [http:/ /perma.cc/ 
RV95-88Q9]. 
75. See, e.g., Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 15, at 535-36, 544-45 
(analyzing the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 and President Roosevelt's Court-pack-
ing plan of 1937 as constitutional hardball). 
76. Indeed, from the perspective of some Republicans, the Bork nomination's defeat 
remains the canonical act of modem constitutional hardball, from which many later itera-
tions followed. See, e.g., Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, 
and the Role of Constitutional Norms in Congressional Regulation of the Courts, 78 Ind. 
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longer time horizon might reveal that asymmetric constitutional hardball 
has an epicyclical character in the American system, with the party that 
feels it was on the losing end of prior periods of hardball becoming the 
dominant hardball player in subsequent periods. 77 
Over the past twenty-five years, arguable examples of Democratic 
constitutional hardball include the Clinton Administration's increasingly 
controversial assertions of executive privilege from 1995 to 1999,78 the 
repeated filibusters of President Bush's first-term circuit court nomi-
nations,79 and the use of pro forma sessions to block President Bush's 
recess appointments in 2007 and 2008.80 More recently, the Obama 
Administration and its congressional allies made a variety of moves that 
might be classified as constitutional hardball, from using the recon-
ciliation process to amend the ACA without a supermajority vote,81 to 
"repeatedly test[ing] the limits of executive authority in implementing 
the ACA,"82 to making recess appointments to the CFPB and NLRB when 
LJ. 153, 155 (2003) ("Some trace the ignition source of the ongoing appointments 
conflagration to the nomination of Robert Bork to the United States Supreme Court in 
1987, whose rejection at the hands of Senate Democrats politicized the judicial appoint-
ments process in unprecedented ways."); Steven G. Calabresi & Shams Hirji, Judicial 
Appointments After Judge Robert H. Bork, Balkinization (Nov. 27, 2017), http:// 
balkin.blogspot.com/2017 /11/judicial-appointments-after:iudge.html [http:/ /perma.cc/ 
2WY5-EGYD] (defending a proposed judgeship bill, widely understood as a Republican 
court-packing plan and an extreme effort at constitutional hardball, with reference to "the 
unprecedented treatment given to Judge Robert H. Bork by Senate Democrats in 1987"). 
We see an unmistakable tit-for-tat pattern in the parties' behavior surrounding judicial 
nominations, going back before the mid-1990s and continuing up to the present. But we 
also observe, since the mid-1990s, an asymmetry emerging within that ongoing tit-for-tat 
pattern. 
77. Cf. infra section III.B.2 (explaining how theories of "constitutional resto-
rationism" have helped to motivate and justify recent Republican hardball). 
78. See Mark]. Rozell, Restoring Balance to the Debate over Executive Privilege: A 
Response to Berger, 8 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 541, 550 (2000) (criticizing President 
Clinton's "extensive use of executive privilege in circumstances that do not warrant the ex-
ercise of that power"). 
79. See supra note 18 and accompanying text; see also Republican Nat'! Comm., 
2004 Republican Party Platform 77 (2004) (calling upon "obstructionist Democrats in the 
Senate to abandon their unprecedented and highly irresponsible filibuster of President 
Bush's highly qualified judicial nominees"). 
80. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
81. See Mark A. Graber, A Tale Told by a President, 28 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. Inter Alia 
13, 23 (2010), http:/ /digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/fac_pubs/1149 (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (describing President Obama and his congressional allies as playing 
"far more constitutional hardball" than they had played before in their push to enact the 
ACA). To work around a Senate filibuster, some Democratic legislators also threatened to 
use the "constitutionally controversial 'deem and pass' procedure" in the House, should 
the need have arisen. Id. 
82. Nicholas Bagley, Legal Limits and the Implementation of the Affordable Care 
Act, 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1715, 1715-16 (2016). As Professor Bagley has explained, "congres-
sional antipathy ... precluded looking to the legislature to iron out" difficulties that arose 
during the ACA's rollout. Id. 
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Senate Republicans were holding pro fonna sessions,83 to eliminating the 
filibuster for non-Supreme Court nominees,84 to announcing initiatives 
that would defer the deportation of large categories of unauthorized 
immigrants in the absence of legislative refonn.85 Republican office-
holders clearly have no monopoly on constitutional hardball. 
They appear to have a dominant market position, however. Espe-
cially within Congress, plausible examples of Democratic constitutional 
83. The NLRB appointments were invalidated by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Noel 
Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). 
84. See Jeremy W. Peters, In Landmark Vote, Senate Limits Use of the Filibuster, 
N.Y. Times (Nov. 21, 2013), http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2013/ll/22/us/politics/reid-sets-
in-motion-steps-to-limit-use-of-filibuster.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (de-
scribing this as "the most fundamental alteration of [Senate] rules in more than a genera-
tion" and noting that "[f]urious Republicans accused Democrats of a power grab"); see 
also id. ("[The 2013 filibuster reform] represented the culmination of years of frustration 
over what Democrats denounced as a Republican campaign to stall the machinery of 
Congress, stymie President Obama's agenda and block his choices for cabinet posts and 
federal judgeships .... "). Judicial appointments may well be the field with greatest overlap 
in Democratic and Republican hardball tactics. But cf. Fontana, supra note 47, at 306-08, 
319-20, 322-26, 332-33 (detailing ways in which the Obama Administration declined to 
play Republican-style hardball on judicial nominations). 
85. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. For an overview of these initiatives 
within the context of the Administration's broader immigration policy, see Adam B. Cox & 
Cristina M. Rodrfguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 Yale LJ. 104, 135-
42 (2015). 
The examples listed in the main text strike us as the most significant and salient acts 
of constitutional hardball by the Obama Administration and its congressional supporters, 
assuming one does not view the Iran nuclear deal or the Paris climate agreement as such. 
Cf. Curtis A Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control over International Law, 
131 Harv. L. Rev. 1201, 1204 (2018) (explaining that the "Paris Agreement and the Iran 
deal are but two recent instances in what has been a long accretion of presidential control 
over international law since the constitutional Founding"). But there may be others. In the 
summer of 2016, for instance, after Republican leadership refused to allow gun-control 
measures with bipartisan support to come up for a vote, Democrats responded with a "sit-
in" on the House floor. See Heather Caygle, GOP Approves New Fines for Livestreaming 
Protests on House Floor, Politico Qan. 3, 2017), http://www.politico.com/story/2017 / 
01/house-fines-livestream-protests-233145 [http:/ /perma.cc/XYF3-S37FJ. While this sit-in 
does seem to qualify as constitutional hardball, the immediate practical impact was 
minimal, and Republicans promptly responded with vigorous hardball of their own-
adopting new rules that fine House members "up to $2,500 for using their phones to take 
pictures or shoot videos on the House floor." Id. See also, e.g., Josh Blackman, 
Presidential Insulation,Josh Blackman's Blog (Dec. 28, 2016), http://joshblackman.com/ 
blog/2016/12/28/presidential-insulation [http:/ /perma.cc/R43V-ZVTF] (cataloging 
actions allegedly taken by the Obama Administration in late 2016 to insulate its policies 
from reversal by the Trump Administration). Earlier, critics argued that certain "Dear 
Colleague" letters sent by the Department of Education in 2011 and 2014 "radically" 
departed from traditional Title IX enforcement and amounted to "a crusade against due 
process for students accused of sexual assault." Stuart Taylor Jr. & KC Johnson, The New 
Standard for Campus Sexual Assault: Guilty Until Proven Innocent, Nat'! Rev. (Dec. 30, 
2015), http:/ /www.nationalreview.com/ article/ 428910 / cam pus-rape-courts-why-arent-
republicans-resisting [http:/ /perma.cc/LU83-U6M7]. Depending on their framing, such 
arguments could be construed as alleging a form of constitutional hardball. 
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hardball in recent decades are harder to find. And intriguingly, when 
Democrats have played hardball, they have been more diffident and apol-
ogetic about it. During the Clinton and Bush years, Balkin has argued, 
Democratic constitutional hardball largely arose out of, and responded 
to, "the Republican Party's desire to cement a lasting conservative 
political order. "86 President Obama's most controversial maneuvers were 
framed and defended as regrettable yet necessary acts of "self-help" in 
the face of extraordinary partisan obstruction.87 Republican 
constitutional hardball, it seems, has been not only more common in 
practice since the mid-1990s but also more confident injustification.88 
In line with these observations, a rough consensus has emerged 
among analysts of Washington politics that Republicans have a decided 
edge in constitutional hardball. Political scientist Jonathan Bernstein 
wrote in 2012, for instance, that "the party that's been [playing consti-
tutional hardball] over the last 20 years ... is the Republican Party."89 
"[T] he most distinctive and damaging feature of Republicans' right 
turn," according to Professors Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson, "is that 
they have steadily ramped up the scale, intensity, and sophistication of 
their attacks on government and the party most closely associated with it" 
through constitutional hardball tactics.90 Thomas Mann and Norman 
Ornstein describe the contemporary Republican Party as an "insurgent 
outlier in American politics" that displays "disdain for negotiation and 
compromise" and has embraced "cynical and destructive means to 
advance political ends."91 Liberal pundits routinely echo these senti-
ments-remarking with envy as well as dismay that Republicans have 
"perfect[ed] constitutional hardball"92 and "become past masters of the 
86. Balkin, Constitutional Hardball and Constitutional Crises, supra note 25, at 588. 
87. See Pozen, Self-Help, supra note 22, at 4-8, 41-47. 
88. For examples of assertive Republican rhetoric concerning government shutdowns 
in particular, see infra notes 189-194 and accompanying text. 
89. Jonathan Bernstein, Opinion, Why the Dysfunctional Republican Party Matters, 
Wash. Post (Apr. 30, 2012), http:/ /www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/post/ 
why-the-dysfunctional-republican-party-matters/2012/04/30/gIQAihKNsT_blog.html 
[http://perma.cc/8DPC.T797]; see also Jonathan Bernstein, Playing Constitutional 
Hardball with the Electoral College, Am. Prospect (Jan. 7, 2013), http:/ /prospect.org/ 
article/playing-constitutional-hardball-electoral-college [http:/ /perma.cc/W7VW-3N32] 
(referring to "20 years of Republican-led Constitutional hardball"). 
90. Jacob Hacker & Paul Pierson, No Cost for Extremism, Am. Prospect (Apr. 20, 
2015), http:/ /prospect.org/article/no-cost-extremism [http:/ /perma.cc/N77F-DCZV] 
[hereinafter Hacker & Pierson, No Cost for Extremism]. 
91. Mann & Ornstein, supra note 48, at 185. "Democrats are hardly blameless and 
have their own ... predilection to hardball politics," Mann and Ornstein acknowledge. Id. 
at 186. "But ... those tendencies have not generally veered outside the normal boundaries 
of robust politics." Id. 
92. Scott Lemieux, The End of the Supreme Court as We Know It, New Republic 
(Feb. 16, 2016), http://newrepublic.com/article/129944/end-supreme-court-know [http:// 
perma.cc/U9CD-GMK6]. 
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art,"93 leaving Democrats "on the receiving end of constitutional hardball 
for more than two decades."94 We do not doubt that some conservative 
pundits would dispute these claims. Yet whereas allegations that 
Republicans play more constitutional hardball have become common-
place on the left, it is hard to find any published commentary that alleges 
the reverse.95 
In sum, while the academic legal literature generally continues to 
treat constitutional hardball as symmetric or to ignore its partisan distri-
bution, the idea of asymmetric constitutional hardball has become in-
creasingly familiar (if seldom analyzed in depth) outside the legal aca-
demy.96 Hence the motivation for this Essay: to deepen these ongoing 
93. Kevin Mahnken, Democrats Will Pay for Nuking the Filibuster. But They Would 
Have Paid, Anyway., New Republic (Nov. 22, 2013), http:/ /newrepublic.com/article/ 
115702/democrats-go-nuclear-senate-filibuster-gop-would-have-done-same [http://perma.cc/ 
66FP-SZQP]. 
94. Republican Obstruction Is Routine, Not Revenge, First Person Pol. (Apr. 23, 
2015), http:/ /www.firstpersonpolitics.com/republican-obstruction-is-routine-not-revenge 
[http://perma.cc/Y9GC-7AHN]; see also Ben Fountain, Welcome to the Reign of King 
Trump, Guardian (Nov. 22, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/ 
nov/22/king-trump-republican-party-donald-trump-presidency [http://perma.cc/ZX72-
C2H4] (attributing "the constitutional hardball and scorched-earth tactics that have 
characterized the past quarter-century of American politics" to choices made by 
Republican leaders in Congress); Rosenberg, supra note 61 (observing "a profound asym-
metry in how constitutional hardball has been played over the period of the past 25 
years"). "The Democrats," according to former Tennessee Congressman John Tanner, 
"have always been ... a little Pollyanna-ish about things and don't want to play much hard-
ball, or whatever the hell you want to call it." Daley, supra note 67, at 109 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
95. Allegations that Democrats are more treacherous, corrupt, or otherwise 
malevolent are part of the ordinary stuff of heated partisan commentary. And as we have 
suggested, plenty of Republicans argue that Democrats "started it" and should bear the 
blame for any given breakdown of norms, especially with regard to judicial confirmations. 
See, e.g., Orrin G. Hatch, Opinion, Sen. Orrin Hatch: Democrats Have Only Themselves 
to Blame for Rules Change, Time (Apr. 6, 2017), http:/ /time.com/4730017 /hatch-
filibuster-nuclear-option [http:/ /perma.cc/ 4AYF-3WNQJ ("I'm not happy Senate 
Republicans had to eliminate the filibuster for Supreme Court nominees .... But let me 
be clear: We are here because of what Democrats have done over the last thirty years to 
poison the confirmation process."). However, we have found no one seriously advancing 
the claim that Democratic officeholders are more likely than their Republican counter-
parts, on the whole, to avail themselves of constitutional hardball. Perhaps the closest 
claim is the charge, developed most fully by Professor David Bernstein, that the Obama 
Administration engaged in "rampant lawlessness." Bernstein, Lawless, supra note 36, at 
xx.iv. Notably, such charges have tended to focus on Democratic Presidents rather than 
Democratic members of Congress, where we observe greater asymmetry. Moreover, their 
gravamen is not so much that President Obama violated constitutional conventions, or 
"the 'go without saying' assumptions that underpin working systems of constitutional 
government," Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, supra note 15, at 523 n.2, but rather that 
he violated the big-C Constitution by exceeding legally binding limits on executive 
power-an accusation that opponents have regularly leveled at every one of the last several 
Presidents, Democratic and Republican. 
96. The immediate reaction to the 2016 presidential vote underscored this point. 
"[W]e know [what] the Republicans would have done[] [i]f Mr. Trump had lost the 
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conversations and to spark a new scholarly conversation about this asym-
metry, its causes, and its implications for constitutional law and politics. 
C. The Plausibility of Asymmetry 
Perhaps, though, we and all of the commentators we cite are mis-
reading the historical record. As discussed above, the hardball asymmetry 
thesis cannot be "proved" in any straightforward manner, given that the 
phenomenon itself resists numerical calculation and the proper char-
acterization of nearly every possible example, including those listed 
above, is subject to debate. Nevertheless, we believe that a number of 
factors, taken together, strongly support our reading of the post-1994 
record as containing more methodical and unabashed constitutional 
hardball on the right. 
First, certain constitutional hardball tactics used repeatedly by con-
temporary Republican legislators have not migrated to the other side of 
the aisle, whereas the hardball tactics attributed to Democratic legislators 
(such as pro forma sessions in the Senate, unilateral filibuster reform, 
and pushing the limits of the budget reconciliation process) have been 
used by both sides alike. For instance, Democrats have not threatened 
credibly to default on the national debt.97 They have not enacted mea-
sures likely to suppress Republican voter turnout in federal elections.98 
Electoral College while winning the popular vote," a New York Times op-ed lamented last 
December: In contrast to "the Democrats' do-nothingness," they would have "thr[own] 
everything they could muster against the wall to see if it stuck." Dahlia Lithwick & David S. 
Cohen, Opinion, Buck Up, Democrats, and Fight like Republicans, N.Y. Times (Dec. 14, 
2016), http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2016/12/14/opinion/buck-up-democrats-and-fight-like-
republicans.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also, e.g., Michael Tomasky, 
Trump: The Gang, N.Y. Rev. Books (Jan. 19, 2017), http:/ /www.nybooks.com/articles/ 
2017/01/19/trump-the-gang (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (imagining similarly 
what Republican Party leaders would be doing "if the situation were reversed" and 
asserting that, among other things, they "would certainly have demanded that the mem-
bers of the Electoral College reject Clinton"). The online version of this Times op-ed at-
tracted 2,259 reader comments-most of them from Democrats, but a substantial fraction 
from self-identified independents or Trump supporters. See Lithwick & Cohen, supra. 
Based on our reading of all these comments, the one point on which everyone seemed to 
agree was the plausibility of the counterfactual premise that Republicans would have 
fought in ways Democrats did not, had the shoe been on the other foot. Members of both 
parties have been interpreting political events through the prism of hardball asymmetry. 
97. There have been some recent murmurs of Democratic opposition to raising the 
debt ceiling, although so far they have not amounted to much; the greater threat appears 
to come from the House Freedom Caucus. See, e.g., James Arkin, Congress' Summer of 
Fiscal Woe, Real Clear Politics (July 11, 2017), http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/ 
2017 /07 /11/ congress_summer_of_fiscal_woe_l34430.html [http:/ /perma.cc/3K8E-8ZPG] 
("Democrats originally took a hard line in June, saying they wouldn't back any increase 
without guarantees that any GOP tax reform wouldn't increase the deficit. They quickly 
backed away from that gambit .... "). 
98. The closest thing to a counterexample we have been able to find is the claim that, 
at the state and local levels, Democrats favor off-cycle or off-year election calendars-
which greatly reduce turnout-more often than Republicans do. See Sarah F. Anzia, 
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They have not fired their own hand-picked Senate Parliamentarian in an 
effort to overturn rulings that displeased them.99 They have not ap-
pointed agency heads known to oppose the agencies they will be 
leading.100 And they have not impeached a President. This tactical divide 
suggests that there is a qualitative, not just a quantitative, difference in 
how the parties have been playing constitutional hardball-which we 
Timing and Turnout: How Off-Cycle Elections Favor Organized Groups 118-19 (2014) 
(describing what might "seem to be a baffling reversal in the major political parties' 
positions": "In the case of school board elections, Republicans claim to be champions of 
increasing voter turnout, and Democrats have become the defenders of the status quo of 
off-cycle election timing"); Eitan Hersh, How Democrats Suppress the Vote, 
FiveThirtyEight (Nov. 3, 2015), http:/ /fivethirtyeight.com/features/how-democrats-
suppress-the-vote [http:/ /perma.cc/H73F-U4PM] ( characterizing Anzia's data provoca-
tively as showing that Democrats deliberately reduce turnout by resisting efforts to 
consolidate elections in November of even-numbered years). But even if this claim were 
true across the board, which it is not, see, e.g., Anzia, supra, at 33 (describing California 
Democrats' unsuccessful push to move statewide referenda to November), it would be the 
sort of exception that proves the rule. Whatever their drawbacks, off-cycle elections do not 
actually block Republicans, or anyone else, from voting. If this is as far as Democrats will 
go, it highlights the limits of their use of hardball in the highly contested constitutional 
sphere of voting. 
99. Both parties, in recent times, have tended to choose a new Parliamentarian upon 
regaining control of the Senate. The novel form of hardball pioneered by Senate 
Republicans is to replace their own chosen Parliamentarian in response to a disfavored 
ruling. See Tonja Jacobi &JeffVanDam, The Filibuster and Reconciliation: The Future of 
Majoritarian Lawmaking in the U.S. Senate, 47 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 261, 336-39 (2013) 
(discussing the 2001 firing of Senate Parliamentarian Robert Dove, after Dove had ruled 
against using budget reconciliation for tax cuts, and the threatened decline in the 
Parliamentarian's power); Tiefer, Out of Order, supra note 63, at 62 (same). 
100. See, e.g., Gillian Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term-Foreword: 1930s 
Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 10 (2017) ("President 
Trump's cabinet is composed of individuals who have long opposed the agencies and pro-
grams they now lead .... "); cf. Donald P. Moynihan & Alasdair S. Roberts, The Triumph 
of Loyalty over Competence: The Bush Administration and the Exhaustion of the 
Politicized Presidency, 70 Pub. Admin. Rev. 572, 574 (2010) (contending that Presidents 
Reagan and Bush II prioritized political loyalty over competence and experience in execu-
tive branch appointments). 
In terms of judicial appointments, while both parties may have chosen individuals 
with strongly held jurisprudential views, Democrats have not pushed through young 
judges to the same extent as Republicans have. Presidents Clinton and Obama, for in-
stance, together appointed zero individuals to a circuit court who were under the age of 
forty at the time of nomination, whereas Presidents Reagan, Bush I, and Bush II respec-
tively appointed eight, three, and two such individuals (in order: Kenneth Starr, J. Harvie 
Wilkinson III, Frank Easterbrook, Edith Jones, Alex Kozinski, Deanell Reece Tacha,James 
Edmondson, Douglas Ginsburg, Samuel Alito Jr., J. Michael Luttig, Timothy Lewis, Neil 
Gorsuch, and Kimberly Moore). See Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges: 
Export, Fed. Judicial Ctr., http://www.fjc.gov/history /judges/biographical-directory-
article-iii-federal:judges-export [http:/ /perma.cc/3N64-JNX5] (last visited July 11, 2017) 
(select "Database Export" to download the Excel spreadsheet containing relevant data). 
The average ages of circuit court and district court nominees were also lower during these 
Republican presidencies. See Sheldon Goldman et al., Obama's First Term Judiciary: 
Picking Judges in the Minefield of Obstructionism, 97 Judicature 7, 41 tbl.6, 43 tbl.8 
(2013). 
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contend in section III.B.l is grounded in part in Republicans' greater 
willingness to incapacitate the government. 
Second, our story takes place against a backdrop of asymmetric 
polarization: Social scientists have shown convincingly that since the 
1970s, Republicans have moved further to the right than Democrats have 
moved to the left. 101 This is true for rank-and-file voters as well as party 
elites; it can be observed in public polling data as well as congressional 
voting pattems. 102 Moving beyond patterns of polarization, survey evi-
dence suggests that Republican partisans are also strikingly more likely 
than Democratic partisans to reject consensual politics in principle. A 
2010 poll, for instance, found that "a clear majority of Republicans" 
prefer politicians who "stand firm," whereas "a large majority of Democrats" 
prefer politicians who "compromise." 103 Insofar as constitutional hard-
ball depends on political actors with strong substantive views eschewing 
compromise in order to advance those views, these differences in the 
parties' attitudes seem illuminating. They suggest an overarching reason 
why constitutional hardball tactics would tend to hold greater appeal and 
less downside for Republican officeholders. 104 Asymmetric constitutional 
101. For overviews of the evidence, see Mann & Ornstein, supra note 48, at 51-58; 
Michael Barber & Nolan McCarty, Causes and Consequences of Polarization, in Am. 
Political Sci. Ass'n, Negotiating Agreement in Politics 19, 19-26 (Jane Mansbridge & 
Cathie Jo Martin eds., 2013). Professor David Schleicher usefully distinguishes (1) the in-
creasingly uniform orientation of all political issues around a single axis of liberal-
conservative disagreement from (2) the movement of Democrats and Republicans toward 
more extreme points along the dominant axis. David Schleicher, Things Aren't Going that 
Well over There Either: Party Polarization and Election Law in Comparative Perspective, 
2015 U. Chi. Legal F. 433, 439-40 (2015). Political scientists have good evidence that both 
(1) and (2) are occurring, but it is only with respect to (2) that it is conceptually possible 
to observe an asymmetry. That asymmetry tends to be linked with a third variable 
Schleicher discusses: (3) the intensity or fundamentalism with which partisans espouse 
their views. Id. at 440-41. As we explain in section III.B, there is evidence of asymmetry 
here as well. 
102. See Mann & Ornstein, supra note 48, at 56-57. 
103. Michael R. Wolf et al., Incivility and Standing Firm: A Second Layer of Partisan 
Division, 45 PS: Pol. Sci. & Pol. 428, 430 (2012); see also Mann & Ornstein, supra note 48, 
at 57 (describing additional survey evidence indicating that Democratic voters value 
political compromise more than Republican voters do); David M. Kennedy, What Pildes 
Missed: The Framers, the True Impact of the Voting Rights Act, and the Far Right, 99 
Calif. L. Rev. 351, 357 (2011) (suggesting that asymmetric polarization has made the 
Republican Party "much less inclined to compromise on value-laden social issues than the 
much more heterogeneous Democratic Party"); Wolf et al., supra, at 430 (describing Pew 
Research Center findings "that Democrats have been significantly more likely to prefer 
compromise than Republicans since 1987 ... , with this gap growing over time"). In 
Facebook posts and press releases from 2015 and 2016, a recent study found, Republican 
members of Congress expressed "indignant disagreement" with the other party at roughly 
four times the rate that Democratic members did. Pew Research Ctr., Partisan Conflict and 
Congressional Outreach 18 (2017), http:/ /assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
sites/5/2017 /02/25100146/LabsReport_FINALreport.pdf [http:/ /perma.cc/ENN4-87UXJ. 
104. Cf. Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, Confronting Asymmetric Polarization, in 
Solutions to Political Polarization in America 59, 66 (Nathaniel Persily ed., 2015) (con-
2018] ASYMMETRIC CONSTITUTIONAL HARDBALL 941 
hardball cannot be reduced to asymmetric polarization-the relationship 
between a party's ideological evolution and its approach to constitutional 
conflict is complex-but the existence of the latter surely makes the exis-
tence of the former more plausible. 
Third, there is considerable evidence that the modern Republican 
Party acts more like a movement party, with clear and cohesive ideo-
logical goals, while the Democratic Party acts more like an amalgamation 
of interest groups. This is an oversimplified characterization of both 
parties, of course, but political scientists have repeatedly found a signif-
icant distinction along these lines.105 Perhaps as a result of being more 
like a movement party, the current Republican Party also has fewer mod-
erates in positions of power. 106 Insofar as constitutional hardball tactics 
tending that " [ t] he most alarming feature of asymmetric polarization has been the in-
creasing resort to forms of 'constitutional hardball'" by "the increasingly off-center and 
confrontational GOP"). 
105. See, e.g., Jo Freeman, The Political Culture of the Democratic and Republican 
Parties, 101 Pol. Sci. Q. 327, 329 (1986) ("Essentially, the Democratic party is pluralistic 
and polycentric. It has multiple power centers that compete for membership support in 
order to make demands on, as well as determine, the leaders."); id. ("The Republicans 
have a unitary party in which great deference is paid to the leadership, activists are ex-
pected to be 'good soldiers,' and competing loyalties are frowned upon."); Grossmann & 
Hopkins, Asymmetry of American Party Politics, supra note 47, at 120 (arguing that the 
"Republican Party is best viewed as the agent of an ideological movement whose members 
are united by a common devotion to ... limited government," whereas "the Democratic 
Party is properly understood as a coalition of social groups whose interests are served by 
various forms of government activity"); Yphtach Lelkes & Paul M. Sniderman, The 
Ideological Asymmetry of the American Party System, 46 Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 825, 840 (2016) 
(finding that Republican Party supporters "have strikingly higher levels of ideological 
awareness and coherence" than do Democratic Party supporters). 
Relatedly, there is intriguing evidence, which we do not have the space to explore 
fully here, that Republicans favor a more hierarchical form of internal party organization. 
See, e.g., Richard M. Skinner et al., 527 Committees and the Political Party Network, 40 
Am. Pol. Res. 60, 64-65 (2012) (reviewing "numerous observational and experimental 
studies" finding that Republicans are "more comfortable than Democrats in leaving im-
portant party decisions up to party leaders" and that "Republican Party organizations tend 
to be more hierarchical than Democratic ones"). By reducing intraparty collective action 
problems, and by reducing the effective veto power of moderates who might oppose some 
tough tactics, this tendency could also facilitate constitutional hardball. 
106. See James E. Campbell, Polarized: Making Sense of a Divided America 185 (2016) 
(noting that while "the ranks of moderate Democrats have also been depleted," moderate 
Republicans in Congress have faced "virtual extinction"). Prior to the Trump presidency, 
the fact that Republicans had fewer moderates in elected positions was easily transformed 
into a perception that they were more disciplined as a party. See, e.g., Jonathan Chait, 
Why Are Republicans More Disciplined than Democrats?, New Republic (Dec. 2, 2010), 
http:/ /newrepublic.com/article/79578/why-are-republicans-more-disciplined-democrats 
[http:/ /perma.cc/SKV4-6CXL]; Robert Reich, Why Republicans Are Disciplined and 
Democrats Aren't, Buffington Post Quly 24, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
robert-reich/republican-party-discipline_b_3646393.html [http:/ /perma.cc/3SUR-57AM] 
(last updated Sept. 23, 2013). The question of whether there was in fact an asymmetry in 
discipline is a matter of some debate. Compare Eliza Newlin Carney, Standing Together 
Against Arly Action, CQ Wkly., Mar. 16, 2015, at 37, 38 (showing significant overlap in the 
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depend on the existence or perception of an ideologically committed 
party with a shared vision of political change, these data points also help 
support the plausibility of asymmetric constitutional hardball. 
Finally, differences in the constitutional philosophies of liberals and 
conservatives suggest different normative orientations toward consti-
tutional hardball. We will return to this issue below. 107 Among other 
potentially relevant differences, stronger commitments on the Republican 
side to the theory of originalism and the idea of a "lost" Constitution are 
apt to yield considerably less deference toward the constitutional status 
quo and the set of unwritten norms that have evolved to facilitate 
moderation and cooperation in government. 108 Democrats' compar-
atively dynamic (or "living") understanding of the constitutional order's 
legitimacy and ontology, in contrast, gives them a general reason to view 
destabilizing constitutional hardball tactics with suspicion. They may en-
gage in such tactics anyway, but the effort will involve greater cognitive 
dissonance. 
These different constitutional commitments of the two parties, it 
bears emphasis, are contingent and bounded in political time. 109 Perhaps 
in some future period, it will be liberals who think and speak in terms of 
restoring a lost constitutional order and conservatives who are more 
focused on defending a body of judicial precedents that has developed 
case by case. 110 But over the past quarter century or so, as Part III 
explains, it has been conservatives who have had more to gain from 
dramatic departures from established constitutional understandings, 
parties' average "unity scores" on roll call votes over the past half century), with Betsy 
Sinclair et al., Agreement Scores, Ideal Points, and Legislative Polarization 21 (2011) 
(unpublished manuscript), http:/ /mason.gmu.edu/-jvictor3/Research/Conferences/ 
AgreementScores_.pdf [http:/ /perma.cc/3CRU-BA5ZJ (finding, based on legislator-pair 
"agreement scores," that congressional "Republicans tend to vote with greater internal co-
hesion than Democrats do"). In any event, the Trump years seem likely to scramble these 
calculations, increasing unity on the Democratic side and division on the Republican side, 
at least temporarily. 
107. See infra section III.B.2. 
108. The idea that liberals (Democrats) and conservatives (Republicans) have system-
atically different views about the Constitution is a familiar one. The idea that these groups 
might, as a result, have systematically different normative orientations toward constitu-
tional conventions and toward breaches thereof is, as far as we are aware, new to the legal 
literature. 
109. See generally Jack M. Balkin, The Last Days of Disco: Why the American Political 
System Is Dysfunctional, 94 B.U. L. Rev. 1159 (2014) [hereinafter Balkin, Last Days of 
Disco] (extending Stephen Skowronek's theory of political time to trace the rise, and per-
haps now the end, of a single coherent conservative political and constitutional regime be-
ginning in the early 1980s, which aimed in part to repudiate the prior liberal regime). 
llO. As we have suggested, built-in counterdynamics may tend to complicate or re-
verse the directionality of asymmetric constitutional hardball over long political cycles. See 
supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text. At least some of the factors that contribute to 
the present asymmetry, however, seem likely to be more enduring. See, e.g., infra section 
111.B.1 (describing how a political coalition's views on the value of government may affect 
that coalition's willingness to engage in forms of hardball that hobble the government). 
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forged during the New Deal and Warren Court eras, while liberals have 
been pushed toward a more incrementalist and cautious constitutionalism. 
The proposition that Republicans play harder hardball, in short, 
plausibly follows not just from the social science evidence on polarization 
and the structure of the parties, but also from the internal logic of each 
side's constitutional vision. 
III. EXP1AINING AsYMMETRIC CONSTITUTIONAL HARDBALL 
Having established that asymmetric constitutional hardball is at least 
plausible, let us now examine its potential origins and meaning a little 
more carefully. Why would the officeholders of different political parties 
be differently disposed toward playing constitutional hardball, partic-
ularly in Congress? There are two basic ways to approach this question. 
The first looks to the incentives and constraints facing these officials as 
actors embedded in a web of institutional relationships, not only with 
fellow legislators but also with the voters, donors, advocacy groups, media 
outlets, and other important players who define the political environ-
ment within which they operate. 
From this angle, we can disaggregate the question into a series of 
smaller ones. Which of these players tend to reward or punish elected 
officials for playing constitutional hardball, and under what circum-
stances? And do these dynamics vary across the parties? We suggest in 
section A of this Part that while both Republicans and Democrats face 
political pressure to play constitutional hardball, such pressure has been 
considerably stronger and more systematic on the Republican side. 
However, this first approach to the question may risk begging it. Why 
are various crucial players within the Republican coalition more inclined 
than their Democratic counterparts to reward constitutional hardball or 
to punish its absence? A second approach moves the analysis to the level 
of values and ideas. Although all political parties are ideologically 
diverse, substantial segments of their coalitions hold identifiable clusters 
of beliefs that are part of what makes the coalitions cohere. We argue in 
section B that differences in the party coalitions' moral, legal, and cul-
tural beliefs further explain the asymmetry we observe. 
Asymmetric constitutional hardball is not the sort of phenomenon 
that can be modeled in a neat, monocausal manner. As one examines the 
potential factors behind it, one quickly finds that many of them do not 
really offer alternative explanations; rather, they are interlocking ele-
ments of related causal stories. We cannot hope in an Essay like this to 
tease out the relative magnitude of the different causal stories, if doing so 
is possible at all. But we think it is useful to gather together their ele-
ments because, collectively, they can help us understand both why asym-
metric constitutional hardball has become such a prominent feature of 
our politics, and whether it is likely to continue in the Trump era and 
beyond. 
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A. Asymmetric Institutions and Incentives 
In order to get into office and stay in office, elected representatives 
need votes. To get votes, they need to secure numerous forms of political 
support, including the labor of campaign workers and volunteers, the 
money of campaign contributors and those willing to make officially 
independent expenditures on a candidate's behalf, and the endorse-
ments of activists, issue groups, public figures, and power brokers of 
various kinds. Successful politicians, accordingly, become embedded in a 
complex set of networks-local, state, and national-that generate pow-
erful and sometimes conflicting incentives for their behavior while in 
government. 
In recent decades, some of these networks have gained in impor-
tance while others have declined. A political scientist discussing these dy-
namics a generation ago likely would have emphasized the role of top 
party officials and, beyond them, top fundraisers and civil society leaders 
closely connected to those officials. m Without support from such "in-
siders," candidates' paths to victory in most electoral contexts seemed 
few and narrow. The influence of these insiders has been waning for 
some time, however, as the elections of the past decade brought into 
sharp relief. The center of gravity within each of the two major party 
coalitions has shifted considerably in the direction of so-called "outside" 
groups, which are not part of the formal party structure and have their 
own independent bases of support among donors and volunteers.112 
These outside groups include comprehensive ideological players such as 
Freedom Works and Democracy Alliance; issue-specific outfits such as the 
Sierra Club, the National Rifle Association, and Planned Parenthood; a 
few unions that remain powerful locally or nationally on the Democratic 
side; and a large number of donor-driven groups organized under 
various legal categories, such as Super PACs or 501 (c) ( 4)s. 
111. For a classic in this genre, see generally Marty Cohen et al., The Party Decides: 
Presidential Nominations Before and After Reform (2008), which argues that even after 
reforms in the 1970s aimed to promote more populist forms of democracy in presidential 
primary politics, party insiders reasserted control of the agenda. See also id. at 15 
(theorizing parties as larger coalitions but noting that most political scientists have viewed 
them as "the creatures of officeholders or top party officials"). Several authors of this book 
have acknowledged that since its publication, a shift away from these elite networks has 
become more pronounced. See, e.g., Hans Noel, Why Can't the G.O.P. Stop Trump?, N.Y. 
Times (Mar. 1, 2016), http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2016/03/01/opinion/campaign-stops/ 
why-cant-the-gop-stop-trump.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Danielle 
Kurtzleben, Celebrities, Lies and Outsiders: How This Election Surprised One Political 
Scientist, NPR (June 21, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/06/21/482357936/celebrities-
lies-and-outsiders-how-this-election-surprised-one-political-scienti ( on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (interviewing Cohen). 
112. See Joseph Fishkin & Heather K Gerken, The Party's Over: McCutcheon, Shadow 
Parties, and the Future of the Party System, 2014 Sup. Ct. Rev. 175, 176-77, 186-92 (2015) 
(describing these trends); see also Bulman-Pozen, supra note 55, at 1085 & n.20 (collect-
ing sources that describe today's parties as "networks" of elected representatives, party offi-
cials, and informally affiliated individuals and organizations). 
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These various "intense policy demanders" 113 may have strong views 
about whether elected officials should or should not engage in acts of 
constitutional hardball. Recall that constitutional hardball, as we have 
defined it, involves either breaching constitutional conventions for parti-
san ends or attempting to shift constitutional law in an unusually bold or 
self-entrenching manner-and very often it involves both. For any given 
elected official, the risks and rewards of playing constitutional hardball 
will therefore depend, first, on whether and to what extent key political 
constituencies and policy demanders wish to change settled under-
standings of the Constitution; and, second, on whether and to what 
extent these actors wish to see their goals pursued in a manner consistent 
with prevailing norms of government practice. On both of these dimen-
sions, there is good cause to believe that the Republican coalition-
including both the policy demanders and the voters114-generates 
stronger incentives than the Democratic coalition to play hardball. 
I. Safe Seats and Primary Challenges. - One source of this imbalance 
is the primary system. A significant fraction of members of Congress from 
both parties now hold "safe seats," with little prospect of general-election 
defeat to a candidate from the other political party. 115 While partisan 
gerrymandering may have contributed to this phenomenon in the 
House, rising levels of geographic polarization and party loyalty in voting 
have extended it to the Senate as well.116 Structurally, this means that the 
113. See Cohen et al., supra note 111, at 20 (applying this label to "interest groups, 
ideological activists, and others" who organize political parties "to get the government pol-
icies they want"). 
114. We can only speculate as to this point, but to the extent that the rise of the digital 
age and new forms of social media and government transparency have made the typical 
act of constitutional hardball more widely publicized in recent years as compared to prior 
periods, this added publicity may tend to make the views of more members of the coalition 
matter. 
115. See Alan I. Abramowitz, U.S. Senate Elections in a Polarized Era, in The U.S. 
Senate: From Deliberation to Dysfunction 27, 30 (Burdett A. Loomis ed., 2012) ("Fewer 
senators represent so-called swing states, or those states that remain competitive for both 
parties, while more senators represent states that are relatively safe for their own party."); 
Nate Silver, As Swing Districts Dwindle, Can a Divided House Stand?, N.Y. Times: 
FiveThirtyEight (Dec. 27, 2012), http:/ /fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/27 /as-
swing-districts-dwindle-can-a-divided-house-stand (on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(" Most members of the House now come from hyperpartisan districts where they face 
essentially no threat oflosing their seat to the other party."). 
116. See Abramowitz, supra note 115, at 30 (discussing the Senate); Richard H. Pildes, 
Romanticizing Democracy, Political Fragmentation, and the Decline of American 
Government, 124 Yale LJ. 804, 821 n.46 (2014) (discussing the empirical literature). It is 
possible that gerrymandering in the House has also contributed indirectly to ideological 
polarization in the Senate, given that so many senators are former House members who 
have, over the past generation, been exposed to repeated primary contests in that 
chamber. See Sean M. Theriault & David W. Rohde, The Gingrich Senators and Party 
Polarization in the U.S. Senate, 73 J. Pol. 1011, 1012 (2011) (finding that "the growing 
divide between the voting scores of Democrats and Republicans in the Senate can be 
accounted for almost entirely by the election of a particular breed of senator: Republicans 
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mam threat to many members' electoral survival comes from the party 
primary. 
In theory, this threat applies equally to Democrats and Republicans. 
In practice, its effects have been far from equal. Very few liberal primary 
challengers have defeated Democratic congressional incumbents in re-
cent years.U7 Over a dozen "Tea Party" challengers, in contrast, unseated 
Republican incumbents from 2010 to 2014, including House Majority 
Leader Eric Cantor.118 And well before the Tea Party emerged on the 
scene, Republican Senators and Representatives were experiencing a 
greater vulnerability to primary challenges-a trend that began in 1996.119 
Ever since the Gingrich Revolution, then, Republican members of 
Congress have had to worry considerably more than their Democratic 
counterparts about ideologically extreme rivals from their own party. 
Insofar as these rivals tend to favor a combative style of politics and to 
hold Beltway conventions in low regard, this dynamic pushes Republican 
officeholders in the direction of constitutional hardball. There is some 
intriguing anecdotal evidence from the Obama years that the most force-
ful demands for constitutional hardball within the House came from 
those representatives whose districts are overwhelmingly Republican, 
where these dynamics are likely the most pronounced.120 The difficult 
who previously served in the House after 1978"). Our argument in this section does not 
depend on any claim that more Republicans than Democrats occupy safe seats or are the 
beneficiaries of partisan gerrymandering. 
117. See Robert G. Boatright, Getting Primaried: The Changing Politics of 
Congressional Primary Challenges 2, 76-77 (2013) (describing the one successful defeat 
of a Democratic Representative by a challenger from the left between 2004 and 2008); id. 
at 133 (describing the two Democratic Senators successfully challenged between 1996 and 
2010); see also Lauren Cohen Bell et al., Slingshot: The Defeat of Eric Cantor 14-16 
(2016) (listing additional primary defeats of Democratic House incumbents between 2010 
and 2014, most of which involved scandal rather than ideological challenge). 
118. See Kiran Dhillon, Before Cantor: Seven Other Tea Party Upsets, Time Oune 12, 
2014), http:/ /time.com/2864303/before-cantor-seven-other-tea-party-upsets [http:// 
perma.cc/5K7P-HJL3]; Associated Press, A Look at the Tea Party's Primary Season Wins, 
Salon (Sept. 15, 2010), http:/ /www.salon.com/2010/09/15/us_tea_party_wins [http:// 
perma.cc/QV6K-7MKT]; see also David Wasserman, What We Can Learn from Eric 
Cantor's Defeat, FiveThirtyEight Oune 20, 2014), http:/ /fivethirtyeight.com/features/ 
what-we-can-leam-from-eric-cantors-defeat [http:/ /perma.cc/52F4-8J3U] ("Overall, 32 
House incumbents have taken less than 75 percent of the vote in their primaries so far this 
year, up from 31 at this point in 2010 and just 12 at this point in 2006. What's more, 27 of 
these 32 'underperforming' incumbents have been Republicans."). 
119. See Boatright, supra note 117, at 76-77 (showing that between 1996 and 2010, 
twenty-seven of the thirty-nine contested primaries were between Republican candidates); 
id. at 86 (showing that "ideology" was the most frequent reason or a common reason for 
primary challenges in every congressional election cycle between 1996 and 2010). In not-
able contrast, Democratic incumbents were more vulnerable than their Republican coun-
terparts to primary challenges from 1970 to 1994. See id. at 76-77, 100-01. 
120. See, e.g., Ryan Lizza, Where the G.O.P.'s Suicide Caucus Lives, New Yorker (Sept. 
26, 2013), http:/ /www.newyorker.com/ news/ daily-comment/where-the-g-o-p-s-suicide-
caucus-lives [http:/ /perma.cc/8DJ9-AFM9] (explaining that the House members who 
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question remains, though, why primary challenges have been playing out 
so differently on the Republican side. The balance of this Part offers 
some partial explanations. 
2. Outside Funders. - One driving force behind Republican primary 
challenges and constitutional hardball over the past decade or so has 
been the Tea Party. The Tea Party arose both as a movement of voters 
within the Republican coalition and as a movement of groups within the 
Koch brothers' network, most prominently Freedom Works and Americans 
for Prosperity.121 Like their precursors the Gingrich revolutionaries, 122 the 
leaders of this uprising viewed the conventional methods of political 
bargaining in Washington, as practiced by both parties, as a form of 
corruption that they sought to purge.123 As we will discuss in section B, 
they also linked this ambition to a powerful vision of constitutional 
change, styled as constitutional restoration. In pressing its "no-compro-
mise ideology,"124 the movement drew organizational and financial 
pushed in 2013 to use a government shutdown as leverage in their long-shot bid to force a 
repeal of the ACA represented such districts). 
121. See Theda Skocpol & Vanessa Williamson, The Tea Party and the Remaking of 
Republican Conservatism 83-87 (2012). Republican supporters sometimes idealize this 
movement as a grassroots citizen uprising, while Democratic critics sometimes characterize 
it as a classic case of "astroturfing" by elite interests. Compare Ronald T. Libby, Purging 
the Republican Party: Tea Party Campaigns and Elections 1 (2014) (describing the Tea 
Party as a "populist, grassroots movement sweeping the country"), with George Monbiot, 
The Tea Party Movement: Deluded and Inspired by Billionaires, Guardian (OcL 25, 2010), 
http://www.theguardian.com/ commentisfree/ cifamerica/2010 / oct/25 / tea-party-koch-
brothers [http:/ /perma.cc/FH9Q-99DB] (calling the Tea Party "the biggest Astroturf 
operation in history"). In fact, the Tea Party was both of these things at once, which is part 
of why it was effective. See Skocpol & Williamson, supra, at 83; Angelia R. Wilson, Tea 
Time? The Rise of the Tea Party, Pol. Insight, Apr. 2014, at 36, 37. 
122. In 2010, FreedomWorks helped launch a "Contract from America," evoking 
Gingrich's 1994 Contract with America. See Teddy Davis, Tea Party Activists Craft 'Contract 
from America,' ABC News (Feb. 9, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/tea-party-
activists-craft-con tract-america/ story?id=97 40705 [http://perma.cc/ 5LFK-A4MC] . 
123. This aspect of the Tea Party's approach was on prominent display in the 2011 
debt ceiling confrontation. After sweeping into power in the 2010 midterms, House 
Republicans demanded steep spending cuts in exchange for raising the debt ceiling in 
August 2011, forcing the U.S. Treasury to the verge of default. See Skocpol & Williamson, 
supra note 121, at 180 (discussing Tea Party opposition to raising the debt ceiling, despite 
potential adverse consequences); Roy T. Meyers, The Implosion of the Federal Budget 
Process: Triggers, Commissions, Cliffs, Sequesters, Debt Ceilings, and Shutdown, Pub. 
Budgeting & Fin., Winter 2014, at l, 8-9 (noting the view of Democrats that Tea Party-
fueled "hardball" led to an "implosion" of the budget process). According to Jane Mayer, 
right-wing donors and advocacy groups such as Americans for Prosperity and the Club for 
Growth played a crucial role in encouraging the Republican Young Guns, led by then-
House Majority Leader Eric Cantor, to push the party to the brink in this episode. See 
Jane Mayer, Dark Money: The Hidden History of the Billionaires Behind the Rise of the 
Radical Right 297 (2016) [hereinafter Mayer, Dark Money]. 
124. Juan Williams, Opinion, Don't Underestimate the Tea Party's Staying Power, Fox 
News (May 9, 2012), http:/ /www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/05/09/dont-underestimate-
tea-party-staying-power.html (on file with the Columhia Law Review); see also Jared A. 
Goldstein, The Tea Party Movement and the Perils of Popular Originalism, 53 Ariz. L. Rev. 
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support from a set of Republican-affiliated funders who have been de-
veloping, since the 1970s, an institutional infrastructure that channels 
monetary resources toward an agenda of deregulation, tax cuts, and 
generally reducing the scope of government. 125 These funders' sheer 
financial clout, and willingness to spend, has had a substantial long-term 
effect on our politics. 
On the Democratic side as well, the center of political gravity has 
been shifting from party leaders and officials to nominally outside 
groups, as noted above.126 But the Democratic network of outside groups 
does not similarly revolve around large, well-resourced, and broad-gauge 
ideological players. Instead, on the left the story remains one of coalition 
politics. 127 It is a story of a few remaining major unions, environmental 
groups like the Sierra Club, PACs like EMILY's List (which supports pro-
choice female candidates), trial lawyers, and so on; the list is long, and all 
of these groups make their demands on Democratic officeholders.128 But 
no financially significant group exerts constant pressure on them to 
upend prevailing norms of governance. On the contrary, many of the 
wealthy donors and funders on whom Democrats depend tend to have a 
827, 862 (2011) ("As Tea Party supporters declare, there can be no compromise or 
dialogue with those who would destroy America."). 
125. While initially obscure, the role of the Koch brothers' network in funding and 
shaping the Tea Party movement has become much more well known, especially through 
Mayer's work. See Mayer, Dark Money, supra note 123, at 203-42; Jane Mayer, Covert 
Operations: The Billionaire Brothers Who Are Waging a War Against Obama, New Yorker 
(Aug. 30, 2010), http:/ /www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/08/30/ covert-operations 
[http://perma.cc/VP6V-\JXX]; see also, e.g., Frank Rich, Opinion, The Billionaires 
Bankrolling the Tea Party, N.Y. Times (Aug. 28, 2010), http:/ /www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/08/29/opinion/29rich.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). The tobacco in-
dustry also played a key role in the development of the Tea Party, building on the success 
of earlier "smokers' rights" groups that sought to fend off restrictions on cigarettes. See 
generally Amanda Fallin et al., "To Quarterback Behind the Scenes, Third-Party Efforts": 
The Tobacco Industry and the Tea Party, 23 Tobacco Control 322 (2014). For instance, 
tobacco companies funded Citizens for a Sound Economy (CSE), a predecessor to 
FreedomWorks and Americans for Prosperity. See id. at 326-27. In a recently published 
expose, an early communications director for CSE portrays the proto-Tea Party of the 
1990s as an alliance of big oil and big tobacco. See generally Jeff Nesbit, Poison Tea: How 
Big Oil and Big Tobacco Invented the Tea Party and Captured the GOP (2016). 
126. See supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text. 
127. See Matt Grossmann & David A. Hopkins, Asymmetric Politics: Ideological 
Republicans and Group Interest Democrats 3 (2016) ("While the Democratic Party is 
fundamentally a group coalition, the Republican Party can be most accurately character-
ized as the vehicle of an ideological movement."). "In contrast to the variety of single-issue 
interest groups and social movements that collectively constitute the activist population of 
the Democratic Party," Professors Grossmann and Hopkins show, Republican politics in 
recent decades has been "dominated by a broadly organized, cross-issue conservative 
movement .... " Id. 
128. See id. at 100 (noting the "plethora of specialized groups that each make their 
own separate demands on [Democratic] candidates and elected officials"). 
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moderating effect on the party, rewarding candidates who cater to the 
professional class and stake out centrist positions. 129 
To be sure, there are some individual donors with strong ideological 
views who have an outsized role in contemporary Democratic politics. In 
the two most recent election cycles, the highest-profile example was 
hedge fund manager Tom Steyer. Before that, it was George Soros. The 
case of Steyer is instructive: While his funding may have encouraged 
Democrats to make addressing climate change a higher political priority, 
it is hard to see how any Democratic officeholder would have faced 
stronger incentives to play constitutional hardball, at least prior to the 
Trump presidency, because of support or lack of support from Steyer. 130 
In the mid-twentieth century, when unions represented a much lar-
ger proportion of American workers, one could imagine how they might 
have spurred Democratic politicians to play constitutional hardball, at 
least on issues related to workers' rights to organize and strike.131 Their 
role in not only funding campaigns but also staffing them and organizing 
members on their behalf was for decades unparalleled.132 Certain unions 
also brought a pugnacious style to Democratic politics. Yet after years of 
decline,133 the labor movement was not even able to convince a sufficient 
129. See, e.g., Douglas Schoen, Opinion, Why Democrats Need Wall Street, N.Y. 
Times (Oct. 17, 2017), http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2017 /10/17 /opinion/why-democrats-
need-wall-street.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that Democrats 
"should keep ties with Wall Street," both because it "keeps their coffers full" and because 
this dependence helps ensure centrist, "pro-capitalist" policies that appeal to the American 
electorate). If the "Wall Street" donors envisioned by this op-ed press in any general tac-
tical or temperamental direction, it is presumably toward bipartisanship rather than to-
ward hardball. 
130. Steyer spent $74 million on the 2014 midterm elections, with $67 million going 
to his Super PAC NextGen Climate to support Democrats who made climate change a 
central issue. See Coral Davenport, Billionaire Environmentalist to Spend $25 Million to 
Tum Out Young Voters, N.Y. Times (Apr. 25, 2016), http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2016/04/ 
26/us/politics/thomas-steyer-nextgen-climate-change-voters.html (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review). He was the largest individual donor once again in the 2016 cycle, giving over 
$91 million to Democratic candidates and liberal outside groups. See Top Individual 
Contributors: All Federal Contributions, OpenSecrets.org, http:/ /www.opensecrets.org/ 
overview/topindivs.php [http://perma.cc/FEC8-53A4] (last visited July 11, 2017). How-
ever, Steyer specifically refused to contribute to Democratic candidates during the 2016 
primaries, see Davenport, supra, suggesting his avoidance of the internecine fights 
through which Republican donors have pushed their representatives to the right. 
131. Consider, for an executive branch example, President Kennedy's dramatic 1961 
intervention in negotiations between the major steel producers and the United Steelworkers 
Union, forcing the steel companies to accept higher wages without raising prices. See 
Michael L. Wachter, Labor Unions: A Corporatist Institution in a Competitive World, 155 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 581, 614-17 (2007). 
132. See Daniel Schlozman, When Movements Anchor Parties: Electoral Alignments 
in American History 50 (2015) (explaining that starting in the late 1930s, and for the next 
several decades thereafter, "labor traded votes, money, and networks for policy" with 
Democratic officeholders). 
133. See Dan Clawson & Mary Ann Clawson, What Has Happened to the US Labor 
Movement? Union Decline and Renewal, 25 Ann. Rev. Soc. 95, 97 (1999) (reviewing 
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number of Democrats to overcome a filibuster of the Employee Free 
Choice Act in 2009, when Democrats controlled both houses of Congress 
and enjoyed a filibuster-proof majority in the Senate. 134 Moreover, it has 
been a long time since the labor movement seriously pressed for a 
wholesale change in the direction of the Democratic Party, let alone a 
wholesale change framed in constitutional terms. For the past half 
century, labor leaders have tended, instead, to make deals with incum-
bent players as part of Democratic coalition politics. 135 
There is, in short, no institutional equivalent on the left of the most 
powerful groups on the right that funded the Tea Party and its prede-
cessors and that continue to threaten "moderate" members of Congress 
with primary challenges.136 As we write these words, the Koch brothers' 
donor network is reportedly pressing Senate Republicans to play con-
stitutional hardball by doing away with the "blue-slip" custom through 
which home-state Senators have traditionally been allowed to block 
measures of union decline, including that unions have "exercised less and less leverage 
within the Democratic party"); see also Mike Konczal, Opinion, Why Don't Llberals Have 
Their Own Tea Party?, Al Jazeera Am. (Dec. 5, 2013), http:/ /america.aljazeera.com/ 
opinions/2013/12/liberals-democraticteapartypolitics.html [http:/ /perma.cc/NMJ3-AKW8] 
("[W]e shouldn't discount the fact that the conservative movement has come to power 
during a period when the main source of liberal infrastructure, the labor movement, has 
fallen into disarray."). But cf. Dorian T. Warren, Labor in American Politics: Continuities, 
Changes, and Challenges for the Twenty-First-Century Labor Movement, 42 Polity 286, 
28~7 (2010) ("The labor movement is still the most powerful core constituency of the 
national Democratic Party by several measures, including campaign contributions, grass-
roots mobilization efforts of the Party's key voters, lobbying, and setting the Party's legis-
lative agenda."). 
134. The bill, which was aggressively championed by unions, would have changed the 
National Labor Relations Act to allow employees to organize by collecting signature cards. 
The signature-card provision was removed after several moderate-to-conservative Democrats 
announced their opposition. See Steven Greenhouse, Democrats Drop Key Part of Bill to 
Assist Unions, N.Y. Times (July 16, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07 /17 /business/ 
l 7union.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
135. Thus, while unions over the past half century have been a source of political 
strength on the left, we find no evidence to suggest they have been a major source of 
primary challenges from the left. There was a time in American history when parts of the labor 
movement-the United Automobile Workers under Walter Reuther in the mid-twentieth 
century, to cite the most prominent example-played a substantial role in pulling the 
Democratic Party leftward on questions of tax-and-transfer policy and economic justice. 
See generally Kevin Boyle, The UAW and the Heyday of American Llberalism 1945-1968 
( 1995); Nelson Lichtenstein, The Most Dangerous Man in Detroit: Walter Reuther and the 
Fate of American Labor (1995). These dynamics were long gone during the period of 
asymmetric constitutional hardball we are considering. 
136. On the efforts of such groups to threaten moderate Republicans with primary 
challenges, see, for example, Jonathan Easley, FreedomWorks Launches PAC Ahead of 
2016, Hill (Apr. 16, 2015), http:/ /thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/senate-races/239082-
freedomworks-launches-pac [http:/ /perma.cc/3DXB-C25N]; Maggie Haberman, Club for 
Growth Targets Republicans, Politico (Feb. 27, 2013), http:/ /www.politico.com/story/ 
2013/02/ club-for-growth-targets-republicans-088153 [http://perma.cc/VE4N-PHZN]. 
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certain judicial nominees.137 But this answer to our main question, once 
again, may seem to raise the same question in a new form. Why are 
Republican donors, like Republican voters, seemingly so much less 
interested in rewarding bipartisanship, incumbency, and dealmaking-
and so much more interested in rewarding political hardball generally 
and constitutional hardball specifically? We will return to this question in 
section B of this Part. 
3. Other Mediating Institutions. - So far, we have focused on the 
parties and some of the funders and advocacy groups in their coalitions. 
But many of the most important mediating institutions in American 
politics are none of these. The most obvious institution that mediates 
political reality for millions of Americans is the media: mass-commu-
nication outlets and the individual hosts, commentators, and journalists 
they feature. Another important but less obvious set of mediating org-
anizations and individuals are the think tanks and experts who are called 
on to articulate competing sides in policy debates. Together, the news 
industry, think tanks, and the expert voices they credential play an essen-
tial role in constructing the American public sphere. For our purposes, a 
particularly significant set of speakers are those credentialed to speak 
about the law and the Constitution. But the general run of pundits matters 
as well. 
Both the Democratic and Republican coalitions have media outlets 
that tend to take their side of policy debates. And at any given time, fac-
tions within each coalition have particular speakers whose voices they 
seek to promote and legitimate. Is there any reason, then, to believe these 
institutions generate asymmetric incentives for the parties to engage in 
constitutional hardball? 
There is. To see why, it helps to step back and view the development 
of the relevant institutions in political time. 138 In the 1970s and '80s, 
American conservatives emerged from the long wilderness of the post-
New Deal era, eventually finding a popular president, Ronald Reagan, 
who brought many conservative ideas into the mainstream. That success 
belies significant challenges conservatives had to surmount during this 
period. From the perspective of those in the vanguard of an emerging 
137. See Fredreka Schouten, Why the Koch Brothers Want to Kill an Obscure Senate 
Rule to Help Shape the Federal Courts, USA Today (July 4, 2017), http://usat.ly/2uG3VFT 
[http:/ /perma.cc/FCB6-8P83]; cf. Robert Barnes & Ed O'Keefe, Senate Republicans 
Likely to Change Custom that Allows Democrats to Block Judicial Choices, Wash. Post 
(May 25, 2017), http:/ /wapo.st/2qnTKUl [http:/ /perma.cc/NZG3-WURW] (observing 
that while adherence to the blue-slip rule "has waxed and waned, depending on the views 
of Senate leaders[,] ... the rule was strictly observed during the Obama administration"). 
Our point here involves no claim about the merits of the blue-slip convention, but simply 
about a potential partisan asymmetry in the extent to which the Senate chooses to follow 
it. 
138. Some parts of the following historical narrative may be familiar to readers. But 
the significance of this story for the dynamics of constitutional hardball has not, as far as 
we are aware, received scholarly attention. 
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coalition that was considerably to the right of the prior regime, it seemed 
that major institutions of almost every important type were unsym-
pathetic to their cause, from print and broadcast media outlets139 to 
Washington think tanks (Brookings being the preeminent one) 140 to 
philanthropic foundations. 141 The policy experts considered qualified, by 
the standards of the time, to speak on important issues seemed centrist at 
best. Some were the alumni of recent, relatively liberal or heterodox po-
litical administrations; some were university professors; very few were 
members of the conservative movement.142 
And so, the conservative movement began a massive institution-
building effort across a number of spheres, 143 an effort whose trajectory 
one might usefully trace from the creation of the Heritage Foundation 
139. For a sampling of these claims from the 1970s and '80s, see Les Brown, News 
'Bias' Seen Tied to Schools, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1974, at 73 (describing remarks by 
Governor Ronald Reagan criticizing "the liberal bias he perceived in the news media," 
which he traced to the "ideology many [members of the media] are exposed to in class-
rooms"); Nixon Aide Scores TV News Practice, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1972, at 1 (reporting on 
White House speechwriter Patrick J. Buchanan's suggestion that "the Nixon Admin-
istration consider antitrust legislation against the three television networks" because their 
"liberal bias" had served to "freeze out opposing points of view and opposing infor-
mation"); Sally Bedell Smith, Conservatives Seeking Stock of CBS to Alter 'Liberal Bias,' 
N.Y. Times (Jan. 11, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/01/ll/arts/conservatives-
seeking-stock-of-cbs-to-alter-liberal-bias.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (dis-
cussing an attempt led partly by Senator Jesse Helms to "buy sufficient stock in CBS to 
change what the North Carolina Republican sa[id] [was] the 'liberal bias' in coverage by 
CBS News of 'political events, personages and views'"). What matters for our purposes 
here is not whether these accusations of liberal bias were correct (although we do discuss 
that question briefly infra notes 150-156 and accompanying text), but rather the ubiquity 
of the accusations themselves and the way they would shape the conservative movement's 
institutional development. 
140. See, e.g., Stephen Isaacs, Coors Beer-and Politics-Move East, Wash. Post, May 
4, 1975, at Al (noting that the founders of the Heritage Foundation hoped it would "some 
day be a right-wing equivalent to the Brookings Institution, which they see as left-wing"); 
Robert Shogan, Liberal Think-Tank Seeks Republicans, LA Times, Feb. 20, 1977, at B7 
( describing efforts by the Brookings Institution, "which many regard as a citadel of liberal 
Democratic ideas," to "recruit some prominent Republican scholars"). 
141. See, e.g., Ghost-Written Ads, Pranks OK, Nixon Aide Says, L.A. Times, Sept. 26, 
1973, at A2 (reporting that Patrick]. Buchanan recommended "measures to counter tax-
exempt organizations like the Ford Foundation whose policies, he said, are 'in basic dis-
agreement with our own political philosophy'"); Martin Morse Wooster, Conservatives 
Create It, and Liberals Spend It-the Dead Must Be Spinning, Wall St.J., Dec. 26, 1989, at 
AS ("In nearly all foundation histories, conservatives create the endowment; liberals spend 
it. One wonders if the liberal program officers of the MacArthur Foundation and the 
Carnegie Corporation, in their ceaseless effort to expand the welfare state, have ever both-
ered to consider the morality of their actions."). 
142. See, e.g., Shogan, supra note 140 (quoting Brookings Institution president Bruce 
K MacLaury as saying that many of the Institution's senior fellows "have come out of the 
Kennedy-Johnson era"). 
143. For an early overview, see Dan Morgan, Conservatives: A Well-Financed Network, 
Wash. Post,Jan. 4, 1981, at Al. 
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and the Cato Institute in 1973 and 1977, respectively,144 through the 1996 
launch of the Fox News Channel.145 In the middle of this period, the 
Federalist Society emerged as a network of lawyers and law students that 
aimed to challenge the prevailing liberalism of law schools and to pro-
mote a conservative vision of American constitutionalism.146 And of 
course, many existing organizations, from the Chamber of Commerce to 
groups on the religious right, aligned with different parts of the emerg-
ing conservative coalition and began to expand their political and legal 
work as well.147 
The story of this explosion of new and newly invigorated institutions 
is not uniform across all these different spheres. Many of the new think 
tanks and foundations were the result of an infusion of capital from 
wealthy, mobilized advocates of deregulation.148 The Fox News Channel, 
in contrast, came into being when its founders saw a business oppor-
tunity to frame cable news for a more conservative audience-an oppor-
tunity that was partly regulatory, partly technological, and partly both a 
144. See About Cato, Cato Inst., http:/ /www.cato.org/about [http:/ /perma.cc/K7H5-
XCJL] (last visited July 14, 2017); A Timeline of Heritage Successes, Heritage Found., 
http:/ /www.heritage.org/article/timeline-heritage-successes [http:/ /perma.cc/D5W4-FSWP] 
(last visited July 14, 2017). 
145. See Paul Farhi, Murdoch Joins Crowded Cable News Field, Wash. Post, Oct. 3, 
1996, at DlO. We do not have the space here to explore the considerable importance of 
the rise of conservative talk radio, especially after the partial repeal of the "fairness 
doctrine" in 1987. Following its national syndication in 1988, The Rush Limbaugh Show's 
"blend of news, entertainment, and partisan analysis became the model for legions of 
imitators" and was, as David Foster Wallace observed, "the first great promulgator of the 
Mainstream Media's Liberal Bias idea," which functioned "as a mechanism by which any 
criticism or refutation of conservative ideas could be dismissed." David Foster Wallace, 
Host: Deep into the Mercenary World of Take-No-Prisoners Political Talk Radio, Atlantic 
(Apr. 2005), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/04/host/303812 [http:// 
perma.cc/5R7P-PUYf). 
146. See About Us: Our Background, Federalist Soc'y, http:/ /www.fed-soc.org/our-
background [http://perma.cc/4FCJ-Q37B) (last visited July 14, 2017) ("Founded in 1982, 
the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies is a group of conservatives and 
libertarians dedicated to reforming the current legal order."); see also Steven M. Teles, 
The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement: The Battle for Control of the Law 135-80 
(2010) (examining the origins and development of the Federalist Society within the con-
text of the larger conservative legal movement). 
147. See, e.g., U.S. Chamber of Commerce, U.S. Chamber of Commerce: The Early 
Years 31, http:/ /www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/uscc_HistoryBook.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/UE4G-8Y2E] (last visited July 14, 2017) ( explaining that the Chamber, 
"inspired" by Justice Lewis Powell's now-famous 1971 memorandum, created the National 
Chamber Litigation Center in 1977). For one journalist's account of the Chamber's 
political rise, see generally Alyssa Katz, The Influence Machine: The U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce and the Corporate Capture of American Life (2015). 
148. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 143 (discussing the "entrepreneurial money" 
behind conservative think tanks, foundations, and scholarly centers that arose in the 
1970s); see also Michael J. Graetz & Ian Shapiro, Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Fight 
over Taxing Inherited Wealth 241--47 (2005) (collecting sources on the rise of right-lean-
ing think tanks). 
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consequence and a cause of ideological polarization. 149 Yet despite their 
somewhat different origin stories, there are some commonalities across 
these institutions, particularly in their character and self-conception as 
insurgent challengers to what they perceived as the dominant liberalism 
of the established order. 
These new institutions not only often disagreed with their "main-
stream" counterparts, but also often operated according to a different 
ethic. To see why, it helps to understand that when conservatives com-
plained in the 1970s and '80s that the media and various centers oflearn-
ing were generally "liberal," there was good data corroborating their 
complaints. Print and broadcast journalists, 150 college professors, 151 and 
scholars working in settings like the Brookings Institution152 were indeed 
mostly liberal, as were the faculties and student bodies of law schools.153 
Such liberal leanings undoubtedly affected the way some of these actors 
thought about and addressed political issues. At the same time, however, 
such liberal leanings were constrained by norms of professional role 
morality that structured the work of these older institutions. Established 
foundations, for instance, "tended to disperse control among a large and 
diverse group of board members and staff" and "steered clear of political 
activism." 154 Journalists in the mid-twentieth-century American tradition 
149. See generally David Folkenflik, The Birth of Fox News, Salon (Oct. 19, 2013), 
http:/ /www.salon.com/2013 / 10 / 19 / the_birth_of_fox_news [http://perma.cc/ AJC9-3UTM] . 
Getting the channel off the ground required some raw political muscle. See Time Warner 
Cable ofN.Y.C. v. City of New York, 943 F. Supp. 1357, 1403 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that 
the City, under Mayor Rudy Giuliani, violated the First Amendment by engaging in "a 
pattern of conduct with the purpose of compelling Time Warner to alter its constitu-
tionally-protected editorial decision not to carry Fox News"), aff'd sub nom. Time Warner 
Cable ofN.Y.C. v. Bloomberg L.P., 118 F.3d 917 (2d Cir. 1997). 
150. Surveys from the period suggested that journalists on the whole leaned left, and 
were more likely to be Democrats than Republicans by approximately a two-to-one margin. 
See, e.g., Stephen Hess, The Washington Reporters 67, 87 (1981) (finding, in a 1978 
survey of Washington, D.C. journalists, that forty-two percent identified as liberal, thirty-
nine percent as middle-of-the-road, and nineteen percent as conservative). 
151. See Neil Gross & Solon Simmons, The Social and Political Views of American 
College and University Professors, in Professors and Their Politics 19, 19-25 (Neil Gross & 
Solon Simmons eds., 2014) (reviewing historical research into the political views of 
American academics and noting that studies in the 1960s, '70s, and '80s indicated that 
"professors are more liberal than members of other occupational groups"). 
152. See Shogan, supra note 140 (quoting a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution 
as estimating that, in 1977, Brookings had more Democratic than Republican scholars "in 
the economic and foreign policy areas" and "the public policy area," though not in "gov-
ernment studies"). 
153. See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis et al., The Patterns and Implications of Political 
Contributions by Elite Law School Faculty, 93 Geo. LJ. 1167, 1177 (2005) (finding that, 
among professors at twenty-one leading law schools who contributed at least $200 to a 
federal election campaign between 1992 and 2002, roughly eighty-one percent contri-
buted to Democrats and fifteen percent to Republicans). 
154. Martha T. McCluskey, Thinking with Wolves: Left Legal Theory After the Right's 
Rise, 54 Buff. L. Rev. 1191, 1217, 1219 (2007) (book review); see also id. at 1215 ("Al-
though a number of non-conservative foundations funding intellectual work are wealthier 
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viewed the "objectivity norm," and its expression in practices such as the 
separation of news reporting and editorializing, as central to their 
craft. 155 They were outraged when conservative critics accused them of 
shading their news coverage in ways that favored liberal policy 
positions. 156 
The architects of the emerging conservative movement generally 
viewed these sorts of depoliticizing norms as either minor or fictitious. 157 
Accordingly, when they established institutions to act as counterweights, 
they designed them in a more partisan manner, with diminished role-
morality constraints. They built grantmaking nonprofits with highly 
centralized governance structures and a "consciously revolutionary 
political mission." 158 They built a Heritage Foundation that proudly 
champions "conservative public policies" and makes no attempt to dupli-
cate the Brookings Institution's aspiration (or pretense) of being non-
ideological.159 In the world of television news, where the pull of an 
[than conservative foundations], 'most ... are centrist, and their philanthropy is cautious 
and apolitical' .... " (quoting Mark Dowie, American Foundations: An Investigative 
History218 (2001))). 
155. See generally Michael Schudson, The Objectivity Norm in American Journalism, 
2 Journalism 149 (2001). The norm against commingling of news reporting and editor-
ializing was formalized in a prominent 1973 code of journalistic ethics. See Soc'y of Prof! 
Journalists, Code of Ethics § IV.8 (1973), http:/ /ethics.iit.edu/ecodes/node/3702 
[http:/ /perma.cc/MM2W-XC83] ("Special articles or presentations devoted to advocacy 
or the writer's own conclusions and interpretations should be labeled as such."); cf. S. 
Robert Lichter, The Media, in Understanding America: The Anatomy of an Exceptional 
Nation 181, 188--89 (Peter H. Schuck & James Q. Wilson eds., 2008) (arguing that this 
objectivity norm became central to the dominant media model of the latter half of the 
twentieth century for economic reasons yet coexisted with a modest partisan skew, where-
by journalists covered politicians of all stripes negatively but in some election cycles cover-
ed Republicans even more negatively). 
156. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, CBS Defends Independence, N.Y. Times (Apr. 18, 
1985), http:/ /www.nytimes.com/l 985 /04/18/business/ cbs-defends-independence.html 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (quoting CBS Inc.'s chairman and CEO as stating 
that "[t]he integrity of CBS News and the independence of CBS News are inextricably 
linked" and that "[t]hose who seek to gain control of CBS" to end CBS News's alleged 
liberal bias "threaten that independence and that integrity-and this country" (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
157. See, e.g., John E. Yang, Gingrich Tells Activists to Outgun "Elite Media," Wash. 
Post, Apr. 23, 1996, at A6 (quoting Representative Newt Gingrich as urging Republican 
activists to become "personal radio stations" to counteract the news media's "overwhelm-
ing" liberal bias). 
158. McCluskey, supra note 154, at 1217. 
159. Compare Brookings Policies on Independence and Integrity, Brookings Inst., 
http:/ /www.brookings.edu/about-us/brookings-policies-on-independence-and-integrity 
[http:/ /perma.cc/EVH8-RFHM] (last visited July 14, 2017) ("The Brookings Institution is 
a nonprofit organization devoted to independent, in-depth research that leads to prag-
matic and innovative ideas on how to solve problems facing society. The integrity and 
objectivity of Brookings scholars and their research constitute the Institution's principal 
assets."), with About Heritage: Mission, Heritage Found., http:/ /www.heritage.org/about-
heritage/mission [http://perma.cc/PUA5-U53B] (last visited July 14, 2017) ("The mis-
sion of The Heritage Foundation is to formulate and promote conservative public policies 
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objectivity norm remains particularly strong, Fox News famously branded 
itself "fair and balanced." It nonetheless conceived of and sold itself as 
an ideological player to a degree that was unmatched among its "main-
stream media" rivals.160 
The 2000s brought a liberal counter-reaction to these developments. 
New liberal think tanks and scholarly institutions such as the Center for 
American Progress (founded in 2003) and the American Constitution 
Society (founded in 2001) explicitly modeled themselves on conservative 
counterparts founded in the 1970s and 1980s, as they sought to chal-
lenge those institutions' dominance during the early twenty-first cen-
tury.161 Following the 2008 elections, MSNBC moved to market itself as a 
liberal cable channel in the mold of Fox News. 162 By then, liberals and 
conservatives were increasingly learning about constitutional develop-
ments through different outlets, which credential different experts and 
privilege different scholarly institutions as sources of legal and policy 
analysis.163 
based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, tradi-
tional American values, and a strong national defense."). As Professor Daniel Drezner 
explains, Heritage led a wave of think tanks that "diverged in key ways from their 
predecessors": "[M]ost obvious[ly]," the new outfits "were overtly ideological in orien-
tation"; they also "concentrated more on political advocacy" and "placed less weight on 
academic credentials." Daniel W. Drezner, The Ideas Industry: How Pessimists, Partisans, 
and Plutocrats Are Transforming the Marketplace of Ideas 133-34 (2017). 
160. The claim that the mainstream media is in fact simply the liberal media is central 
to the channel's self-understanding and justification. See, e.g., Marshall Sella, The Red-
State Network, N.Y. Times Mag. (June 24, 2001), http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2001/06/24/ 
magazine/the-red-state-network.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (quoting 
Roger Ailes, founding chairman and CEO of Fox News, as stating that "[i]fwe look conser-
vative, it's because the other guys are so far to the left"). 
161. See, e.g., Bob Dreyfuss, An Idea Factory for Democrats, Nation (Feb. 12, 2004), 
http://wwww.thenation.com/ article/ idea-factory-democrats [http://perma.cc/94QY-2~] 
("In a city heavy with well-funded right-wing think tanks (Heritage Foundation, Cato 
Institute, American Enterprise Institute, Hudson Institute, Federalist Society), the [Center 
for American Progress] is designed to provide some ballast for the other side."); Crystal 
Nix Hines, Young Liberal Law Group Is Expanding, N.Y. Times (June l, 2001), http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2001/06/0l/us/young-liberal-law-group-is-expanding.html (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review) ( quoting the founder of the American Constitution Society 
as saying, "We view it as a counter to the Federalist Society"). 
162. See Rebecca Dana, Slyer than Fox, New Republic (Mar. 25, 2013), http:// 
newrepublic.com/ article/ 112733 / roger-ailes-msn bc-how-phil-griffin-created-lefts-fox-news 
[http:/ /perma.cc/763K-WNEM]. 
163. See, e.g., Vlad Niculae et al., QUOTUS: The Structure of Political Media 
Coverage as Revealed by Quoting Patterns, 24 Int'! World Wide Web Conf. Proc. 798, 807 
(2015) (finding that" [t]here is systematic bias in the quoting patterns of different types of 
news sources" and that "an important dimension of [such) bias is roughly aligned with an 
ideology spectrum"). This phenomenon can be studied at various levels of granularity with 
similar results. See, e.g., Lauren Feldman et al., Climate on Cable: The Nature and Impact 
of Global Warming Coverage on Fox News, CNN, and MSNBC, 17 Int'! J. Press/Pol. 3, 6 
(2012) (discussing prior findings that "Fox News interviewed a lower ratio of guests who 
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Yet if many on both the left and the right now occupy media 
"bubbles" or "echo chambers," which are themselves shaped by larger 
networks of idea generation and dissemination, there is a significant 
asymmetry in the way the bubbles work. Liberals mainly continue to rely 
on, and to place greatest trust in, legacy media outlets such as CNN, 
NPR, and the New York Times, 164 whose institutional cultures continue to 
prize objectivity and to foster a relatively strong degree of respect for gov-
ernment and government officeholders.165 In the world of opinion jour-
nalism, unabashedly liberal outlets abound. But their audiences have 
been small compared to the audience for conservative talk radio or the 
Fox News Channel, 166 and they themselves may be more constrained than 
their conservative counterparts by certain norms of professionalism. 167 
Liberals do not tend to get their straight news from overtly ideological 
believed in global warming to those who doubted global warming, relative to CNN"); id. at 
14-15 (replicating those findings). 
164. See Pew Research Ctr., Political Polarization and Media Habits 11-16 (2014), 
http://wwwjoumalism.org/ files/2014/ 10 /Political-Polarization-and-Media-Habits-FINAL-
REPORT-7-27-15. pdf [http:/ /perma.cc/UB9E-ZXP3] [hereinafter Pew Research Ctr., 
Political Polarization and Media Habits]. 
165. See, e.g., J. Benjamin Taylor, Extreme Media and American Politics: In Defense 
of Extremity 1 (2017) ("Viewers of broadcast network nightly news ... generally see even-
handedness and objectivity."); Stephen Ansolabehere et al., The Orientation of 
Newspaper Endorsements in U.S. Elections, 1940--2002, 1 QJ. Pol. Sci. 393, 400 (2006) 
("[N]ewspapers today endorse the incumbent four out of five times .... "); see also Liz 
Spayd, Seeking More Voices, Even if Some Don't Want to Hear Them, N.Y. Times (Apr. 
22, 2017), http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2017 /04/22/public-editor /seeking-more-voices-
even-if-some-dont-want-to-hear-them.html (on file with the Columhia Law Review) (de-
scribing the New York Times's efforts, following President Trump's election, to "put an out-
stretched hand toward Red America" and feature more conservative voices). 
166. See, e.g., Abram Brown, Why All the Talk-Radio Stars Are Conservative, Forbes 
(July 13, 2015), http:/ /www.forbes.com/sites/abrambrown/2015/07 /13/why-all-the-talk-
radio-stars-are-conservative [http:/ /perma.cc/57ZN-6Y88] ("You would've thought a sin-
gle liberal [radio] personality could have emerged on a major scale. But that just hasn't 
happened.");Jesse Holcomb, 5 Facts About Fox News, Pew Research Ctr.: Fact Tank (Jan. 
14, 2014), http:/ /www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/01/l 4/five-facts-about-fox-news 
[http://perma.cc/F8XG-5NSV] ("[W]ith 1.7 million viewers each evening [in 2013], the 
[Fox News Channel] . . . drew a bigger audience than CNN, MSNBC and HLN 
combined."). 
167. Opinion journalists and commentators do not conceive of their work in the same 
terms as other journalists; they do not systematically aim to separate news coverage and 
editorializing. Even still, prominent commentators on the left have long complained about 
what they sometimes call the "hack gap," or the sense that right-wing pundits operate with 
less regard for empiricism or with greater fealty to their political side. See, e.g., Jonathan 
Chait, The Hack Gap, New Republic (June 22, 2011), http:/ /newrepublic.com/article/ 
90492/the-hack-gap [http:/ /perma.cc/WSF3-FJ9X]; Kevin Drum, The Hack Gap Rears Its 
Ugly Head Yet Again, Mother Jones (Oct. 9, 2012), http:/ /www.motherjones.com/kevin-
drum/2012/ 10 /hack-gap-rears-its-ugly-head-yet-again [http://perma.cc/ 5\,\JY-X3XP]; 
Matthew Yglesias, Hack Gap, Atlantic (Aug. 14, 2007), http:/ /www.theatlantic.com/ 
politics/archive/2007 /OS/hack-gap/ 45795 [http:/ /perma.cc/KD4Q-K379]. This is a 
difficult proposition to assess with any real objectivity. We simply note here that there is a 
perception on the left of a persistent and politically consequential gap. 
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sources-think of Daily Kos or Democracy Now!-whose editors and pro-
ducers have more leeway to feature voices arguing that the current 
conventions of politics or current constitutional understandings need ra-
dical revision.168 
The conservative echo chamber of the past two decades has been 
less staid and more self-contained.169 Survey data show that a large 
plurality of conservatives, to an extent that has no parallel on the left, 
orient themselves around a single news source: Fox News. 170 And as al-
ready suggested, Fox News is less beholden than its mainstream rivals to 
conventions of bipartisanship and nonpartisanship. 171 Fox News journ-
alists do operate with significant role constraints172 as compared to, say, 
conservative talk-radio hosts.173 But across the core media outlets and 
think tanks on the conservative side, for reasons having to do with their 
development in political time, the authorities presented tend to be more 
explicitly partisan and more willing to argue that the actions or priorities 
168. It is possible that the Trump era could alter these dynamics. MSNBC, in par-
ticular, has gained many more viewers recently, although it still trails Fox News. See Joe 
Otterson, TV Ratings: Cable News Viewership Surges in May as Fox News, CNN, MSNBC 
Log Double-Digit Gains, Variety (May 31, 2017), http:/ /variety.com/2017 / tv /news/cable-
news-ratings-may-2017-fox-news-cnn-msnbc-1202448761 [http://perma.cc/VDM6-766N]. 
169. Cf. Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Democracy and Dysfunction: An 
Exchange, 50 Ind. L. Rev. 281, 320 (2016) (discussing how the development of "a separate 
set of conservative media, think tanks, and educational institutions," combined with other 
factors, has "created a conservative echo chamber" and arguing that this echo chamber 
helps explain President Trump's political ascent). 
170. See Pew Research Ctr., Political Polarization and Media Habits, supra note 164, at 
4 (" [C]onservatives orient strongly around Fox News. Nearly half of consistent conser-
vatives (47%) name it as their main source for government and political news .... No 
other sources come close. Consistent liberals, on the other hand, volunteer a wider range 
of main sources for political news .... "). 
171. See supra note 160 and accompanying text; see also, e.g., Project for Excellence 
in Journalism, The State of the News Media 164 (2005), http://assets.pewresearch.org. 
s3.amazonaws.com/files/joumalism/State-of..the-News-Media-Report-2005-FINAL.pdf [http:// 
perma.cc/8J49-KHJK] (finding in content analysis that "Fox was measurably more one-
sided than the other networks, and Fox journalists were more opinionated on the air"). It 
is nearly impossible to disentangle the specific contributions of Fox News from other 
factors contributing to asymmetric polarization, but an intriguing recent study uses the 
quasi-random variable of cable news channel numbering (lower-numbered channels draw 
more viewers) to estimate the size of the "Fox News effect" on viewers' political prefer-
ences, and finds that this effect has increased over time and exceeds that of any other news 
channel. Gregory J. Martin & Ali Yurukoglu, Bias in Cable News: Persuasion and 
Polarization, 107 Am. Econ. Rev. 2565, 2565-68 (2017). 
172. See, e.g., Sarah Ellison, "It's a Disaster. It's a Nightmare." Is a Civil War Brewing 
Inside Fox News?, Vanity Fair (Mar. 21, 2017), http:/ /www.vanityfair.com/news/2017 /03/ 
inside-fox-news-after-megyn-kelly-nbc-scandal [http:/ /perma.cc/PK5S-ZPUR] ("Despite its 
appearance to the outside world as a monolithic force on the right, the [Fox News] net-
work operates internally with a distinction between its news side and its commentary 
side."). 
173. See Pew Research Ctr., Political Polarization and Media Habits, supra note 164, at 
10 ("Fox News sits to the right of the midpoint, but is not nearly as far right as several 
other sources, such as the radio shows of Rush Limbaugh or Glenn Beck."). 
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of the other side are egregious and indefensible.174 From Fox News 
suggesting in the 1990s that President Clinton be impeached175 to Cato 
Institute scholars suggesting in the early 2010s that the debt ceiling is 
"overrated,"176 it is plausible to infer that these institutions are more 
likely to explicitly or implicitly promote constitutional hardball-urging 
officials to upend governmental norms, just as these institutions them-
selves upended elite extragovernmental norms, when necessary to rescue 
the country or the Constitution from the damage being done by political 
opponents. 
B. Asymmetric Ideologi,cal Commitments 
The two coalitions that make up our major political parties once 
teemed with internal ideological diversity. In recent decades, however, 
they have become increasingly ideologically coherent and distinct. 177 The 
174. Many of the right's leading mediating institutions are also more willing to 
challenge perceived moderates on their own side. See, e.g., Konczal, supra note 133 
(" [T]he Heritage Foundation has been willing to burn relationships with [moderate] 
House Republicans to maintain outside pressure, something inconceivable for liberal org-
anizations, much less centrist ones like the Brookings Institution, to do."). 
175. See Jane Mayer, Roger Ailes, the Clintons, and the Scandals of the 
Scandalmongers, New Yorker (Aug. 24, 2016), http:/ /www.newyorker.com/news/daily-
comment/roger-ailes-the-dintons-and-the-scandals-of-the-s;candalmongers [http:/ /perma.cc/ 
5DQY-S7X9] (discussing "Fox's breathless coverage of the Clinton-impeachment pro-
ceedings"); see also Monica Lewinsky, Opinion, Monica Lewinsky: Roger Ailes's Dream 
Was My Nightmare, N.Y. Times (May 22, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/22/ 
opinion/monica-lewinsky-roger-ailess-dream-was-my-nightmare.html (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (stating that Roger Ailes, as head of Fox News, "took the story of the 
[Clinton-Lewinsky] affair and the trial that followed and made certain his anchors ham-
mered it ceaselessly, 24 hours a day"). 
176. Michael D. Tanner, The Overrated Debt Ceiling, Cato Inst. (Jan. 15, 2013), 
http:/ /www.cato.org/publications/ commentary/ overrated-debt-ceiling [http://perma.cc/ 
ZPQ8-9NGE]; see also, e.g., Tad DeHaven, The Debt Ceiling Game, Cato Inst. (Feb. 22, 
2011), http:/ /www.cato.org/publications/ commentary/ debt-ceiling-game [http:/ /perma.cc/ 
8S7L-6ZG7] ("The political stakes in the latest debt ceiling game are high. The conse-
quences of failing to use it as an opportunity to start reining in the federal government are 
even higher."). 
177. See, e.g., Barber & McCarty, supra note 101, at 20-21 ("From the 1930s until the 
mid-1970s,... [n]ot only were [roll-call voting] differences between the typical 
Democratic and Republican legislators small, but there also were significant numbers of 
conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans."); id. at 21-22 (noting that, "[s]ince the 
1970s, ... there has been a steady and steep increase in the polarization of both the House 
and Senate" and that "[m] any issues that were once distinct from the party-conflict 
dimension have been absorbed into it"); Robert S. Erikson et al., Public Opinion in the 
States: A Quarter Century of Change and Stability, in Public Opinion in State Politics 229, 
238 (Jeffrey E. Cohen ed., 2006) ("It is approaching common knowledge that the United 
States is becoming increasingly polarized in terms of the party-ideology connection."); 
Yphtach Lelkes, Mass Polarization: Manifestations and Measurements, 80 Pub. Opinion Q. 
392, 395 (2016) (arguing that while evidence of some forms of polarization is more con-
tested, evidence of increased "alignment between party identity and issue attitudes" in the 
mass public is unequivocal); see also Daryl]. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of 
Parties, Not Powers, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2311, 2333 & nn.80--83 (2006) (reviewing the liter-
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resulting polarization opens the door to constitutional hardball on both 
sides. As a general matter, if each party has many moderates in office, or 
if many high-profile policy issues do not break neatly along party lines, 
there will be many opportunities for bipartisan bargaining and com-
promise. Legislators who contemplated hardball tactics in the mid-
twentieth century could expect to encounter opposition within their own 
party, making such tactics not only costlier to pursue but also less effec-
tive.178 As we suggested at the outset and began to flesh out in preceding 
sections, the fact that polarization itself has been asymmetric since the 
1970s-with Republicans moving further to the right than Democrats 
have moved to the left-is likely bound up on several levels with the rise 
of asymmetric constitutional hardball over the past twenty-five years. 179 
The main question we examine in this section is slightly different. So 
far we have talked of polarization (and its asymmetric character) largely 
without regard to the specific ideological commitments around which 
the parties have come to cohere. Does the content of those commitments 
also have implications for each side's propensity to play constitutional 
hardball? The answer to this question may play a significant role in de-
termining whether use of these tactics remains asymmetric in the years 
ahead. 
We believe that the answer is yes-that constitutional hardball can-
not be well understood without taking into account the values and ideas 
espoused by its practitioners. The axes of disagreement between the two 
major party coalitions now include views about (i) government, (ii) the 
Constitution, and (iii) the stakes of constitutional politics, all of which 
bear on officeholders' assessments of the risks and rewards of engaging 
in certain forms of constitutional hardball. These ideological factors 
complement, and to some degree underpin, the institutional and elec-
toral incentives discussed above. 180 
ature on party polarization and ideological coherence). The increasing distinctness of the 
parties in terms of ideology and policy preferences does not mean that either party lacks 
internal disagreement. But it does mean that there is less room than before for agreement 
across party lines. 
178. Cf. supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship be-
tween party unity and constitutional hardball). 
179. See supra notes 11, 101-106 and accompanying text; supra section III.A. 
180. Some political science models of legislators' behavior focus almost exclusively on 
their electoral incentives. See, e.g., David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection 
13 (1974) (positing that "United States congressmen are interested in getting reelected-
indeed, ... interested in nothing else"); see also Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, 
and Impartial Justice, 58 Duke LJ. 623, 646 (2009) (describing Professor Mayhew's 
electoral-incentive assumption as "the central principle in theories about legislative 
politics and empirical analyses of it"). Other models assume that legislators are motivated 
in significant part by a desire to implement their own views. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, 
Beyond Public Choice: Comprehensive Rationality in the Writing and Reading of Statutes, 
66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 14-45 (1991) (critiquing the legislator "re-election-maximizer" model 
and emphasizing the role of ideological motivations). The analysis of asymmetric constitu-
tional hardball offered in this section does not depend on which of these two models is 
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l. Views of Government and the Costs of Constitutional Hardball. - Some 
of the last several decades' most forceful-and Republican-identified-
forms of constitutional hardball drew their force from the way in which 
they threatened to disrupt the ordinary operations of government. The 
thousand-plus subpoenas that Representative Burton issued to the 
Clinton Administration consumed an enormous amount of executive 
branch time and energy.181 The routinization of Senate filibusters under 
President Obama made it more difficult to advance legislation and nom-
inations.182 Government shutdowns under both Clinton and Obama 
forced agencies to curtail nonessential operations and services for 
nontrivial periods of time.183 Lately, large blocs of Republican legislators 
have flirted with defaulting on the national debt, with potentially severe 
economic and geostrategic consequences, by failing to raise Congress's 
self-imposed "debt ceiling."184 All of these tactics seek to gain political 
leverage through behaviors that risk hobbling the government. 
Whether this seems like a worthwhile risk to take depends in part on 
one's views about how bad it would be to hobble the government. That 
question is a proxy for what one thinks about the value of the institution. 
Is government primarily a force for good that implements important 
public values, or is it primarily an impediment to individual freedom and 
a source of corruption and waste? There is ample reason to believe that 
Republicans' views on this question lubricate the path to constitutional 
more accurate, as the ideological commitments we consider are widely espoused both by 
politicians themselves and by many of the key players within each of the party coalitions. 
181. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
182. See supra note 70 and accompanying text; see also Josh Chafetz, Congress's 
Constitution, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 715, 762 (2012) (explaining that the filibuster, as of 2012, 
operated "as an absolute bar to the passage of measures that command[ed) the support of 
fewer than sixty Senators"). 
183. See supra notes 30, 56, 72 and accompanying text. This is constitutional hardball 
of the convention-straining kind, although after the government shutdowns of the mid-
l 990s, 2013, and now 2018, see supra note 13, it is becoming less certain that there is a 
convention against shutting down the government over policy disagreements. 
184. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. The debt ceiling is a particularly 
interesting animal from the perspective of constitutional hardball. Imposing the statutory 
ceiling was not itself a form of constitutional hardball, so much as an act of symbolic 
politics intended to signify opposition to excessive debt. See Neil H. Buchanan & Michael 
C. Dorf, How to Choose the Least Unconstitutional Option: Lessons for the President 
(and Others) from the Debt Ceiling Standoff, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 1175, 1201 (2012). 
However, once the law was in place and subject to periodic votes to increase the ceiling in 
line with the amounts necessary to close the gap between the money Congress 
appropriates and the money it raises, the debt ceiling created the possibility of a 
particularly dangerous form of hardball: brinkmanship over default. See Jonathan Chait, 
The Shutdown Prophet, N.Y. Mag. (Oct. 4, 2013), http:/ /nymag.com/news/politics/ 
nationalinterest/government-shutdown-2013-10 [http:/ /perma.cc/LCC4-WKSHJ ("Lift-
ing the debt ceiling, a vestigial ritual in which Congress votes to approve payment of the 
debts it has already incurred, is almost a symbolic event, except that not doing it would 
wreak unpredictable and possibly enormous worldwide economic havoc."). 
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hardball. 185 The value of government--especially, but not only, the federal 
government-has become a point of deep division between the parties, 
with contemporary Republicans more likely to oppose taxes186 and "view 
the [state] with suspicion even when in power," and Democrats more 
likely to trust public entities and experts and to believe "a strong gov-
ernment is necessary in order to counterbalance private economic dom-
ination. "187 H conservatives assume that they have largely lost the war to 
limit the size and scope of the federal government, that by itself may tend 
to make certain forms of government-hobbling constitutional hardball 
appealing, as a sort of guerrilla tactic or rearguard action.188 
185. As Mike Konczal observes, "liberals and those to their left look to government to 
provide for the common good, and therefore have an interest in showing that the govern-
ment can work well." Konczal, supra note 133. For conservatives, in contrast, "sabotage of 
governmental processes is useful"; "when domestic government fails in the eyes of the 
public ... it serves the right politically." Id.; see also Mike Lofgren, Goodbye to All That: 
Reflections of a GOP Operative Who Left the Cult, Truthout (Sept. 3, 2011), 
http://www. truth-out. org/ opinion/ i tern/ 3079:good bye-to-all-that-reflections-of-a-gop-
operative-who-left-the-cult [http:/ /perma.cc/X76F-N4LX] (critiquing "the long-term 
Republican strategy of undermining confidence in our democratic institutions" and link-
ing this strategy to tactics of "political terrorism"); id. ("A couple of years ago, a Republican 
committee staff director told me candidly (and proudly) what the method was to all this 
obstruction and disruption .... By sabotaging the reputation of an institution of govern-
ment, the party that is programmatically against government would come out the relative 
winner."); Alec MacGillis, Opinion, Can Democrats Be as Stubborn as Mitch McConnell?, 
N.Y. Times (Feb. 5, 2017), http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2017 /02/03/ opinion/ can-the-
democrats-be-as-stubborn-as-mitch-mcconnell.html ( on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
(stating that Democrats "are more philosophically invested in showing that government 
can function" and that this makes it unclear whether they could "really bring themselves 
to replicate [Senator Mitch] McConnell's obstructionist methods"). 
186. See David Scott Louk & David Gamage, Preventing Government Shutdowns: 
Designing Default Rules for Budgets, 86 U. Colo. L. Rev. 181, 206 (2015) (arguing that the 
"emergence of a broad anti-tax sentiment among conservatives" in the 1970s, coupled 
with political polarization, has enhanced incentives for many Republican representatives 
"to participate in game-of-chicken-style [budget] negotiations"). 
187. Freeman, supra note 105, at 336-37; see also Russell Heimlich, Wide Gap 
Between Republicans, Democrats in Views of Government Effectiveness, Pew Research 
Ctr.: Fact Tank (June 7, 2012), http:/ /www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2012/06/07 /wide-
gap-between-republicans-democrats-in-views-of-government-effectiveness [http:/ /perma.cc/ 
EZ4C-S6S3] (" About three-fourths of Republicans (77%) say that when something is run 
by the government it is usually inefficient and wasteful .... In contrast, just 41 % of 
Democrats say the same .... "); Frank Newport, On Economy, Republicans Trust Business; 
Dems Trust Gov't, Gallup (Mar. 12, 2009), http:/ /www.gallup.com/poll/116599/ 
economy-republicans-trust-business-dems-trust-gov.aspx ( on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) ("While 64% of Republicans say they place more trust in businesses to solve the na-
tion's economic problems, 72% of Democrats say they trust the government more, under-
scoring the enormous philosophical divide in the way Republicans and Democrats view the 
government's role in solving the country's economic problems."). The proportion of 
Republicans and Democrats who report negative views of government rises when the presi-
dency is controlled by the other political party. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 55, at 1119-
20; Heimlich, supra. 
188. We thank Peter Schuck for this point. 
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Republican rhetoric surrounding recent government shutdowns and 
threatened shutdowns vividly conveys the connection between consti-
tutional hardball and views of government. Asked about a possible veto 
by President Clinton of a balanced budget bill in 1995, House Speaker 
Gingrich retorted, "Which of the two of us do you think worries more 
about the government not showing up?" 189 "We're very excited," 
Representative Michele Bachmann said on the eve of the 2013 shutdown 
over the ACA. "It's exactly what we wanted, and we got it." 190 Prominent 
conservative commentators amplified these sentiments. "Bring on the 
shutdown," wrote Tom Giovanetti, president of the libertarian Institute 
for Policy Innovation, in 2011. "Every day that Americans wake up and 
find that the coffee still brews and the water still comes out of the faucet 
without the assistance of the federal government, Republicans win. "191 
RedState contributor Jeff Emanuel celebrated a shutdown that same year 
as a means to combat "our bloated, overfunded (with borrowed money), 
unsustainable government, which is badly in need of trimming and 
streamlining."192 RedState's then-editor-in-chief Erick Erickson tweeted in 
2010: "The upside? No laws passed. No gov't spending. Can't wait for the 
shutdown." 193 Picking up on these attitudes toward the federal govern-
ment, President Trump recently touted the idea of a shutdown, even in a 
period of unified Republican control of Congress, as a way to "fix [the] 
mess" in Washington. 194 
189. Karen Tumulty, Getting the Edge, Time, June 5, 1995, at 22, 22. Reflecting on 
this episode in 2013, Gingrich enthused: "I helped close the government twice. It actually 
worked. Bill Clinton came in and said 'the era of big government is over' after two clo-
sures, not before." Liz Marlantes, Republicans Talk Up a 'Government Shutdown.' Do 
They Mean It?, Christian Sci. Monitor Qan. 7, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), 
http:/ /www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/Decoder/2013/0107 /Republicans-talk-up-
a-government-shutdown.-Do-they-mean-it [http:/ /perma.cc/GZ3E-Z48T]; cf. Hacker 
& Pierson, No Cost for Extremism, supra note 90 (describing Gingrich's political strategy, 
when in the House, as "simultaneously ratcheting up dysfunction and disgust while more 
sharply distinguishing the GOP as the anti-government party"). 
190. Ed O'Keefe & Rosalind S. Helderman, On Cusp of Shutdown, House 
Conservatives Excited, Say They Are Doing the Right Thing, Wash. Post (Sept. 28, 2013), 
http://wapo.st/l4Tl7rl [http://perma.cc/C34E-FSUP]. 
191. David Mark, Would a Government Shutdown Be that Bad?, Politico: The Arena 
(Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.politico.com/arena/archive/would-a-government-shutdown-
be-that-bad.html [http:/ /perma.cc/J2FM-5ECA]. 
192. Id. 
193. Erick Erickson (@EWErickson), Twitter (Aug. 30, 2010), http:/ /twitter.com/ 
EWErickson/status/22571962647 [http:/ /perma.cc/C7F3-2FM7]. 
194. Donald]. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (May 2, 2017), http://twitter.com/ 
realDonaldTrump/status/859393829505552385 [http:/ /perma.cc/91Yf-KJ55] ("Our 
country needs a good 'shutdown' in September to fix mess!"). In light of the connection 
between constitutional hardball and views of government, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
when Democrats tried to borrow this particular page from the Republican playbook and 
shut down the government in January 2018, they began looking for an exit strategy almost 
immediately-and after one weekday allowed the government to reopen without obtain-
ing any significant concessions. See supra note 13. 
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It is less clear whether this divide over the value of government 
affects the parties' propensity to engage in other types of constitutional 
hardball that do not have such obvious implications for government 
capacity. We might draw a distinction here between obstruction-creating 
forms of constitutional hardball and obstruction-clearing forms of 
constitutional hardball. The latter aim to minimize or circumvent bar-
riers that have arisen-sometimes as a result of forceful uncompromising 
methods by the other side-to prevent legislative or administrative 
action. Such forms of hardball enable the government to get things done. 
President Obama's most controversial recess appointments and executive 
initiatives, for instance, were pitched in these terms.195 Even if Democratic 
officeholders are more likely than Republicans to be constrained by a 
commitment to "the smooth functioning of government," 196 as a former 
aide to Senator Harry Reid asserted last year, their corollary commitment 
to a strong government that solves economic problems197 may have dis-
inhibiting effects. 
Overall, though, it seems safe to assume that the practice of con-
stitutional hardball, and especially obstruction-creating hardball, tends in 
the aggregate to raise the transaction costs of governance. It may also 
lead to less durable and effective policy, insofar as it pushes those in 
power toward relatively precarious or piecemeal solutions that do not 
command broad bipartisan support and do not necessarily become 
legally entrenched. These policy consequences, in turn, may contribute 
to a decline in public trust in government as well as an exacerbation of 
constitutional conflict. 198 And so on multiple levels, one would expect 
that a party whose main commitments are framed in terms of incapa-
citating the govemment199 would have a stronger political motivation to 
engage in more, and more destabilizing, forms of constitutional hardball. 
Conversely, one would expect that a party whose commitments are 
195. See Pozen, Self-Help, supra note 22, at 4-8, 41-47. 
196. Adam Jentleson, Senate Democrats Have the Power to Stop Trump. All They 
Have to Do Is Use It., Wash. Post (Jan. 27, 2017), http:/ /wapo.st/~FGKGP?tid=ss [http:// 
perma.cc/v\'.)'N9-6ZBL] ("The kind of universal obstruction pioneered by McConnell dur-
ing Obama's presidency is not in Democrats' nature: They believe in the smooth function-
ing of government."). 
197. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
198. Cf. Richard H. Fallon,Jr.,Judicial Supremacy, Departmentalism, and the Rule of 
Law in a Populist Age, 96 Tex. L. Rev. 487, 548 (2018) ("Through much, though not all, of 
our history, individual and institutional norms of accommodation and restraint have play-
ed invaluable roles in averting both governmental paralysis and constitutional crises."). 
199. Of course, Republican officeholders may seek to expand various public-sector 
functions (for instance, law enforcement and national security), while Democratic office-
holders may seek to limit various other public-sector functions for reasons of principle or 
political calculation (as with welfare reform under President Clinton). Still, the two parties 
differ starkly in their rhetoric, framing, and self-conception in relation to the general pro-
ject of governance. 
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framed primarily in terms that demand government action would, as a 
general matter, be warier of constitutional hardball. 
2. Originalism, Constitutional Restorationism, and Forms of Fidelity. - In 
addition to becoming more ideologically coherent and distinct, the 
parties have also become more constitutionally coherent and distinct over 
the past several decades. As numerous scholars have observed, the 
Republican Party has been associated since the 1980s with the inter-
pretive theory of originalism,200 often paired in political discourse with a 
commitment to judicial restraint and strict construction of the federal 
government's powers.201 The rise of the Tea Party only intensified these 
associations.202 The Democratic Party, on the other hand, has been 
identified with a philosophy of "living constitutionalism" that is plural-
istic as to interpretive method but generally concerned to construe the 
Constitution in a manner that safeguards canonical precedents and 
supports contemporary needs and values.203 
200. See, e.g.,Jamal Greene et al., Profiling Originalism, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 356, 373 
(2011) ("Eighty-five percent of originalists [in surveys from 2009 and 2010] identify as or 
lean toward Republican ... , whereas 21 % of nonoriginalists identify as or lean toward 
Republican .... "); id. at 398 ("[A]mong those who identify as 'strong Republicans,' 59% 
are originalists, and among those who identify as 'extremely conservative,' 78% are ori-
ginalists."); John 0. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Supermajority Rules and the 
Judicial Confirmation Process, 26 Cardozo L. Rev. 543, 554 (2005) (" [ 0] ur parties now 
seem to be divided on originalism, with the Republican Party much more sympathetic to 
originalism and the Democratic Party opposed."); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism 
as a Political Practice: The Right's Living Constitution, 75 Fordham L. Rev. 545, 554-74 
(2006) (discussing the rise of originalism as a political practice on the right). "Begin-
ning ... in the 1980s, originalism gave conservative activists a language in which to attack 
the progressive case law of the Warren Court on the grounds that it had 'almost nothing to 
do with the Constitution' and was merely an effort to enact 'the political agenda of the 
American left.'" Post & Siegel, supra, at 555 (quoting Lino A. Graglia, "Constitutional 
Theory": The Attempted Justification for the Supreme Court's Liberal Political Program, 
65 Tex. L. Rev. 789,789 (1987)). 
201. See Neil S. Siegel, Interring the Rhetoric of Judicial Activism, 59 DePaul L. Rev. 
555, 557-74 (2010) (describing the development of these themes in Republican political 
rhetoric). 
202. See Greene et al., supra note 200, at 356 ("Two of the largest Tea Party organi-
zations have been at odds on occasion, but they both agree on a commitment to the inten-
tions of the Framers."); Kate Zemike, Injustice Confirmation Hearings, Echoes of the Tea 
Party, N.Y. Times (July 2, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/03/us/politics/ 
03constitution.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("The Tea Party is often called 
'loosely organized,' but the unifying philosophy for groups across the country is a belief 
that the nation can solve its problems-primarily its economic problems, which is what its 
supporters care most about-if lawmakers stick to a strict interpretation of the 
Constitution."). 
203. See, e.g., 2 Howard Gillman et al., American Constitutionalism: Rights and 
Liberties 690 (2d ed. 2017) ("Democrats retain ... constitutional commitments from the 
New Deal/Great Society Era. Liberal . . . commentators either insist on a living 
Constitution or devise an originalism that requires constitutional interpreters to under-
stand the original meaning of constitutional language in terms of contemporary un-
derstandings of the principles laid down in 1791 or 1868."); Mark A. Graber, Judicial 
Supremacy and the Structure of Partisan Conflict, 50 Ind. L. Rev. 141, 168 (2016) ("The 
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This partisan divide is itself asymmetric. While both coalitions have 
developed increasingly clear views about the basic direction in which they 
would like to see constitutional law go, 204 Republican politicians and 
activists have promoted their themes-originalism, strict construction, ju-
dicial restraint-far more vigorously than Democrats have promoted any 
alternative high-level constitutional vision.205 Republican and Democratic 
voters show the same asymmetry, whether as a consequence of their poli-
ticians' rhetoric or a cause of it or both. Significantly more Republicans 
tell pollsters that they regard the Supreme Court as an important or the 
most important issue when they vote for President,206 and the content of 
their views about the Court indicates that "originalism has been trans-
lated into common parlance with some success." 207 
As suggested above,208 the Republican Party's embrace of originalism 
and its denigration of living constitutionalism may be relevant to its 
propensity to play constitutional hardball, in at least two ways. Rhe-
torically, these arguments have contributed to a narrative of constitu-
tional corruption that authorizes, and maybe even requires, bold moves 
to recover a prelapsarian past. Conceptually, these arguments frame con-
stitutional fidelity in a manner that heavily discounts the importance of 
judicial precedent and of unwritten norms that have developed over time 
to structure and facilitate the government's work. The combination sup-
plies both motivation and justification for acts of hardball that aim to 
deprive Democrats of the opportunity to make or apply constitutional 
law. 
Uniting its stances on constitutional interpretation, constitutional 
history, and the proper role of government, we might say that the 
contemporary Republican and Democratic Parties champion very different constitutional 
approaches and visions. Republicans are originalists while Democrats celebrate a living 
constitution."). 
204. See H.W. Perry, Jr. & L.A. Powe, Jr., The Political Battle for the Constitution, 21 
Const. Comment. 641, 641-45, 649-89 (2004) (detailing how the two parties have devel-
oped "fundamentally different" constitutional philosophies and agendas since the Warren 
Court era). 
205. See Simon Lazarus, Hertz or Avis? Progressives' Quest to Reclaim the 
Constitution and the Courts, 72 Ohio St. LJ. 1201, 1214 (2011) ("During the last three 
decades, while ... conservative advocates, politicians, and judges never missed an oppor-
tunity to trumpet their fealty to the 'original' Constitution, the Framers' intent, 'strict con-
struction,' and '.judges who do not legislate from the bench,' their ... progressive adver-
saries were all but mute on these issues."). 
206. See, e.g., Karlyn Bowman, Reading the Polls: Supreme Court Nominations, Public 
Opinion and Litmus Tests, Forbes (Jan. 30, 2017), http:/ /www.forbes.com/sites/ 
bowmanmarsico/2017 /01/30/reading-the-polls-supreme-court-nominations-public-opinion-
and-litmus-tests [http:/ /perma.cc/6MH4-TA2C] (reporting on 2016 national exit-poll 
data showing that voters who said Court appointments were the most important factor in 
their vote split 56% to 41 % for Trump, whereas voters who said Court appointments were 
not a factor at all in their vote split 55% to 37% for Clinton). 
207. Greene et al., supra note 200, at 417. 
208. See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text. 
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Republican Party has cultivated a politics of constitutional restorationism. 
One extreme form of this politics centers on the "Constitution in exile," 
or the belief that the entire edifice of New Deal precedents enabling the 
growth of congressional and administrative power is unsupportable and 
ought to be overturned.209 But well short of the Constitution-in-exile 
position, Republican activists have mobilized around ideas and tropes of 
constitutional restorationism for years now.210 In political time, in other 
words, it seems that both sides' basic constitutional outlooks remain the 
ones that were forged in the 1970s and '80s, when a more rightward-
leaning Supreme Court began to reshape the jurisprudence of the pre-
vious era. Wielding the charge of judicial activism and, subsequently, the 
theory of originalism, Republican officials going back to President Nixon 
have agreed on the necessity of restoring the Constitution's true, real, 
lost meaning in the face of subversion by liberal judges and politicians. 
This view lends itself naturally to engaging in constitutional hard-
ball. The more illegitimate the other side's constitutional usurpations, 
the more legitimate are the measures taken to counter them211-up to 
and including "united and unyielding opposition" to a President's 
agenda212 or flatly refusing to consider a Supreme Court nominee.213 And 
if the key inputs into constitutional analysis are those that illuminate the 
meaning of the text at the time of its adoption, then the institutional 
norms and settlements that developed over the course of the twentieth 
century are not necessarily owed any constitutional respect, whether as a 
matter of precedent, prudence, or epistemic insight. 
None of this is to suggest that Republicans' views on constitutional 
hardball and their ideas about originalism or the lost Constitution will 
209. See generally Symposium, The Constitution in Exile, 51 Duke LJ. 1 (2001). For a 
classic statement of these themes, see Douglas H. Ginsburg, Delegation Running Riot, 
Regulation, Winter 1995, at 83, 84 (book review) (contending that "for 60 years the 
nondelegation doctrine" and related doctrines such as "enumerated powers" have been 
"banished for standing in opposition to unlimited government" and hence have "existed 
only as part of the Constitution-in-exile"). 
210. See Peter Beinart, The Republican Obsession with 'Restoring' America, Atlantic 
(Nov. 13, 2014), http:/ /www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/ll/the-republican-
obsession-with-restoring-america/382689 [http:/ /perma.cc/5ZCM-8UY6] (noting that 
conservative politicians "love the word 'restore'" and that the 2012 "Republican platform 
promised the 'Restoring of the American Dream' and the 'Restoration of Constitutional 
Government'"); see also Randy Barnett, Constitution in Exile?, Legal Affairs: Debate Club 
(May 2, 2005), http://legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/debateclub_cie0505.msp [http:// 
perma.cc/V8ZQQ3SY] (denying that there is a "'Constitution in Exile' movement" but 
defending originalism and linking it to the idea of the "Lost Constitution," which "is 
about restoring various provisions of the written text that have been gutted or weakened 
by judicial decisions"). For a more recent example, see generally Senator Mike Lee, Our 
Lost Constitution: The Willful Subversion of America's Founding Document (2015). 
211. See generally Pozen, Self-Help, supra note 22, at 61-76 (describing norms of 
proportionality that have traditionally constrained "constitutional countermeasures"). 
212. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
213. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text. 
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always or necessarily be in perfect alignment. Most people's con-
stitutional beliefs seem to be motivated in complex and often uncon-
scious ways by their political preferences, moral values, and cultural 
worldviews,214 and there is no reason to think that partisans on the right 
(or left) would be an exception.215 People's views about the efficacy and 
desirability of constitutional hardball are likewise the product of a range 
of factors. But at a minimum, ideas about originalism and the lost 
Constitution furnish a powerful legal vocabulary and conceptual toolkit 
with which to explain, defend, and rally around constitutional hardball. 
Along with its resonance with conservative voters' moral and cultural 
commitments, part of what makes originalist talk of constitutional restor-
ation such a powerful discursive mode, and one that creates such a 
hospitable climate for constitutional hardball, is that it works on different 
levels for different audiences. Some appeals to originalism function as a 
kind of "value-laden ... symbolic language" for the Republican elec-
torate,216 while others are highly nuanced-indeed, far more nuanced 
than the opinions of the Supreme Court-and suitable for debate among 
legal theorists, historians, and philosophers of language.217 The more 
sophisticated versions cast a vague legitimating halo over the less sophi-
sticated versions.218 Ordinary voters may not know the difference between 
original expected application and original public meaning, but they get 
the message that liberal courts have gone wild, administrative agencies 
have ballooned, and drastic measures are needed to rein them in.219 
214. See Pozen, Bad Faith, supra note 22, at 934-39. 
215. Cf. Greene et al., supra note 200, at 375-85 (presenting survey evidence showing 
that originalists tend to be "more religious, conservative," "morally traditionalist, and 
economically libertarian" and "to hold the predictably conservative views on the 'hot' 
constitutional controversies of the day," including abortion, gay rights, gun rights, school 
prayer, and the death penalty). 
216. Jamal Greene, How Constitutional Theory Matters, 72 Ohio St. LJ. 1183, 1192 
(2011). 
217. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. Chi. L. Rev. 269, 
269-72 (2017) (offering an account of originalist methodology that draws on "legal theory 
and theoretical linguistics," using three meanings of the word "meaning," two conceptions 
of "content," and a master distinction between "constitutional interpretation" and "consti-
tutional construction"). Without taking anything away from the impressiveness or impor-
tance of work of this kind, it is fuir to assume that most voters and politicians who endorse 
"originalism" are unaware of these distinctions. 
218. See Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A Life 
Cycle Theory of Legal Theories, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1819, 1886 (2016) (discussing "the 
potentially productive tension between byzantine academic defenses of a [legal] theory 
and the existence in popular discourse of a simpler, idealized version of that theory" and 
noting that "scholars have posited just such a double life in the case of originalism"). 
219. Republican Senators routinely draw a connection between nonoriginalism and 
judicial activism in arguments addressed to their supporters and constituents. See, e.g., 
Press Release, Sen. Marco Rubio, Rubio Praises Nomination of Judge Neil Gorsuch to the 
U.S. Supreme Court (Jan. 31, 2017), http://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfrn/press-
releases?id=FA887AB9-2CC7-4COA-8797-45AB8A05350E [http:/ /perma.cc/9PFX-8N7T] 
("Most importantly, Uudge Gorsuch] is committed to the principles of original intent and 
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Originalist talk of constitutional restoration simultaneously provides pro-
fessional respectability and populist ballast for a political coalition that, 
while conceiving of itself as an insurgent challenger to a left-wing 
judiciary, has controlled the Supreme Court for over forty years.220 The 
Court's conservatism, in turn, feeds back into the dynamics of consti-
tutional hardball by decreasing the odds (real or perceived) that 
Republican hardball will be met with a judicial rebuke. 221 
This same historical trajectory has had a very different effect on the 
other major political coalition and its orientation toward the Constitution. 
Democrats have been on the defensive in American constitutional po-
litics since the late 1970s, and this has put a premium on articulating 
arguments for leaving past gains in place.222 Like conservatives, liberals 
have come to insist on particular forms of constitutional fidelity. But 
instead of aligning themselves with the Founders' Constitution and 
advancing claims about its "true" meaning, they tend to align themselves 
with the constitutional law that has developed in certain transformative 
periods of American history, especially Reconstruction and the Second 
Reconstruction that took place from 1954 through the early 1970s. 
Liberals argue for fidelity to, among other things, the Reconstruction 
Amendments;223 Brown v. Board of Education's promise of racial 
judicial restraint. This is critical, because too many in the federal judiciary today believe it 
is appropriate for judges to invent new policies and rights instead of interpreting and 
defending the Constitution as it is written."). 
220. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Opinion, The Conservative Era of the Supreme Court Is 
Over [sic], L.A. Times Qune 29, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-
chemerinsky-end-of-conservative-supreme-court-20160628-snap-story.html (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) ("From the time President Nixon's fourth court nominee was con-
firmed in 1971 until Justice Antonin Scalia's death in February (2016], there have always 
been five ideologically conservative Republican appointees on the bench."). 
221. Cf. Lee Epstein, Some Thoughts on the Study of Judicial Behavior, 57 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 2017, 2041-44 (2016) (reviewing empirical research showing that "[n]o 
matter how we measure it, ideology plays a role in judicial decisions," although adding 
that "ideological ( or partisan) motivations have their limits"); Michael S. Kang & Joanna 
M. Shepherd, The Long Shadow of Bush v. Gore: Judicial Partisanship in Election Cases, 68 
Stan. L. Rev. 14ll, 1424 (2016) (observing that "the partisanship of the many judges and 
political actors in the 2000 postelection process uncannily predicted their decisionmaking 
for and against Bush and Gore"). 
222. The point transcends constitutional politics. See Tony Judt, What Is Living and 
What Is Dead in Social Democracy?, in When the Facts Change: Essays, 1995-2010, at 319, 
337 Qennifer Homans ed., 2015) ("The Left, to be quite blunt about it, has something to 
conserve. It is the Right that has inherited the ambitious modernist urge to destroy and in-
novate in the name of a universal project."). 
223. See Pozen, Bad Faith, supra note 22, at 927 (noting the "strain of commentary on 
the political left [that] accuses conservatives of refusing to accept the full scope of con-
stitutional change wrought by the Reconstruction Amendments"); cf. Kermit Roosevelt III, 
Reconstruction and Resistance, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 121, 141-42 (2012) (book review) (discuss-
ing the "constant struggle" in constitutional politics "between the values of the Founding 
and the values of Reconstruction," in which "Reconstruction stands for equality, for 
broader federal authority, for federal rights and federal laws protecting individuals from 
their own states"). 
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integration;224 Roe v. Wade's promise of reproductive autonomy;225 and 
the precedents of the Warren Court that set the high-water mark for 
liberal constitutional interpretation in a variety of spheres, especially 
those having to do with electoral representation and the rights of the 
politically disempowered. 226 
From the perspective of this sort of fidelity, plenty has been lost in 
recent decades, and there is plenty to restore. A few recent Supreme 
Court decisions, above all Citizens United v. FEC, have stirred Democratic 
voters and politicians to call for dramatic change, such as a constitutional 
amendment or a judicial reversal.227 But for the most part, liberal consti-
tutionalism in recent decades has instead emphasized fidelity to mid-
twentieth-century precedents and to the established order.228 If anything, 
224. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Constitutional Law as 
Trademark, 43 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 385, 401--05 (2009) (discussing the political struggle 
over Brown's legacy and liberals' commitment to an "antisubordination" account that 
"sees the promise of Brown as the full integration of African Americans (and other 
historically excluded groups) into American society, rather than the abolition of formal 
racial distinctions"). 
225. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see Perry & Powe, supra note 204, at 670-78 (reviewing the 
development of the parties' positions on constitutional abortion rights since Roe). 
Compare, e.g., Democratic Nat'! Comm., Moving America Forward: 2012 Democratic 
National Platform 18 (2012), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/papers_pdf/101962.pdf 
[http:/ /perma.cc/93NF-S9E3] ("The Democratic Party strongly and unequivocally sup-
ports Roe v. Wade and a woman's right to make decisions regarding her pregnancy .... We 
oppose any and all efforts to weaken or undermine that right."), with Republican Nat'! 
Comm., We Believe in America: 2012 Republican Platform 13-14 (2012), http:// 
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/papers_pdf/101961.pdf [http:/ /perma.cc/XA4F-F7R4] ("We 
support a human life amendment to the Constitution and endorse legislation to make 
clear that the Fourteenth Amendment's protections apply to unborn children."). 
226. See, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Ali to, Jr. to Be 
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 728, 730 (2006) (statement of "veteran civil rights 
attorney" Fred D. Gray) ("I cannot overstate to this Committee the importance of [the 
Warren Court voting rights] cases, for they laid the foundation for our democracy .... A 
nominee to the Supreme Court who has a judicial philosophy ... set against ... the reap-
portionment cases is ... saying that he would tum the clock back."). In Professor James 
Fleming's terms, liberals are more likely to conceive of constitutional fidelity as a matter of 
"honoring" the Constitution's "aspirational principles," rather than "following" the doc-
ument's "concrete original meanings." James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect 
Constitution: For Moral Readings and Against Originalisms 20 (2015). 
227. 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see, e.g., John Nichols, Her First 30 Days: Clinton Will 
Propose an Amendment to Overturn 'Citizens United,' Nation (July 16, 2016), http:// 
www.thenation.com/ article/her-first-30-days-clinton-will-propose-amendmen t-to-overtum-
citizens-uni ted [http:/ /perma.cc/224W-R2NU] (describing Hillary Clinton's pledge, if 
elected President, to propose an amendment "to overturn the Supreme Court's Citizens 
United decision" and the positive response this pledge received from Senator Bernie 
Sanders and "progressive activists"). 
228. See Post & Siegel, supra note 200, at 571 (" [I]n recent years, it has been liberals, 
rather than conservatives, who have been unable to find ways to connect constitutional 
vision to living political values."); id. ("In recent confirmation hearings, ... liberals have 
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the erosion of that order has prompted liberals to become even more 
staunchly protective of what remains. The net result for the Democratic 
Party has been a small-c conservative orientation toward the Constitution. 
It is an orientation that emphasizes incremental progress, the insulation 
of law from politics, and respect for the prevailing conventions and 
understandings of constitutional practice-and that, as such, is distinc-
tively unsuited to constitutional hardball. If the Republican Party's domi-
nant conception of constitutional fidelity has emboldened its officials to 
play hardball, the Democratic Party's "defensive crouch"229 since losing 
the Supreme Court has made its officials wary of staking bold claims oil 
the Constitution.230 
3. Existential Politics. - Constitutional narratives of debasement and 
restoration are consonant with a broader type of narrative in contem-
porary conservative politics: a story that something has gone fundamen-
tally awry in the republic, on the order of an existential crisis, and that 
unpatriotic liberals have allowed or caused it to happen. We use the 
phrase type of narrative because it is not a single story. Within the con-
servative movement, there are some who worry deeply about the 
unsustainability of the national debt and excessive government spending; 
others focused on the perceived threat of unchecked immigration; 
others concerned that a growing bureaucratic state is stifling private 
enterprise; others who decry a deterioration in respect for institutions 
like the family or the police; and still others who believe their side to be 
losing the "culture wars" in ways that threaten the nation's moral 
defended the constitutional values of the Warren Court by invoking stare decisis and by 
emphasizing the importance of protecting constitutional law from the taint of politics."). 
229. Cf. Mark Tushnet, Abandoning Defensive Crouch Liberal Constitutionalism, 
Balkinization (May 6, 2016), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2016/05/abandoning-defensive-
crouch-liberal.html [http:/ /perma.cc/PDJ5-LB6RJ ("Several generations of law students 
and their teachers grew up with federal courts dominated by conservatives .... The result: 
Defensive-crouch constitutionalism, with every liberal position asserted nervously, its 
proponents looking over their shoulders for retaliation by conservatives .... "). 
230. Although this is more speculative, the tenets of liberal constitutionalism itself may 
have evolved in a manner that reinforces this divide. It is arguably constitutive of post-
Warren Court liberal constitutionalism (and characterological of contemporary legal 
liberals) to venerate, on the one hand, procedural regularity and, on the other, "common-
sense notions of fairness" that can accommodate a wide range of values and groups. See, 
e.g., David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution 34 (2010) (discussing and defending the 
central role of "precedents" and "commonsense notions of fairness" in American 
constitutional practice). These commitments suggest a deferential stance toward the 
unwritten rules of the political game; they fit poorly with efforts to upend longstanding 
norms in the name of building a better constitutional order. To be sure, there will always 
be context-specific reasons that can be adduced to justify a given act of constitutional 
hardball. Democratic politicians who have used hardball tactics have hardly hung their 
heads in shame. But in general, plausible accusations that one's own side has used 
"forceful uncompromising methods" in pursuit of partisan gain, see supra note 20 and 
accompanying text (defining hardball), would seem especially uncomfortable for liberals 
whose constitutional commitments, as they have developed since the Warren Court era, 
especially emphasize pluralism, procedural regularity, and procedural fairness. 
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fabric. 231 Although it has become more ideologically coherent in recent 
decades, the conservative movement remains far from monolithic. Many 
who hold conservative positions on such issues do not frame them in 
existential terms. But many Republican Party activists and politicians do. 
As fears of the Party's own "demographic extinction"232 have mounted in 
recent years, a significant proportion of the Party's most influential media 
personalities and legislators, from Rush Limbaugh to House Speaker 
Paul Ryan to Senator Ted Crnz (a famously fierce constitutional hardball 
player233), have drawn repeatedly on these themes when describing the 
stakes of partisan politics. 234 
President Obama aroused a great deal of existential alarm on the 
right. Republican politicians questioned his commitment to principles 
231. For journalistic accounts of such narratives, see, for example, Conor Friedersdorf, 
How the Conservative Movement Enabled the Rise of Trump, Atlantic (Feb. 25, 2016), 
http:/ /www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/20l6/02/how-the-conservative-movement-
enabled-donald-trumps-rise/470727 [http:/ /perma.cc/D~9-MX7G] (describing strains in 
the conservative movement that portray the United States as "under siege," elites as con-
spiring to "have illegal aliens overrun the nation," and Democratic Party leaders as plot-
ting "to deliberately destroy the country"); Jeet Heer, Apocalypse Now and Then, New 
Republic (Jan. 14, 2016), http:/ /newrepublic.com/article/127778/apocalypse-now 
[http:/ /perma.cc/MW8J-38D4] ("The Republican Party is often portrayed as deeply 
divided against itself. . . . But the [presidential primary] debate in South Carolina on 
Thursday night made clear there is one idea that unifies the party: the strong conviction 
that we are all doomed."). 
232. Jonathan Chait, 2012 or Never, N.Y. Mag. (Feb. 26, 2012), http://nymag.com/ 
news/features/gop-primary-chait-2012-3 [http:/ /perma.cc/ZP5Y-SPVL] (describing "apo-
calyptic rhetoric" as "the premise" of the Republican Party's 2012 electoral strategy and 
arguing that such rhetoric reflects the Party's fear of "its own demographic extinction"). 
233. See, e.g., Pozen, Self-Help, supra note 22, at 45 (noting that Senator Cruz 
"employed a battery of unorthodox procedural maneuvers in a campaign to defund 
'Obamacare"'). 
234. See, e.g., Paul D. Ryan, A Roadmap for America's Future: Version 2.0, at 3 
(2010), http://paulryan.house.gov/uploadedfiles/rfafv2.0.pdf [http:/ /perma.cc/M2DE-
CARDJ ("Now America is approaching a 'tipping point' beyond which the Nation will be 
unable to change course-and this will lead to disastrous fiscal consequences, and an 
erosion of economic prosperity and the American character itself. The current admin-
istration and Congress are propelling the Nation to the brink .... "); Paul Egan, GOP 
Candidate Sen. Ted Cruz: "Our Country Is in Crisis," Det. Free Press (Sept. 19, 2015), 
http://www.freep.com/story/news/2015/09/19/gop-candidate-sen-ted-cruz-our-country-
crisis/72468618 [http:/ /perma.cc/3F4A-SD8FJ (quoting Senator Cruz as telling Republican 
voters, "It's now or never. We are bankrupting our kids and grandkids, our constitutional 
rights are under assault from Washington and America has receded from leadership in the 
world and it's made the world a much more dangerous place" (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Must Hearl!! Rush Blows the Lights Out in the Final Houri What This Election 
Is Really About and What's Really at Stake, Rush Limbaugh Show (Feb. 23, 2016), 
http:/ /www.rushlimbaugh.com/ daily /2016/02/23 / must_hear_rush_blows_the_lights_ 
out_in_the_final_hour_what_this_election_is_really_about_and_what_s_really_at_stake 
[http:/ /perma.cc/5P8C-H2RP] (" [The 2016 election is] a last chance, a last-gasp effort at 
preserving the culture that developed after the founding .... It's no more complicated 
than that, folks. The country's under siege from all quarters, and recently the Democrat[ic] 
Party has joined those who have put the country under siege."). 
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such as free-market capitalism235 and American exceptionalism,236 and 
they encouraged a "birther" movement that insisted he was born in 
Kenya and therefore ineligible to hold office.237 If one widens the his-
torical lens, however, it is apparent that this general brand of racially 
charged alarmism laced with conspiracy theory was not simply a product 
of what some called Obama Derangement Syndrome.238 Bolstered by the 
rise of fundamentalist groups and a conservative-media echo chamber, 
the "paranoid style in American politics" 239 had been making inroads 
into the Republican coalition for some time before President Obama was 
elected.240 Republican officials at the state and national level, for 
235. See, e.g., Newt Gingrich with Joe DeSantis, To Save America: Stopping Obama's 
Secular-Socialist Machine (2010). 
236. See, e.g., Darren Samuelsohn, Giuliani: Obama Doesn't Love America, Politico 
(Feb. 18, 2015), http:/ /www.politico.com/story/2015/02/rudy-giuliani-president-obama-
doesnt-love-america-115309.html [http:/ /perma.cc/B9CS-LL55]. 
237. The most prominent such advocate, of course, was President Trump. See Barack 
Obama Citizenship Conspiracy Theories, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barack_ 
Obama_citizenship_conspiracy_theories [http:/ /perma.cc/F3DK-348D] (last visited 
July 20, 2017) (reviewing the development of the birther movement into a significant po-
litical force and listing numerous Republican politicians among "[n] otable advocates of 
the view that Obama may not be eligible for the Presidency"); see also Rosenberg, supra 
note 61 (suggesting that "the birther hysteria over Obama is perhaps the sharpest re-
minde [r] of just how radical the GOP's commitment to constitutional hardball really is" 
and that this commitment is rooted in contemporary conservatives' "apocalyptic tum of 
mind"). 
238. See, e.g., Eric Boehlert, Obama Derangement Syndrome Is Terminal: The GOP 
Is Going to Make the Next Year a Living Hell, Salon Qan. 14, 2016), http:/ /www. 
salon.com/2016/01 / 14/ obama_derangement_syndrome_is_terminal_the_gop_is_going_t 
o_make_the_next_year_a_living_hell_partner [http://perma.cc/4G7P-B65T]. The prolif-
eration of "derangement syndrome" labels in our public discourse (Clinton, Bush, 
Obama, and perhaps now or soon Trump Derangement Syndrome) is itself an interesting 
indication of the fact that the story is not only about Obama but also about longer-run 
trends in American politics. Coded appeals to white racial anxieties, in particular, have 
been a strand of Republican electoral politics ever since Richard Nixon's "southern stra-
tegy," see Thomas Byrne Edsall & Mary D. Edsall, Chain Reaction: The Impact of Race, 
Rights, and Taxes on American Politics 74-98 (1991); Ian Haney L6pez, Dog Whistle 
Politics: How Coded Racial Appeals Have Reinvented Racism and Wrecked the Middle 
Class 17-34 (2014); Tali Mendelberg, The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit 
Messages, and the Norm of Equality 134-65 (2001), and demographic change has likely 
sharpened some of the anxieties that underlie this type of political strategy. 
239. Richard Hofstadter, The Paranoid Style in American Politics, Harper's Mag. 
(Nov. 1964), http:/ /harpers.org/archive/1964/11/the-paranoid-style-in-american-politics 
[http:/ /perma.cc/PR8R-SEV2]. 
240. See Cary C. Franklin, The Paranoid "Fringe" in American Politics,Jotwell (Dec. 
6, 2017), http://conlaw.jotwell.com/ the-paranoid-fringe-in-american-politics [http:// 
perma.cc/ 46PG-GX 4H]; see also supra section III.A.3 ( discussing the rise of right-wing 
media). Insofar as media outlets such as Fox News set out to undermine the credibility of 
their "mainstream" counterparts and the liberal establishment generally, it appears this 
project has been highly successful on the right. According to a recent Pew survey, liberals 
trust a "large[] mix of news outlets." Pew Research Ctr., Political Polarization and Media 
Habits, supra note 164, at 5. "Consistently conservative" individuals, in contrast, tend to 
trust only Fox News and a small number of other identifiably conservative news sources 
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instance, have been warning since Bush v. Gore, without any good evi-
dence, of a "plague" of Democratic voter fraud that imperils the elec-
toral system.241 In the 2016 election cycle, a prominent politician on the 
right edge of the Republican Party argued explicitly that if Hillary Clinton 
were to win the presidency in 2016, it would be "the last election" the 
country would ever hold, as Democrats would finally go ahead and end 
American democracy. 242 A widely cited conservative essay described the 
Trump-Clinton contest as "the Flight 93 election," in which American 
voters must "charge the cockpit or ... die." 243 Assertions like these make 
political sense only in the context of a coalition in which existential (or 
eschatological) thinking and profound suspicion of the other side play 
an important, and perhaps unifying, role.244 
(including The Sean Hannity Show, The Rush Limbaugh Show, and The Glenn Beck Program}, 
and they strongly distrust all of the major broadcast networks and national newspapers. Id. 
at 53. 
241. U.S. Senate Republican Policy Comm., Putting an End to Voter Fraud 1 (2005), 
http:/ /www.votelaw.com/blog/blogdocs/V oter%20Fraud%20Paper%20 (no%20sig). pdf 
[http:/ /perma.cc/8CKY-GCTR]; see also Lorraine C. Minnite, The Myth of Voter Fraud 
89 (2010) (describing "Republican efforts to tar the Democrats with ... fraud allega-
tions"); Thomas B. Edsall, Opinion, The Paranoid Style in American Politics Is Back, N.Y. 
Times (Sept. 8, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/08/opinion/campaign-stops/ 
the-paranoid-style-in-american-politics-is-back.html ( on file with the Columbia Law Review) 
( characterizing Republican claims of voter fraud and vote-rigging as an instance of the 
"paranoid style"). 
242. See Nikita Vladimirov, Bachmann: If Clinton Wins, 2016 Will Be "Last Election," 
Hill (Sept. 2, 2016), http:/ /thehill.com/blogs/ballot-box/presidential-races/294283-
bachmann-if-clinton-wins-2016-will-be-last-election [http://perma.cc/SWT7-2VCUJ ( quoting 
former Representative Michele Bachmann as saying, "I don't want to be melodramatic but 
I do want to be truthful. I believe without a shadow of a doubt this is the last election" 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
243. Publius Decius Mus, The Flight 93 Election, Claremont Rev. Books (Sept. 5, 
2016), http:/ /www.claremont.org/crb/basicpage/the-flight-93-election [http://perma.cc/ 
649R-LAS3]; see also id. ("To compound the metaphor: a Hillary Clinton presidency is 
Russian Roulette with a semi-auto."). The author of this essay is now reportedly "a senior 
national-security official in the Trump White House." Michael Warren, The Anonymous 
Pro-Trump "Decius" Now Works Inside the White House, Wkly. Standard (Feb. 2, 2017), 
http:/ /www.weeklystandard.com/the-anonymous-pro-trump-decius-now-works-inside-the-
white-house/article/2006623 [http:/ /perma.cc/Q37M-87SW]. 
244. Narratives of existential threat need not be entirely congruent with one another 
to help sustain a collective sense of Manichean conflict between the two parties, especially 
if they resonate with the general worldview or psychology of a party's base. That is, even if 
some members of the conservative coalition do not share or even find credible all of the 
precise fears that motivate various other members, this kind of politics has a certain 
internal momentum. If many people on your side believe that the stakes are high and 
clear, the two sides are good and evil, and the time to act is now, then there is little to be 
gained by insisting, instead, that the situation is nuanced, the other side has some good 
ideas, and the best approach is to cut a deal. 
Although we put no great weight on it, a growing body of evidence suggests that 
liberals and conservatives have different "cognitive styles," with conservatives more likely 
on average to focus on clear, stable, and persistent overall patterns in the world, and lib-
erals more likely to be "responsive to informational complexity, ambiguity[,] and novelty." 
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Existential politics is not genteel. For obvious reasons, it does not 
facilitate bipartisan compromise or foster respect for the prevailing 
norms of governance. If enough of an elected official's supporters con-
ceive of politics in existential terms, the fact that a particular tactic flouts 
constitutional conventions or settled constitutional understandings may 
count in its favor. The question is whether that flouting can be linked to a 
politically credible claim that extraordinary threats to the republic call 
for an extraordinary response. As Richard Hofstadter argued in his 
famous essay on the paranoid style, if "what is at stake is always a conflict 
between absolute good and absolute evil, what is necessary is not com-
promise but the will to fight things out to a finish. "245 
Existential themes have not played nearly so prominent a role in 
liberal political discourse in recent decades-which gives us one more 
clue as to why constitutional hardball did not similarly take hold in the 
Democratic Party during this period. The closest analogy on the 
Democratic side is telling. Many liberals with strong environmental com-
mitments view climate change as quite literally an existential threat to 
humanity, with apocalyptic implications if current trends are not re-
versed.246 Yet while environmental groups have long been important 
actors in the Democratic political coalition, Democratic officeholders 
have largely resisted framing the climate change issue in dire terms.247 
David M. Amodio et al., Neurocognitive Correlates of Liberalism and Conservatism, 10 
Nature Neuroscience 1246, 1246 (2007); see also, e.g., Serge Caparos et al., The Tree to 
the Left, the Forest to the Right: Political Attitude and Perceptual Bias, 134 Cognition 155, 
155 (2015) (finding, across a range of perceptual tasks, that conservatives have "a stronger 
bias towards global perception" and "that this stronger bias is linked to higher cognitive 
rigidity"). In any event, the Republican coalition's disparate existential narratives-from 
creeping socialism to rising debt to the loss of national identity-share a common 
emotional valence. They evoke a sense of willful subversion by liberals and a politics of 
fear. Cf. John R Hibbing et al., Differences in Negativity Bias Underlie Variations in 
Political Ideology, 37 Behav. & Brain Sci. 297, 303--04 (2014) (finding a correlation be-
tween conservatism and the tendency to put more weight on negative stimuli, including 
those that induce fear). 
245. Hofstadter, supra note 239. If these are the stakes in the eyes of the key voters, 
donors, or mediating institutions, then a rational reelection-seeking officeholder-regard-
less of her own views--ought to respond with both the reality and, if at all possible, the 
appearance of engaging in constitutional hardball. 
246. See generally, e.g.,James Hansen, Storms of My Grandchildren: The Truth About 
the Coming Climate Catastrophe and Our Last Chance to Save Humanity (2010); Naomi 
Klein, This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate (2014). 
247. Indeed, it is a common lament of environmental activists that the Democratic 
Party has failed to adopt an appropriately existential perspective on climate change. See, 
e.g., James Hansen, Isolation of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue: Part I, at 2 (2015), http:// 
www.columbia.edu/-jehl/mailings/2015/20151127 _Isolation.pdf [http:/ /perma.cc/7D8U-
Y59W] ("The scientific community agrees on a crucial fact: we must leave most remaining 
fossil fuels in the ground, or our children and future generations are screwed. Yet Obama 
is not proposing the action required for the essential change in energy policy direc-
tion .... "); id. (describing the Obama Administration's expressed optimism about climate 
policy as "unadulterated 100% pure bullshit"). 
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The presidency of Donald Trump, on the other hand, has both uni-
fied the coalition on the left (including some independents in the mid-
dle) and generated a raft of apocalyptic rhetoric among liberal elites.248 
This presents an interesting test case, albeit one that is in certain respects 
sui generis. The short-term question is whether President Trump will 
inspire liberals in the same way that President Obama inspired conser-
vatives-leading them to embrace a more existential view of politics and, 
on that basis, a correspondingly greater willingness, even eagerness, to 
engage in constitutional hardball in opposition to the President. This 
question quickly leads to several others. If President Trump does prove 
galvanizing in this way, will the partisan asymmetry in constitutional 
hardball that has been a defining feature of our politics for the past 
quarter century disappear or even reverse itself? Would such a change, if 
it occurs, prove more durable than the Trump presidency? And finally, 
would it be a good thing for the country? We conclude with some 
thoughts on these questions. 
CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL HARDBALL-
AND THE REPUBLIC 
The central organizing claim of this Essay is that the Republican 
Party has played constitutional hardball with greater intensity and 
efficacy than the Democratic Party over the past quarter century or so. As 
the Essay has tried to show throughout, it is simply impossible to 
understand contemporary constitutional politics in the United States 
without understanding this point. Our project has been primarily 
descriptive and explanatory: to illustrate what asymmetric constitutional 
hardball has meant in practice; to set this asymmetry in a larger 
historical, institutional, and intellectual context; and to examine a range 
of factors that have likely contributed to it. We expect that some right-
leaning readers may remain skeptical of the asymmetry thesis, while some 
left-leaning readers may feel we have enacted something analogous to 
the very Democratic tendencies we discuss, by being overly anxious to 
identify caveats and complications. Yet even if we cannot hope to garner 
agreement on all the particulars of our argument, we hope this Essay will 
spur sustained reflection from scholars of all stripes on the phenomenon 
of asymmetric constitutional hardball. 
Although our aims in this Essay have been primarily descriptive and 
explanatory, the analysis also has predictive implications for whether 
Republicans will continue to play more constitutional hardball than 
Democrats in the years ahead. The evidence from President Trump's first 
year in office has been mixed. Moreover, American politics is sufficiently 
248. See, e.g., Jessica Mendoza, In Age of Trump, Apocalyptic Rhetoric Becomes 
Mainstream, Christian Sci. Monitor (Feb. 22, 2017), http:/ /www.csmonitor.com/USA/ 
Politics/2017 /0222/In-age-of-Trump-apocalyptic-rhetoric-becomes-mainstream [http:// 
perma.cc/RJE9-NLB8]. 
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unsettled right now that its future course seems even harder than usual 
to predict. It is quite possible, as Balkin has argued, that we are nearing 
the end of the long Reagan regime in American political time and will 
soon begin a very different era.249 However, the factors identified in Part 
III are stubborn; despite our unsettled present, they show few signs of 
imminent change. Taken together, they give good cause to believe that 
the basic asymmetry explored in this Essay will persist through and 
beyond the Trump Administration. These factors illuminate precon-
ditions that may need to be met for Democrats to eliminate the consti-
tutional hardball gap. At this writing, they have not been met. 
Briefly consider a few of them. The financial engine that drives a 
number of the central institutional players on the right, such as the Koch 
brothers' network and the Heritage Foundation, continues to hum. The 
prospects for an equal and opposite counterweight on the left-a dra-
matic revival of the power of unions, say, or a decision by wealthy liberals 
to begin investing in political advocacy on a Koch-network-like scale-
appear unlikely at this juncture.250 In the media, the story is more 
equivocal. There has been a recent uptick in viewers for programs such 
as The Rachel Maddow Show that are unabashedly partisan on the left,251 
and some have suggested that mainstream outlets might respond with a 
sharper-edged, more liberal brand of news.252 Even still, the conservative 
media bubble is likely to remain more insular than the liberal one for the 
foreseeable future, given the way each side's news organizations and 
think tanks have been shaped by their development in political time.253 
Barring a major rearrangement in Democratic funding patterns or media 
249. See Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Rot, in Can It Happen Here? Authoritarianism 
in America 19, 32-35 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2018); Balkin, Last Days of Disco, supra note 
109, at 1169-77. 
250. Although this could change, the most significant anti-Trump groups that have 
emerged since his election have strived "'to maintain [their] independence both from the 
funders and from the [Democratic] party."' Kenneth P. Vogel, The 'Resistance,' Raising 
Big Money, Upends Liberal Politics, N.Y. Times (Oct. 7, 2017), http:/ /www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/10/07 /us/politics/ democrats-resistance-fundraising.html ( on file with the Columbia 
Law Review) (quoting an official from Indivisible). Tom Steyer's multimillion-dollar 
campaign to impeach President Trump may reflect a new boldness on his part, cf. supra 
note 130 and accompanying text, but it has been even more disconnected from Democratic 
Party politics. See Mark Z. Barabak, Tom Steyer Has Gathered More than 3 Million 
Signatures to Impeach President Trump. So Why Are Democrats So Annoyed?, LA. Times 
(Nov. 30, 2017), http:/ /www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-on-politics-column-20171130-
story.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (quoting numerous Democratic Party 
leaders who have criticized Steyer's campaign as a distraction with "precisely zero chance 
of success"). 
251. See supra note 168. 
252. See, e.g., Jonathan Mahler, CNN Had a Problem. Donald Trump Solved It., N.Y. 
Times Mag. (Apr. 4, 2017), http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2017 /04/04/magazine/cnn-had-a-
problem-donald-trump-solved-it.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing that 
conflict with Trump pushed CNN into a posture that was "no longer neutral program-
ming" from the perspective of viewers). 
253. See supra section III.A.3. 
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consumption habits, it is hard to see what could generate and sustain a 
wave of primary challenges from the left to rival the Tea Party wave of 
challenges to Republican incumbents from the right. 
Moreover, the two party coalitions seem set to retain their 
underlying attitudes about government. There will be no near-term 
reversal in the identity of the party that feels more keenly the danger of a 
prolonged government shutdown, a debt ceiling standoff, or the destruc-
tion of small-c constitutional norms that facilitate negotiation and 
legislation. Contemporary Democrats and liberals believe, centrally, in 
the promise and usefulness of government; outside of certain domains 
such as the military, contemporary Republicans and conservatives do 
not.254 President Trump's victory might have been thought to presage a 
radical realignment in this regard: the possible emergence of a populist 
conservatism that favors the welfare state and direct public spending on 
domestic infrastructure. Soon after his inauguration, however, it became 
clear that this (always remote) possibility was not occurring.255 Democrats 
are likely to continue to see greater risk than Republicans in the nu-
merous types of constitutional hardball that threaten to disable the 
machinery of government. 
Perhaps even more importantly, the two party coalitions seem set to 
retain their views of the constitutional order. Notwithstanding the emer-
gence of liberal versions of originalism within the legal academy, 
Democrats today largely continue to defend a doctrinal regime built up 
in accretive steps through Reconstruction, the New Deal, and the Warren 
Court era,256 while conservatives largely continue to advocate fundamen-
tal revisions to the prevailing constitutional order. Conservatives may dis-
agree internally about exactly which form of constitutional "restor-
ationism" is preferable, but for our purposes these disagreements are 
unimportant. Any of the available options, or any combination of them, 
will do the work of justifying constitutional hardball. 
As noted above, President Trump certainly seems to have moved the 
needle on liberals' receptiveness to what we have called existential 
politics.257 But some caution is in order. The existential alarm about 
Trump has fixated on him and his Administration, not on the 
254. See supra section III.B. l. 
255. See Matt Grossmann & David A. Hopkins, Trump Isn't Changing the Republican 
Party. The Republican Party Is Changing Trump., Wash. Post: Monkey Cage (Aug. 2, 
2017), http://wapo.st/2vnFFNn [http://perma.cc/9ZGD-523M]; John Wagner & Juliet 
Eilperin, Once a Populist, Trump Governs Like a Conservative Republican, Wash. Post 
(Dec. 6, 2017), http:/ /wapo.st/2BCTrdR [http:/ /perma.cc/XVW4-SVXP]. · 
256. For a prominent recent statement of this position, see Confirmation Hearing on 
the Nomination of Neil M. Gorsuch to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. 4 (2017) 
(statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein) ("This is personal, but I find this 'originalist' judicial 
philosophy to be really troubling .... I firmly believe the American Constitution is a living 
document intended to evolve as our country evolves."). 
257. See supra note 248 and accompanying text. 
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Republican Party. It lacks the Manichean quality of the existential alarm 
that has been directed at Democrats and is therefore less apt to prove 
durable. Far from appearing the leader of a well-oiled national machine, 
President Trump appears to liberals (as well as to some members of his 
own party) a frightening and solitary sower of chaos. The resulting sense 
of crisis seems unlikely to survive without Trump in the Oval Office. 
For all these reasons, we anticipate that the deep forces that drive 
asymmetric constitutional hardball will outlast the Trump Administration. 
They are too closely linked to the main disagreements that define the 
current party coalitions. Some liberal voices will continue to call on 
Democratic officeholders to "fight like Republicans" and play more 
constitutional hardball.258 And in the short run, with Trump as President, 
they may occasionally get their wish. But in the medium and long run, 
any such hopes for equalizing the practice of constitutional hardball will 
be realized only if far-reaching institutional or ideological shifts have first 
altered the landscape this Essay has described. It is always possible that 
unanticipated new developments will reconfigure American constitu-
tional politics. Our point is that these developments would have to be 
quite fundamental to remake the dynamics of constitutional hardball. 
Finally, even if they were able to ramp up the practice of con-
stitutional hardball in the medium and long run, it is not obvious to us 
that it would be wise for Democrats to do so. There are two basic game-
theoretic models for the interaction between the parties' approaches to 
constitutional hardball. According to one model, Republicans continue 
to deviate from cooperative strategies in part because Democrats-at least 
since the advent of Clintonian triangulation259-have failed to respond 
proportionately. More forceful "punishments" might have imposed 
political costs sufficient to compel Republicans to let up. This first model 
258. Lithwick & Cohen, supra note 96; see also, e.g., David Faris, Opinion, Obstruct 
and Delay Trump: Opposing View, USA Today (Jan. 4, 2017), http:/ /www.usatoday.com/ 
story/ opinion/2017 /01 /04/ congress-donald-trump-president-obama-editorials-debates/ 
96166892 [http:/ /perma.cc/GB3M-ZAST] ("Democrats must. . . adopt the GOP's 
scorched-earth philosophy."); Jonathan Martin & Alexander Bums, Democratic Leaders 
Try to Slow Calls to Impeach Trump, N.Y. Times (May 18, 2017), http:/ /www.nytimes.com/ 
2017 /05/18/us/politics/ democrats-trump-impeachment.html ( on file with the Columhia 
Law Review) (describing the efforts of Democratic leaders in Congress to tamp down calls 
by "liberal activists" for President Trump's impeachment); cf. Michael Tomasky, The 
Resistance So Far, N.Y. Rev. Books (Nov. 9, 2017), http:/ /www.nybooks.com/ articles/ 
2017 /11/09/the-resistance-so-far [http:/ /perma.cc/6MAM-SCRM] ("The Democrats are 
showing more resolve partly because of the extreme nature of this presidency, but mostly 
because their base is getting a bit-a bit-more like the Republican base."). 
259. See Mark Tushnet, The Supreme Court, 1998 Term-Foreword: The New 
Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 
29, 39 n.37 (1999) (discussing President Clinton's "political strategy of triangulation, in 
which he distanced himself both from what he characterized as the rigid and excessive 
conservatism of the Republicans who controlled Congress, and from what he char-
acterized as the old-fashioned New Deal/Great Society liberalism of many Democrats in 
Congress"). 
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suggests that greater Democratic constitutional hardball would ultimately 
lead to an equilibrium with less Republican constitutional hardball. 
Prominent liberal law professors have urged greater Democratic consti-
tutional hardball based implicitly on this model.260 
The second model, however, is one of tit-for-tat escalation with no 
obvious endpoint. According to this model, greater use of constitutional 
hardball by Democrats now would, if anything, tend to increase even 
further the use of constitutional hardball by Republicans, as members of 
both parties successively shred cooperative norms, shrink the space for 
bipartisan policy solutions, and make governance more difficult-all 
without paying a significant political price because of current levels of 
partisan polarization. The general observed pattern of mutual escalation 
of constitutional hardball over the past generation lends some support to 
the second model over the first, even though this escalation has so far 
been asymmetric. 261 
Ramping up constitutional hardball, then, is a dangerous game to 
play over any extended period of time. It might bring the other side to 
the bargaining table. But especially if it does not produce immediate 
payoffs, it might also undermine the constitutional system and leave 
everyone worse off. 262 
For liberals who are troubled by this Essay's asymmetry thesis and yet 
also worry that sustained Democratic hardball is as likely to lead to 
260. See Fontana, supra note 47, at 307 ("This Essay argues that the tactical roots 
of ... failures to do more on judicial nominations during the Obama Administration re-
side in a common tactical error made by political leaders in the Democratic Party: exces-
sive cooperation with political forces that do not manifest the same behavioral patterns of 
cooperation."); Jack M. Balkin, Declaring a Payroll Tax Holiday, Balkinization (Dec. 3, 
2010), http:/ /balkin.blogspot.com/2010/12/declaring-payroll-tax-holiday.html [http:// 
perma.cc/VK5G-N58Y] (" [W] hen your opponents engage in constitutional hardball ... 
the correct response is not to wring your hands and urge them to play fair .... Rather, the 
correct response ... is to engage in constitutional hardball of your own, in order to make 
the other side come to the bargaining table .... "). 
261. Game theory itself cannot answer which model is more plausible. A set of well-
known results in game theory, often referred to as folk theorems, suggests that virtually 
any set of strategies that Pareto-dominate the one-shot uncooperative outcome (constitu-
tional hardball by both sides) may constitute a repeat-play equilibrium, so long as the 
players are sufficiently patient. See Peter T. Leeson, The Laws of Lawlessness, 38 J. Legal 
Stud. 471, 480 (2009) ("The folk theorem suggests that when play is infinitely repeated 
and players are sufficiently patient, the shadow of the future can support the cooperative 
equilibrium .... Of course, as the folk theorem also suggests, other equilibria, including 
violent equilibria, are also possible when play is infinitely repeated."). 
262. In a book that came out while this Essay was in production, Professors Steven 
Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt draw on experiences abroad to argue that "the idea that 
Democrats should 'fight like Republicans' is misguided," as it is liable to "play[] directly 
into the hands of authoritarians" and leave American politics "dangerously unmoored." 
Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die 215-17 (2018); see also 
Whittington, supra note 48 (asserting that the "constitutional system functions best if the 
formal rules are supplemented by a robust set of norms and practices that deter govern-
ment officials from using all the political weapons at their disposal"). 
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mutual escalation as to de-escalation or Democratic electoral gains,263 
there are at least two other possible responses to the present asymmetry. 
First, liberals could try to work toward the sort of fundamental 
realignment of the political system-either a fracturing of the 
Republican coalition264 or a wholesale reorientation of the Democratic 
one-that might alter the underlying drivers of constitutional hardball.265 
It goes without saying that any such effort would face immense chal-
lenges. We do not purport to know how best to tackle these challenges, 
although we hope this Essay has helped to clarify some of them. 
A second possible response is not to play constitutional hardball 
whenever the opportunity arises, but instead to use temporary points of 
leverage to press for procedural changes that amount to anti-hardball. For 
instance, independent redistricting commissions, professionalized non-
partisan election bureaucracies, and the like, while far from optimal in 
terms of maximizing political advantage, have the effect of taking certain 
types of constitutional hardball off the table (and also, in the case of the 
redistricting commissions, of altering the constituencies of Republican 
and Democratic representatives alike so that elected officials would have 
somewhat less to fear from ideological primary challengers and thus 
from being seen as moderate, an effect that would likely be more trans-
formative on the Republican side). Unfortunately and paradoxically, the 
"voting wars" have reached such a high temperature that even effec-
tuating these temperature-lowering, anti-hardball solutions might in 
some cases require constitutional hardball. 
Our analysis raises a different set of strategic questions for con-
servatives. The Republican coalition, this Essay has suggested, has 
increasingly been built around a set of narratives, beliefs, and institu-
tional structures that justify and demand constitutional hardball. Indeed, 
this orientation toward constitutional hardball seems to be doing impor-
tant work to unify a Republican coalition of considerable internal 
263. For an eloquent statement of this anxiety from a leading liberal constitutional law 
scholar, see Richard Primus, Rulebooks, Playgrounds, and Endgames: A Constitutional 
Analysis of the Calabresi-Hirji Judgeship Proposal, Harv. L. Rev. Blog (Nov. 24, 2017), 
http:/ /blog.harvardlawreview.org/rulebooks-playgrounds-and-endgames-a-constitutional-
analysis-of-the-calabresi-hirji-judgeship-proposal [http:/ /perma.cc/S3QQAPK4] ("One of 
the nice things about living in post-Reconstruction America has been that conflict between 
the major political parties has not escalated all the way to the point of ultimate crisis. I'd 
like us to keep that going."). 
264. Cf. Levitsky & Ziblatt, supra note 262, at 223 (suggesting that restoring norms of 
mutual tolerance and forbearance "requires that the Republican Party be reformed, if not 
refounded outright"). 
265. Certain revisions to the Constitution itself might also alter the underlying drivers 
of constitutional hardball-for instance, revisions designed to break up the two-party 
duopoly or to reduce the number of vetogates in the legislative process. We bracket this 
possibility because Article V amendments of this sort are such an unlikely route to 
effecting change in our polarized political system. But the broader question of how the 
structure of the hard-wired Constitution bears on the practice of constitutional hardball, 
and on the prospects for asymmetric constitutional hardball, deserves further study. 
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complexity. That is a major benefit, but there are also costs. Constitu-
tional hardball has internal as well as external feedback effects. Engaging 
in hardball normalizes hardball; arguments offered in its defense put a 
premium on ideological purity and make it tougher to compromise at a 
later date. The more your side plays hardball, the less it even feels like 
you are playing hardball. 
The appeal of flouting Washington norms is now very strong among 
Republican voters, and it takes no great public-opinion expertise to see 
that this appeal was central to the electoral success of President 
Trump.266 The long-term problem is that organizing a coalition (in part) 
around constitutional hardball puts continual pressure on the con-
ventions at the foundations of governance. If the ultimate goal is to build 
a broad and effective legislative majority, it is not at all clear that the 
Republican Party's optimal strategy is to engage in continued escalation 
of the most polarizing forms of constitutional politics. And yet, for the 
reasons this Essay has discussed, it will often be risky for Republican 
officeholders to resist the incentives our system currently provides to 
engage in constitutional hardball. 
Our conclusion is thus depressing for all sides-but asymmetrically 
so. Liberals have the strongest cause for despair. As long as the two major 
party coalitions and their institutional infrastructures look roughly as 
they do now, calls for Democratic officeholders to engage in persistent, 
Republican-style constitutional hardball are unlikely to succeed, while 
strategies that aim to reduce the overall amount of hardball face daunt-
ing odds. Conservatives, however, have reason to worry as well. It is 
possible for a political coalition to become too devoted to hardball cul-
ture for its own good, let alone the good of the republic. Constitutional 
hardball may have helped Republicans win a number of partisan 
skirmishes in recent decades, but it has also fueled demand for a mode 
of governance that makes governance itself more difficult. Breaking out 
of this vicious cycle will be one of the great challenges for American con-
stitutionalism in the twenty-first century. 
266. In office, President Trump has continued the pattern. See Emily Bazelon, How 
Do We Contend with Trump's Defiance of 'Norms'?, N.Y. Times Mag. Quly 11, 2017), 
http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2017 /07 /11/magazine/how-do-we-contend-with-trumps-<lefiance-
of-norms.html (on file with the Columhia Law Review) ("Trump's flouting of norms was the 
siren song of his candidacy, and it has become a defining feature of his presidency."). 
Perhaps the most unifying action he has taken to date-the action that most appeals to the 
disparate strands of the Republican coalition-is the move with which we began this Essay: 
pushing through ideologically conservative judicial nominees, in particular Justice 
Gorsuch, under the banner of constitutional restorationism. 
